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Part 1 
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State: Theoretical and Empirical Approaches  
 
2 
 
   
Chapter 1  
Globalization and the Welfare State: Existing Theoretical Approaches 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Economic globalization is commonly referred to as “the increasing 
internationalization of the production, distribution, and marketing of goods and 
services” (Harris, 1993, p. 755). Economic globalization in this sense is characterized 
by the integration of financial and labor markets via trade, foreign investment and 
capital transfers (Shariff, 2003). Increasing exposure to global integration has resulted 
in economic dislocations for many countries throughout the world. Much of this 
dislocation has come in the form of job losses, poverty, income decrease and 
increasing income inequality even among advanced industrial countries (Lawrence, 
1996).  
Globalization’s negative externalities for the welfare state and questions 
regarding what the appropriate policy responses should be have sparked passionate 
debate among policy makers and have grabbed the attention of academic researchers. 
However, much of the existing academic scholarship is hobbled by theoretical and 
empirical limitations that conceal more than they reveal about how global economic 
forces are shaping social policies. The motivation of this research is to elucidate the 
conditions under which the effects of globalization on social policy are shaped by the 
nature of countries’ domestic political institutions and economic structures.  
The question that guides this study is: what explains states’ social 
expenditures when national economies are increasingly integrated into the global 
economy? In answering this question, a dominant theoretical approach in the extant 
literature, often referred to as the Efficiency Theory of the welfare state, advances the 
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proposition that globalization produces a ‘race to the bottom’ effect on social 
spending. As global market forces dictate national economic decision-making, 
considerations of greater economic efficiency will lead policy makers to sacrifice the 
welfare state in order to compete with other states by attracting mobile transnational 
capital. As national economies become increasingly integrated into the global 
economy, transnational capital will flow to those countries that provide the lowest 
levels of social protections for their citizens (Adsera and Boix, 2002, Avelinon et al., 
2005, Cameron, 1978, Garrett, 2001, Garrett, 1998, Hicks and Swank, 1992, Huber, 
1999, Iversen and Cusack, 2000b, Katzenstein, 1985, Pierson, 2001, Rodrik, 1998, 
Rudra, 2002, Rudra, 2008, Rudra and Haggard, 2001, Swank, 2002).  
While the efficiency theory has in some respects become the intellectual 
expression of anti-globalization populists on the right and the left (Bhagwati, 2004, 
pp.21-25), the theory is limited by its inability to clearly identify the primary causal 
mechanisms through which economic globalization produces the ‘race to the bottom’ 
effect on welfare expenditures.  
Notwithstanding the limitations of the efficiency theory, other scholars posit 
what they claim to be an alternative theory – the Compensation theory of the welfare 
state, which advances the proposition that global economic integration may in fact 
produce an expansionary effect on social spending. It is argued that governments will 
expand welfare spending to compensate the losers of economic globalization for the 
purpose of maintaining their political legitimacy (Miller, 1986, O'Connor, 1971). 
However, as it is currently configured, the compensation theory is nothing more than 
a statement that global economic integration is correlated with an increase in 
governments’ welfare expenditures. As a result, it is not considered a theory in this 
analysis but its insights along with those drawn from the efficiency theory are used to 
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develop an integrated theory of globalization’s effects on the welfare state.  
In addition to the literature’s theoretical limitations, the empirical research of 
the existing literature has produced evidence that cannot be generalized across a large 
sample of countries. Some studies have largely analyzed the relationship between 
economic globalization and welfare spending among OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) countries (Cameron, 1978, Garrett, 1998, 
Hicks and Swank, 1992, Iversen and Cusack, 2000b), while others have based their 
analyses on developing countries (Avelinon, et al., 2005, Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo, 2001, Rudra, 2002, Rudra, 2008). Studies whose samples rely on OECD 
countries suggest that increasing levels of global economic integration increase 
government welfare expenditures, consistent with the compensation thesis. 
Meanwhile, studies with samples taken from countries in the developing world 
suggest that increasing levels of economic globalization significantly reduce 
government welfare spending as predicted by efficiency theories (Rudra, 2008). 
Given these limitations this study contributes to the existing literature in the 
following ways. First, it draws upon efficiency and compensation approaches and 
develops an integrated theoretical framework that explains globalization’s effects on 
social spending. Second, the study’s theory is systemically tested within the context of 
a large-N cross-national pooled time-series analysis of 122 countries during the years 
1970-2002. To reinforce the statistical analysis, the study also tests the theory via 
comparative case study analyses of South Korea, Chile and Spain. The methodology 
that motivated the selection of these countries is discussed in chapter 3. Third, relative 
to existing studies, a comprehensive measure of economic globalization is utilized 
that adequately captures the theoretical definition of the concept. Fourth, using 
principal component analysis, an aggregate indicator that measures the institutional 
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factors of countries’ domestic politics is constructed. Economic globalization interacts 
with these domestic political factors to empirically predict governments’ social 
spending.   
This manuscript is organized in three parts. Part I is comprised of chapters 1, 
2 and 3. Chapter 1 reviews the existing literature that features efficiency and 
compensation approaches to the welfare state. After discussing the theoretical 
limitations of the existing literature an alternative theoretical framework is advanced 
that draws upon and integrates efficiency and compensation approaches to explain 
social policies under conditions of global economic integration. Chapter 2 presents a 
full discussion of the various components of the study’s theoretical argument and 
affixes hypotheses at the end of each discussion. Chapter 3 presents the study’s 
research design. The outcome variable – welfare spending – and the various 
explanatory variables are discussed and operationalized. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the estimation procedures, which feature various time-series regressions 
that are used to analyze the cross-national data as well as a discussion of the 
methodology that informed the selection of countries used in the case study analysis.  
Part II is comprised of chapter 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 presents the empirical 
finding of the interactive effect of economic globalization and national capitalist firms 
on states’ social spending. Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings of the interactive 
effects of economic globalization and domestic political institutions on states’ welfare 
spending. A number of interactions are examined. The first analyzes the interaction 
between economic globalization and an index of domestic political institutions on 
welfare spending. And the analyses that follow examine the interaction between 
economic globalization and the disaggregated components of political institutions on 
welfare spending; namely, the interaction between economic globalization and regime 
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type; the interaction between economic globalization and voter’s participation; and 
the interaction between economic globalization and electoral competition. Chapter 6 
shifts the analysis to a discussion of the empirical findings that feature the interactive 
effects of economic globalization and domestic political affiliation on states’ welfare 
spending. These include the interaction between economic globalization and labor 
unions and the interaction between economic globalization and the ideology of ruling 
political parties. 
Part III is comprised of Chapters 7, 8, and 9, which presents the case studies 
of South Korea, Chile and Spain. The case studies illustrate that the effects of global 
economic integration on welfare policy in emerging economies with authoritarian 
political histories are conditioned by the variation in the political institutions found in 
each country. Chapter 10 concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and policy 
implications that emerge from the research.  
 
1.2. The Efficiency Theory of Welfare Spending 
The fundamental proposition of the efficiency theory is that high levels of 
government social spending undermine economic efficiency and the competitiveness 
of domestic firms in international markets (Avelinon, et al., 2005, Garrett, 2001, 
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001). It is argued that since social spending is largely 
funded from corporate taxes, any increase in social expenditures will be accompanied 
by an equivalent increase in the level of taxes (Song and Hong, 2005). Increased taxes 
undermine investor confidence and the competitiveness of domestic companies in 
both domestic and international markets (Garrett, 2001). Increased social spending 
can also result in increased government debt as the state increases its borrowing to 
finance its welfare policies. Consequently, increased government borrowing results in 
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higher interest rates and the devaluation of the currency, both of which increase 
production costs and discourage companies from making new investments (Garrett, 
2001).  
High levels of taxes brought about by increases in government welfare 
policies will ultimately facilitate capital flight, as transnational corporations will begin 
re-locating their investments to countries that have lower taxes and limited social 
protections, hence producing a ‘race to the bottom’ effect on the welfare state (Barnet 
and Cavanagh, 1994, Barnet and Muller, 1974, Brecher and Costello, 1994). Since 
economic globalization increases the mobility of transnational capital, it is this threat 
that forces governments to significantly reduce social expenditures in order to restore 
investor confidence. In sum, the efficiency theoretical model posits that economic 
globalization and the level of international competition that emerges from it constrain 
and limit government welfare spending in order to attract and retain mobile capital. 
 Recent empirical research seems to confirm the logic of the efficiency theory 
of welfare spending. One study assessed the impact of economic globalization on the 
growth of government spending in OECD countries and showed that trade and 
international financial openness had a negative effect on government spending 
(Garrett, 2001). Consistent with this finding, recent research using a sample of Latin 
American countries examined the relationship between economic globalization and 
welfare spending and found that trade openness had a consistently negative effect on 
aggregate social spending and social security transfers (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 
2001).  
Razin and Sadka (2005) explain the decline of the welfare state in terms of 
the changing demographic patterns and the global integration of national economies. 
Under conditions of global economic integration and the growth of an aging 
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population, governments are caught between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, 
increasing taxes on capital runs the risk of driving away mobile transnational capital. 
On the other hand, increasing taxes on a young but increasingly small labor force is 
both economically and politically unsustainable. Since young people represent an 
important element of the median voter, they are likely to effectively resist the 
government’s attempt to increase welfare spending. Given this dilemma, government 
welfare spending is likely to decline (Razin and Sadka, 2005). To the extent that 
economic globalization exerts a downward ‘race to the bottom’ effect on social 
spending, the above discussion serves as this study’s theoretical baseline and 
generates the following hypotheses: 
 
HE: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with a decrease in 
welfare spending.  
 
1.3. The Compensation Approach 
While recognizing the budgetary constraints of the state under conditions of 
increased global economic integration, compensation approaches to welfare spending 
emphasize the social demands for welfare allocation and the political incentives of 
policy makers to respond to such demands. The welfare system, according to this 
approach, is a necessary mechanism for offsetting the costs of global economic 
integration (Cameron, 1978, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001, Quinn, 1997). 
Scholars in this tradition argue that efficiency theories overlook the political incentive 
to increase public programs in response to international economic integration (Garrett, 
2001). Since policy makers in democracies are primarily motivated by re-election, 
they are more likely to increase welfare spending to offset negative economic 
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externalities, such as job losses and increased income inequality that emerge from the 
competitive nature of the global economy. Hence, knowing that those who are 
displaced will blame political incumbents for the negative externalities of economic 
globalization, policy makers are more likely to increase welfare spending to pacify 
displaced workers. In addition, policy makers will also provide welfare benefits to 
insure that the negative externalities of global economic integration do not disrupt 
national financial markets (Avelinon, et al., 2005).  
David Cameron’s (1978) seminal research provides the first empirical and 
historical analysis of the growth of the welfare state among Northern European 
countries. The research was the first quantitative analysis of welfare policy that 
showed that openness to trade was strongly correlated with what he referred to as the 
“scope of the public economy,” which was measured in terms of the change in total 
taxes as a percentage of GDP. The research showed that openness to trade was the 
best predictor of the growth of government revenues. Large nations that were 
economically less open experienced moderate increases in the scope of the public 
economy compared to smaller nations with more open economies. While the scope of 
the public economy among small Western European countries varied with the 
dominance of left parties in Scandinavian countries or the dominance of centrist or 
conservative parties in countries like Belgium and Ireland, the best explanation for the 
expansion of government expenditures is the degree to which national economies had 
been integrated into the global economy (Cameron, 1978).  
In his classic, Small States in World Markets, Peter Katzenstein’s (1985) 
analysis is consistent with the compensation approach to welfare policy. By 
employing a comparative case study analysis of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Belgium, Katzenstein demonstrates that global economic integration 
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is causally related to welfare expenditures as well as to the various state interventions 
that are designed to increase economic growth and productivity. According to 
Katzenstein, what distinguishes the small states of Western Europe from larger nations 
is the ways in which they have combined liberal policies that are designed to leverage 
greater global economic integration with a policy of domestic compensation through 
which the country’s national economy is protected from the negative consequences of 
liberal openness (Katzenstein, 1985).  
In pursuing an effective industrial policy, the mix of international liberalism 
and domestic compensation varies widely among small Western European states. 
Moreover, the development of an industrial policy is not dependent on size but what 
Katzenstein refers to as democratic corporatism, which is the way in which 
conflicting economic interests are mediated domestically. Democratic corporatism is 
characterized by an “ideology of social partnership expressed at the national level; a 
relatively centralized and concentrated system of interest groups; and voluntary and 
informal co-ordination of conflicting objectives through continuous political 
bargaining between interest groups, state bureaucracies, and political parties” 
(Katzenstein, 1985, 32). It is, therefore, the democratic corporatist nature of small 
European states that makes it possible to develop an industrial policy that is based on 
effectively integrating national economies into the global economy, while at the same 
time developing a robust system of domestic compensation (Katzenstein, 1985).  
In building on the work of Cameron (1978) and Katzenstein (1985), Rodrik 
(1998) developed a cross-national study of the relationship between economic 
globalization and the size of government. This study was motivated by a simple 
question: is the relationship between trade and government spending negative as 
efficiency theory predicts or is the relationship positive as predicted by the 
 
11 
 
   
compensation approach? The research shows a positive correlation between countries’ 
exposure to international trade and the size of government. These results are robust to 
most measures of government spending and the inclusion of a wide range of control 
indicators as well as various sample selections. According to Rodrik, government 
spending reduces societal-risk for countries whose economies are increasingly 
vulnerable to global economic integration, and the relationship between trade 
openness and the size of government is strongest when the terms-of-trade risk is the 
highest (Rodrik, 1998).  
Other scholars within this research tradition consider the effects of other 
aspects of economic globalization on government welfare spending. Quinn’s (1997) 
cross-national study of 38 nations estimated the effects of capital mobility on 
government spending and found that greater capital mobility is associated with higher 
levels of spending. Other research on the effect of capital mobility on welfare 
spending has shown that the integration of capital markets has been associated with 
increases in welfare spending as well as higher corporate taxes (Swank, 1998). A 
recent empirical treatment of Latin American countries provided additional support 
for the compensation thesis. Using a measure of financial openness as well as 
measures of trade openness, Avelinon, Brown and Hunter’s research suggests that 
trade openness has a positive relationship with education and social expenditures, and 
financial openness does not reduce government expenditures for social programs as 
predicted by the efficiency theory (Avelinon, et al., 2005). 
 
1.4. Theoretical Limitations of the Existing Literature 
A significant limitation of efficiency theory’s ‘race to the bottom’ approach to 
social policy is that the central mechanism through which economic globalization is 
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said to have a reductive effect on welfare spending is not clearly specified. Different 
authors in this tradition identify different causal mechanisms. Some identify global 
corporations as the central mechanism through which economic globalization 
produces a ‘race to the bottom’ effect on welfare spending. These scholars argue that 
since economic globalization increases the mobility of transnational capital, it is the 
threat of corporate divestment and re-location to other countries that forces 
governments to slash welfare expenditures in order to reduce costs and restore 
investor confidence (Barnet and Cavanagh, 1994, Barnet and Muller, 1974). Others 
point to states as the central mechanism and argue that governments regardless of 
their ideological orientation are increasingly willing to sacrifice the interests and 
rights of workers and the poor in order to promote an investor friendly environment 
(Holman, 1993). And still others point to the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as the central mechanism 
and argue that the conditionalities associated with SAPs force governments to 
retrench welfare expenditures in order to improve economic efficiency by reducing 
public sector and balance of payments deficits (Bartilow, 1997).  
The various mechanisms that scholars identify either directly or indirectly 
involve the role of corporate capital. As a result, the theoretical discussion in the next 
chapter draws upon Marxist theories of the welfare state to construct the conditions 
under which the integration of national capitalist firms into the global production 
process establishes the causal mechanism through which globalization exerts a 
downward pressure on states’ welfare policies.  
A significant limitation of the compensation thesis is that it is based on the 
assumption that the welfare state is a necessary mechanism for offsetting the negative 
externalities of economic globalization (Cameron, 1978, Kaufman and Segura-
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Ubiergo, 2001, Quinn, 1997). In fact, the Keynesian welfare state is not a creature of 
global capitalism but was created to stabilize the economic contradictions of 
capitalism in its national form. In many respects the Keynesian welfare state, as 
discussed in chapter 2, is naturally incongruent with the logic of global capitalism 
(Teeple, 1995). Therefore, if it is observed that the welfare state offsets globalization’s 
negative externalities, then this outcome is not natural to the operations of the 
Keynesian welfare state (Miliband, 1969); but is a function of the ways in which 
endogenous political institutions, which are absent from the compensation perspective, 
averts globalization’s natural tendencies to retrench the welfare state. 
The compensation thesis, as it is currently configured, is less theory and 
more an observation that the global integration of national economies is correlated 
with an increase in governments’ welfare expenditures. The conditions under which 
this correlation takes place are never specified. As a result, the compensation thesis is 
not considered a theory because it fails to specify the necessary endogenous political 
factors that offset globalization’s negative externalities.  
On this note, empirical studies in the existing literature have largely overlooked 
the importance of how economic globalization’s effect on states’ welfare spending is 
conditional on the nature of domestic political institutions. It is only in the past few 
years where a handful of scholars have attempted to address this deficit. In their 
research, Boix (1998) and Garrette (1998) demonstrate that the impact of global 
economic integration on governments’ welfare expenditures is conditional on the 
nature of partisan politics. Domestic political variables also feature prominently in the 
research of Asera and Boix (2002). They argue that the relationship between the 
openness of national economies and the size of the public sector’s welfare spending is 
heavily conditional on the nature of the political regime. They contend that 
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governments strategically provide welfare compensation to build domestic political 
coalitions that support free trade, and democratic governments relative to 
authoritarian regimes are more likely to use welfare spending to compensate the losers 
of economic globalization.  
While recent studies have attempted to bring greater theoretical precision by 
identifying the mechanisms through which globalization operates in determining 
social policies, the mechanisms that are tested in such studies are limited to partisan 
politics and political regimes. These studies do not provide a comprehensive analysis 
of how the interactions of economic globalization and other domestic political 
variables affect states’ welfare spending.  
This study argues that government welfare spending is a function of the ways in 
which the pressures of economic globalization is conditioned by domestic politics. 
Domestic politics consists of political affiliation and political institutional factors that 
refer respectively to the willingness and capacity of political systems to initiate 
changes in public policy (Glatzer and Rueshemeyer, 2005). Political institutional 
factors, which include the characteristics of political regimes and the levels of 
electoral competition and political participation, determine the political environment 
that shapes the incentives and preferences of government officials who make welfare 
policy. Political affiliation factors, which include organized labor and political parties, 
determine how government resources - specifically welfare expenditures - are 
distributed. This study, therefore, builds on the existing literature by examining the 
ways in which economic globalization’s effect on welfare policy is conditional on the 
domestic political environment that shapes welfare policy and the political affiliations 
of domestic political actors who distribute social benefits.  
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1.5. Towards an Integrated Theory of the Welfare State  
The theoretical limitations of the extant literature present an opportunity to 
construct a robust theoretical framework that integrates efficiency and compensation 
approaches to the welfare state. While the existing literature treats these approaches as 
competing or mutually exclusive ‘theories’ of the welfare state, they are considered 
here to be mutually inclusive processes in the development of social policy. 
Government welfare policy emerges from the tension of globalization’s proclivity to 
retrench social spending and the proclivity of domestic political actors and institutions 
to compensate. In essence, the construction of social policy, under conditions of 
global economic integration, is a function of the dialectical pressures for greater 
economic efficiency and domestic political preferences for greater compensation. 
It is postulated that in a world absent of domestic political institutions and 
where transnational corporations completely dominate countries’ political economy, 
by default, economic globalization will exert a downward pressure on social spending. 
However, in the presence of domestic politics, globalization’s natural proclivity for 
welfare retrenchment will be averted since its effect on social spending is conditional 
on the nature of political institutions and the political preferences of labor unions and 
political parties that set a floor against further retrenchment. The dialectical tension 
between globalization’s tendency to retrench the welfare state and the tendency of 
domestic political institutions to resist retrenchment is fully developed and 
empirically tested in the chapters that follow.  
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Chapter 2 
Globalization’s Effect on the Welfare State: Economic Efficiency by 
Default but Compensation by Design 
 
In the previous chapter it was argued that, by default, economic globalization 
exerts a downward pressure on welfare expenditures through the operations of 
transnational corporations. However, since globalization’s effect on social policy is 
conditional on the nature of endogenous political forces, its proclivity to retrench 
welfare expenditures is averted by the preferences of domestic institutions and 
political actors to compensate. In developing this integrated theoretical explanation of 
welfare policy, this chapter asks the following questions: under what structural 
conditions of corporate capitalism will economic globalization produce a ‘race to the 
bottom’ effect on states’ social spending? And under what domestic political 
conditions will institutions and political actors avert globalization’s ‘race to the 
bottom’ effect on social spending? In answering these questions, the discussion that 
follows draws upon Marxist and political democratic theories of the welfare state.  
 
Transnational Corporations and the Race to the Bottom 
2.1. Marxist theory of the Welfare State 
Marxist scholars have consistently argued that the dynamics of the modern 
welfare state cannot be understood apart from the historical development of 
capitalism. For Marxists, the productive relations of national capitalism depended on 
the welfare state. State intervention was endemic to the birth of capitalism, guided its 
early development and has been crucial to the history of capital accumulation, even in 
the U.S., a country that prides itself as exceptionally and fiercely committed to rugged 
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individualism and laissez faire (Manley, 2008, Miliband, 1969, 9). The intervention of 
the welfare state was promoted by corporate capital when labor markets were 
constrained by national boundaries and capital was largely immobile due to the fact 
that national economies were relatively closed before the 1970s. Corporate capital’s 
promotion of state intervention emerged from the desire to socialize the costs of the 
business cycle whose economic booms and busts created uncertainty, social disruption 
and political instability. In addition, corporate capital’s promotion of the welfare state 
represented an attempt to diminish the growing interest in socialism that emerged as a 
result of the 1930s’ depression. The desire to socialize the costs of capital 
accumulation has historically led countries to introduce old age pensions, hospital 
insurance and public education. While industrial accident insurance schemes were 
partly won by labor unions, they largely emerged from the efforts of corporations to 
create a system that would limit corporate liability for industrial accidents as well as 
socialize the costs via industry-wide insurance premiums (Teeple, 1995, 13-14). 
Marxist scholars argue that the intervention of the welfare state was necessary to 
the very survival of national capitalism. State intervention helped to mitigate class 
conflict and managed the internal contradictions of capital accumulation, which given 
the business cycle produces massive unemployment and economic dislocations for 
which capitalism in itself has no mechanism to accommodate. In the attempt to 
rationalize capitalism the welfare state subsidizes the costs of capital accumulation by 
reproducing the working class, by intervening into labor markets to offset the 
dominant leverage that capital has over labor, and by intervening into the production 
process. The state’s provision of health care, education, subsidized childcare, child 
and family allowances, and food stamps has always been associated with attempts to 
propagate the working class and prepare them for the national labor market. The 
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regulation of minimum wage and the enactment of child labor laws, education and job 
training, pensions and unemployment assistance have always been associated with 
attempts to bring equity in national labor markets. In addition, for Marxists, the 
welfare state’s provision of collective bargaining is nothing more than an institutional 
framework that manages class conflict between workers and the owners of capital 
(Milward, 2003, 106-110, Teeple, 1995, 15). The scale and scope of the welfare state’s 
intervention, for Marxists scholars, underscores the fact that capitalism in its national 
form: 
“Depends to an ever-greater extent on the bounties and direct support of the state, and 
can only preserve its ‘private’ character on the basis of such public help. State 
intervention in economic life in fact largely means intervention for the purpose of 
helping capitalist enterprises. In no field has the notion of the ‘welfare state’ had a 
more precise and apposite meaning than here: there are no more persistent and 
successful applications for public assistance than the proud giants of the private 
enterprise system” (Miliband, 1969, 78).  
While corporate capital in its national form depended on the welfare state, 
Marxists scholars argue that under conditions of global economic integration the 
welfare state is increasingly at variance with the logic of capital accumulation. 
Essentially, the conditions that gave rise to the welfare state have been eroded by the 
integration of global markets. As capital became increasingly internationalized and 
was no longer limited to the national labor market, it no longer required the welfare 
state’s intervention to facilitate political compromise with the national working class. 
The growth of the global labor market undermined national labor markets and thereby 
undermined the state’s raison d’être to provide welfare benefits and collective 
bargaining for the working class. Furthermore, since labor unions are unable to 
accompany capital into the global labor market, they have now become anachronistic 
relics of an earlier era of capitalism. National jurisdictions have now become less 
important in corporate decision-making since transnational corporations can now 
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secure greater tax concessions from states who increasingly compete for corporate 
investment in a never-ending race to the bottom where state revenues dwindle and the 
priorities of the welfare state are abandoned (Milward, 2003, 112-115, Teeple, 1995, 
69-74). To the extent that Marxist scholars claim that globalization’s ‘race to the 
bottom’ effect on social spending is conditional on changes in the structure of 
corporate capitalism, Marxist theory, in this respect, is a variant of efficiency theories 
and as such the above discussion generates the following hypothesis: 
 
HE1: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with a decrease 
in welfare spending when the structure of corporate capital is transnational. 
 
Institutions and the Politics of Compensation 
2.2. Democratic Regimes and Social Generosity 
The authority characteristics of political regimes simultaneously influence 
both the pace at which national economies are integrated into the global economy and 
the scale of government welfare spending. Relative to authoritarian regimes, 
democratic governments who face public pressure have a strong incentive to 
compensate economic dislocations that arise from global integration (Garrett, 2001). 
Several scholars have examined how political regimes affect social spending and 
argue that political regimes play a crucial role when governments decide social 
welfare policies under the conditions of increasing economic globalization (Adsera 
and Boix, 2002, Avelinon, et al., 2005, Hicks and Swank, 1992, Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo, 2001). Since policy makers in democracies are subject to pressures from 
elections and interest groups, they are more likely to allocate a larger portion of their 
budgets for social welfare spending than those in authoritarian regimes. Research on 
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Latin America demonstrates that in the face of trade expansion, democratic 
governments are more likely to provide social welfare programs than non-democratic 
regimes (Avelinon, et al., 2005, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001).  
Other researchers, however, caution that democracies do not affect all types of 
social spending equally. Segura-Ubiergo (2007) argues that lower income groups in 
Latin America are likely to pressure governments to increase social spending only to 
the extent that they are the direct beneficiaries of such spending. Results from his 
research have shown that democracies in Latin America tend to be negatively 
associated with social security expenditures but positively associated with health and 
education expenditures (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007, 169). These results reflect the fact that 
social security beneficiaries in Latin America must be legally employed in the formal 
sector, and since lower incomes groups who are largely unemployed have no access to 
these benefits, they have no incentive to press their governments to receive them. 
Health and education expenditures reach a much larger segment of the population and 
lower income groups are more likely to press government to increase such 
expenditures (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). To the extent that economic globalization’s 
effect on welfare spending is conditional on the authority characteristics of political 
regimes, the above discussion generates the following hypotheses: 
 
H2: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase 
in welfare spending when political regimes are democratic. 
 
2.3. Competitive Elections and Social Spending 
Political democratic theories emphasize the effect that political competition 
among political parties has on government welfare policies (Hicks and Swank, 1992, 
 
21 
 
   
Kite, 2004). Given the clientelistic nature of competitive electoral politics in many 
countries throughout the world, political parties are more likely to propose generous 
welfare allotments such as pensions, unemployment insurance, job training, health 
care, and social security in order to secure votes. As the global economic integration 
of national economies increases, the clientelistic nature of competitive electoral 
politics is also expected to increase since parties increasingly seek to provide welfare 
benefits for constituent voting districts adversely affected by economic globalization 
(Cammack et al., 1988). This discussion generates the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase 
in welfare spending when the level of electoral competition is high. 
 
2.4. Political Participation and Welfare Expansion 
Political democratic theories argue that the level of political participation also 
affects government welfare expenditures (Hicks and Swank, 1992, Kite, 2004). High 
voter turnout is reflective of the political entrance of first time and working class 
voters who will most likely to terminate the political careers of incumbents that they 
hold responsible for the negative externalities of global economic integration. And 
since re-election matters to incumbents, they are more likely to promise increasing 
welfare expenditures to appease the wrath of the voters. To the extent that economic 
globalization’s effect on welfare spending is conditional on the level of political 
participation, the above discussion generates the following hypothesis:   
 
H4: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase 
in welfare spending when the level of political participation is high. 
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2.5. Democratization and Welfare Expansion 
The above discussions considered the interactive effect of economic 
globalization and the institutional factors of domestic politics on states’ welfare 
spending. However, because the domestic political system is more than the sum of its 
parts, it is also important to consider the interaction between economic globalization 
and the aggregate effect of political institutions (which is an index that is comprised 
of indicators that measure regime type, the level of electoral competition and political 
participation) on states’ welfare spending. When regimes are democratic and the level 
of electoral competition and political participation is high, then democratization 
defines the nature of political institutions (Vanhanen, 1984, Vanhanen, 1990, 
Vanhanen, 1997).  
To fully account for the cross-national variation in states’ welfare spending it is 
also necessary to estimate the interactive effect of global economic integration and the 
aggregate and disaggregate political environmental factors that shape states’ welfare 
spending. In estimating the aggregate effect of institutions an index is constructed via 
principal components analysis. This discussion generates the following hypotheses:  
 
H5: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase 
in welfare spending when democratization of political institutions is high. 
 
Political Affiliations and the Politics of Compensation  
2.6. Labor Unions and Welfare Expansion 
Social democratic corporatist theories emphasize the ways in which organized 
labor can directly affect government welfare policies. Although governments in free 
market economies tend to be more responsive to the preferences of the business sector, 
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they will also respond to pressure from labor unions that demand the provision of 
social protection benefits to union members who have been adversely affected by 
global economic integration. With the threat of strikes, which undermine investor 
confidence and economic growth, governments are more likely to provide social 
welfare programs such as pensions, unemployment insurance, job training, health care, 
and social security under the organized collective power of labor unions (Esping-
Anderson, 1990, Garrett, 1998, Hicks, 1999, Kite, 2004, Rodrik, 1998).  
Organized labor can also exert indirect pressure on governments to increase 
welfare spending. In recent years, the labor movement has effectively lobbied the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) to link labor standards to free trade agreements. 
The Social Clause, as it is commonly called, would require trading countries to 
observe a series of labor standards, which guarantees minimum wages, the right of 
labor to engage in collective bargaining, and the prevention of child labor. In addition, 
global institutions like the WTO would be given the authority to impose sanctions 
against countries that fail to observe these standards (Hughes and Wilkinson, 1998, 
Wachtel, 1998, Wet, 1995, Wilkinson and Hughes, 2000).  
International agreement on the Social Clause would potentially force 
governments to implement labor standards, which would increase the negotiation 
power of unions to elicit further concessions from governments to increase welfare 
spending. Therefore, to the extent that economic globalization’s effect on welfare 
spending is conditional on the strength of organized labor, the above discussion 
generates the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase 
in welfare spending when labor unions are strong.  
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Other scholars argue that globalization has weakened organized labor and 
therefore challenge the notion of labor unions’ influence in shaping states’ welfare 
policies. Charles Lindblom’s Politics and Markets is a classic treatise on this issue. 
Lindblom argues that corporate capital, relative to labor unions, occupies a privileged 
position in government. Since economic recession and high inflation can topple 
governments, the legitimacy of governments largely depends on private corporations’ 
providing jobs, generating economic growth and increasing living standards. 
Consequently, public policy is always geared towards supporting corporate priorities 
and not those of organized labor (Lindblom, 1977, 172-173). Increasing levels of 
global economic integration only serve to deepen organized labor’s inferior position 
in government and significantly weaken its political influence to extract welfare 
allocations from the state. 
Case study research about the politics of the labor movement in emerging 
economies has corroborated Lindblom’s basic thesis. Since the 1950s the labor 
movements in many of these countries have been transformed from being militant 
organizations that pressed for the rights of working people, to being increasingly co-
opted into the free market priorities of transnational capitalism. Given the fact that 
unions in emerging economies increasingly see themselves as a responsible partner to 
government and capital they are less likely to press governments to increase welfare 
allocations (Gray, 2008, Gray, 2007).  
Recent empirical research also shows that with increasing global economic 
integration labor unions in the less developed countries (LDCs) have been unable to 
prevent the decline of the welfare state. Collective action problems of labor unions in 
countries with large pools of low-skilled workers tend to weaken the political 
bargaining power of labor unions vis-à-vis the state and transnational corporations. 
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Therefore, global economic integration is expected to decrease government welfare 
spending because labor unions in developing countries are politically too weak to 
effectively engage the state to provide societal safety nets against the negative 
externalities of economic globalization (Rudra, 2002).  
Still other scholars are quick to remind us that the phenomenon of weak labor 
unions in LDCs is also taking place in advanced industrial economies, albeit for 
different reasons. Teeple (1995) argues that global economic integration has 
significantly reduced government welfare spending in advanced industrial economies 
largely because governments have consistently enacted legislation intended to curb 
the political power that labor unions had progressively won since the late nineteenth 
century. Since the 1980s, advanced industrial countries have enacted legislation that 
has limited the rights and security of labor unions and consequently has reduced their 
legal status, and restricted the ways in which labor unions are financed. All these 
factors make it increasingly difficult for unions to organize and lobby the state in 
defense of welfare allocations (Teeple, 1995). Therefore, to the extent that increasing 
global economic integration has weakened the ability of organized labor to extract 
welfare expenditures from the state, the discussion generates the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H7: Increasing levels of global economic integration are not associated with an 
increase in welfare spending regardless of the strength of labor unions.  
 
2.7. Political Parties and Social Policy 
Social democratic corporatist theories also focus on the power of the political 
left; namely, leftist parties in shaping the welfare policies of the state (Hicks and 
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Swank, 1992, Katzenstein, 1985, Kite, 2004). The core theoretical proposition of this 
perspective is that the political orientation of leftist parties and their supporters affects 
the ways in which the governments respond to economic globalization. It is argued 
that the effect of global economic integration on states’ welfare spending is 
conditional on the nature of party politics. Governments led by left or centrist political 
parties (labor, social democratic, or Christian democratic parties) are more likely to 
support robust welfare policies than governments led by parties to the political right 
(Huber and Stephens, 2001, Stephens, 2005). Kite (2004) argues that in countries 
where social democratic parties are strong the public is less tolerant of economic 
inequality and holds government accountable for providing welfare benefits. This 
discussion generates the following hypotheses: 
 
H8: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase 
in welfare spending when ruling political parties are on the left. 
 
2.8. The Null Effect on Social Spending 
 Some scholars argue that the extent of countries’ integration into the global 
economy is exaggerated. It is argued that the great expansion of international trade is 
grossly exaggerated since world trade, as a percentage of countries’ gross domestic 
product, is roughly the same today as it was before World War 1 (Serrano, 2002). 
International trade is not a global phenomenon but largely confined to geographical 
regions, and the foreign investments of transnational corporations are not dispersed 
globally but largely flow to a few countries. Moreover, since developing countries’ 
participation in the global economy is limited by civil war and mounting debt, the 
extent of their economic integration and its supposed effect on government welfare 
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spending should be minuscule (Hirst, 1997, Hirst and Thompson, 1996, Jones, 1995, 
Scarpf, 1991, Wade, 1996).  
 Another reason why economic globalization does not affect the welfare state is 
that states still maintain considerable control over their economies and frequently use 
government expenditures to provide collective goods (social stability and 
infrastructure) that are under-supplied by the market but are nevertheless vital to the 
process of capital accumulation (Friden and Rogowski, 1996, Garrett, 1999, Kurzer, 
1993, Vernon, 1971). This discussion generates the following hypothesis:  
 
H9: Increasing levels of global economic integration has no effect on states’ welfare 
spending. 
  
The previous discussions presented an integrated theoretical explanation of 
globalization’s effects on social policy that is informed by efficiency and 
compensation perspectives. Drawing on Marxist theory, it was shown that the natural 
tendency of economic globalization, as it operates through transnational corporations, 
is to exert a downward pressure on social spending. However, given the preferences 
and interests of domestic institutions and political actors, globalization’s proclivity to 
retrench the welfare state is resisted and averted as it operates through the forces of 
domestic politics. The study’s integrated theory treats the efficiency and compensation 
perspectives as mutually inclusive processes that determine welfare expenditures 
under conditions of economic globalization. The subsequent chapter discusses the 
study’s design and data estimation procedures used to empirically test the hypotheses 
that emerge from the study’s theory. 
  Copyright © Hanbeom Jeong 2010 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
The Empirical Determinants of Welfare Spending1
3.1. Measuring the Dependent Variable 
 
The existing literature has defined and measured governments’ welfare 
expenditures in terms of countries’ social spending as a percentage of GDP, countries’ 
per-capita social spending, or total government spending as a percentage of GDP 
(Hicks and Swank, 1992, Rudra, 2002). Much of the research on the relationship 
between economic globalization and government welfare spending has used total 
central government spending or total government revenues as the dependent variable 
(Cameron, 1978, Garrett, 2001, Iversen and Cusack, 2000a, Quinn, 1997, Rodrik, 
1998). However, measuring the dependent variable in these ways could produce 
measurement error. This is because central government spending or total government 
revenues contain numerous items that are not related to welfare spending but include 
spending for national security, various government subsidies and government 
employment spending. Total central government spending or revenues can increase 
without expanding welfare spending. Some governments, in response to 
globalization’s negative externalities, may choose to provide subsidies to domestic 
corporations (Drunberg, 1998). Others may choose to increase spending on national 
security in order to put down public riots and protests against global economic 
integration (Looney, 1993). Therefore, operationalizing the dependent variable in 
terms of total central government spending or revenues incorrectly conflates welfare 
spending with other spending priorities of the state (Rudra, 2002).  
                                      
1 A full description of the data sources and the operationalization of the variables used in this 
study are found in this chapter’s data appendix.  
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 To correct this type of measurement error, the dependent variable that is used 
in this study is measured in terms of governments’ social spending as a percentage of 
total government spending (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001, Nooruddin and 
Simmons, 2009, Rudra, 2002, Rudra, 2008). The dependent variable is calculated 
from data adopted from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) of National 
Account Official Country Data.2
 
 Government welfare spending is calculated via the 
formulae:  
Social Protection Expenditure +Education Expenditure + Health Expenditure 
Total Government Expenditure3
 
 
Social protection expenditure includes social security and welfare affairs 
services. Social security is composed of income transfers and in-cash benefits for the 
elderly, death survivors, sickness and maternity, work injury, unemployment and 
family allowances. Welfare affairs and services are defined as assistance delivered to 
clients or groups of clients with special needs, such as the young, the old, and the 
disabled (Rudra, 2002). This measurement of the dependent variable eliminates other 
types of non-governmental welfare spending that is so often conflated into aggregate 
measures of government expenditures. Moreover, this measurement reflects where 
governments place their allocative priorities within the national economy (Kaufman 
and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001).4
                                      
2 This UNSD data is available from 1970 for most countries in the world.  
  
3 Government welfare spending (Social Protection Expenditure + Education Expenditure + 
Health Expenditure) is also calculated as a percentage of countries’ GDP and used as an 
alternative measure to check the robustness of the study’s results.  
4 The adoption of GDP measure follows the research tradition in this literature. However, it 
should be acknowledged that this measure is not without limitations. For one thing the growth 
in a country’s GDP may result in more resources being available for welfare expenditures 
even if the rate of extraction for social benefits does not change. It is not clear from the 
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3.2. Measuring the Primary Explanatory Variables   
For the empirical test of the study’s theory, which integrates efficiency and 
compensation approaches to social policy, the central explanatory variables are 
operationalized as follows. The first, which captures Marxist theory of globalization’s 
‘race to the bottom’ effect on social spending, is an interaction between the structure 
of corporate capital within countries’ political and economic systems and the extent to 
which they are integrated into global economy. The second, which captures the 
tendency of domestic political forces to resist globalization’s downward pressures on 
social spending, is an interaction between countries’ domestic politics (which includes 
disaggregate measures of political institutions and political affiliations) and their level 
of integration into the global economy. In addition, principal component analysis is 
used to generate an aggregate index - Domestic Political Institutions - that is 
comprised of indicators that measure regime type, the level of electoral competition 
and political participation. Domestic Political Institutions also interacts with the level 
of countries’ integration into the global economy. Further details regarding the 
construction of this index appear in the appendix.  
As a constituent element of the interactive term - economic globalization is an 
index that measures actual financial flows into countries and government reactions to 
such flows (Dreher, 2006). Actual financial flows include trade as a percentage of 
GDP, foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, portfolio investment as of 
percentage of GDP, and income payments to foreign nationals as a percentage of GDP. 
Government restrictions of these flows are composed of hidden import barriers, the 
mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade as a percentage of current revenue, and 
                                                                                                          
existing theories if globalization is expected to alter the amount of resources available for 
welfare or the portion of a nation’s productivity that goes towards such policies. 
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capital account restrictions. Larger numbers in the index indicate higher levels of 
integration into the global economy (Dreher, 2006, Dreher et al., 2008).  
 
The Empirical Determinant of the Race to the Bottom 
3.3. Marxist Measures of Corporate Power 
 In Marxist theory, human society is composed of two parts: the substructure and 
the superstructure. In capitalist societies the substructure corresponds to the structure 
of corporate capitalism that gives rise to society’s superstructure, which is the 
political structure of the state with its corresponding laws that define and regulate the 
economics of the market. While the structure of corporate capital (the substructure) 
exerts a predominant influence over the state and the nature of the market (the 
superstructure), the ideas and policies that are produced by the superstructure also 
influence the substructure and are reinforced in its operations (Marx and Stone, 1904).   
Since Marxist theory suggests that the structure of corporate capital 
determines the political superstructure of the state as well as the economic 
superstructure of markets (Miliband, 1982, Miliband, 1983, Miliband, 1969), the 
power of corporate capital is calculated in terms of: 
 
         The Market Capitalization of Domestic Corporation as a % of GDP 
The Openness of Political Institutions x The Level of Economic Freedom  
 
The relative openness of political institutions and the level of economic 
freedom, which define the regulatory mechanism of the market, capture the political 
and economic superstructure. Measures of the openness of countries’ political 
institutions and economic freedom are taken, respectively, from the Polity IV index 
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and the Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW). The Polity IV index measures 
the political characteristics of governments, capturing the nature of a country’s 
political superstructure.5 The EFW index measures the degree of economic freedom 
that is present in five major areas of a country’s economic superstructure: the size of 
government; legal structures and the security of property rights; access to sound 
money; freedom to trade internationally; and the regulation of credit markets, labor, 
and business.6
The more open countries’ political institutions are and the greater the level of 
economic freedom, the more likely it is that the interest and influence of the corporate 
substructure will be firmly reflected in the political superstructure of the state as well 
as in the economic superstructure of the market (Lindblom, 1977, Mills, 1956). 
Countries with open political institutions, as discussed in the previous chapter, and by 
extension those with greater economic freedoms are more likely to increase welfare 
spending. However, when a larger share of a country’s GDP comes under the control 
of corporate capital, open political institutions and economic freedom will affect 
welfare spending only through its substructure, which is the level of corporate 
capitalization of the domestic economy.
 The denominator represents the substructure of corporate capital. It is 
captured by the capitalization or the market value (as a percentage of GDP) of 
domestically incorporated corporations listed on countries’ stock exchanges. 
7
 
  
                                      
5 Details regarding the construction of the Polity IV index are provided in the next section that 
discusses the measurement of Regime Type.  
6 Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson with Herbert Grubel, Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Stur
m, and Eelco Zandberg (2009). Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report. Vanc
ouver, BC: The Fraser Institute. Data retrieved from www.freetheworld.com 
7 Diagnostic test were performed to test whether the underlying theoretical assumptions that 
guided the calculation of this variable are correct. The test results are reported in Table 3.2 in 
the data appendix. Consistent with Marxist theory, the openness of political institutions 
(POLITY) and economic freedom – the superstructure - has no independent effect on welfare 
spending but only indirectly through the substructure – the corporate capitalization of the 
domestic economy. 
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Measuring Political Institutions 
3.4. Political Regime Type 
The data for countries’ political regime type is adopted from the Polity IV 
data set, which measures the institutional authority characteristics of governments. 
The measure includes the recruitment of the executive, the constraints on executive 
authority, and political competition. The Polity IV data is an index that ranges from -
10 (autocratic regimes) to 10 (democratic regimes). The indicator is categorized as 
follows:  consolidated autocracies range from -10 to -6, anocracies, which are regimes 
with weakly constituted political authority range from -5 to +5, and consolidated 
democracies that range from +6 to +10 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). 
 
3.5. Electoral Competition  
The variable that measures the level of countries’ electoral competition is 
adopted from Vanhanen’s democratization database. Electoral competition is 
measured by the portion of votes received by smaller parties in presidential or 
parliamentary elections, or both. The variable is calculated by subtracting the 
percentage of votes received by the largest party from 100. If the largest party’s 
portion is 45%, the electoral competition value is 55 (= 100-45). Calculating the 
distribution of seats in parliament is used to generate the variable when vote 
percentages are not available. And in cases where the composition of the government 
is not based on popular elections, then electoral competition is zero (Vanhanen, 1990).  
 
3.6. Political Participation  
The variable that measures countries political participation is adopted from the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The level of political 
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participation is measured by the percentage of the voting age population who actually 
voted in Parliamentary and Presidential Elections. Theoretically, the value can range 
from 0 (no participation) to 100 (full participation).8
 
   
Measuring Political Affiliations 
3.7. The Strength of Labor Unions  
Some studies measure the strength of organized labor in terms of the level of 
unionization. However, unionization is not comparable across countries. In some 
developing countries, like China, unionization rates are high because labor laws make 
union membership compulsory. And yet, unions in these countries have little power to 
represent the interest of their members (Chan and Senser, 1997). In this sense, 
unionization rates in developing countries “exaggerate labor’s independent political 
strength” (Rudra, 2002, 425), which weakens its ability to adequately capture the 
strength of unions in the developing world (Banuri and Amadeo, 1991, McGuire, 
1997, Valenzuela, 1989, 449). Rudra (2002) resolves this problem by creating the 
Potential Labor Power (PLP) indicator that measures unions’ strength as the ratio of 
skilled labor to unskilled labor divided by the level of surplus workers as a percentage 
of the work force. This study adopts the PLP to measure the strength of labor unions 
for all the countries in the data set.9
 
  
 
                                      
8 The database can be accessed at http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm 
9 PLP decreases as surplus labor expands and the number of low-skilled workers increases 
relative to skilled workers. To the extent that the surplus labor pool shrinks and labor markets 
become tighter, PLP increasingly depends on the ratio of skilled to low-skilled workers. This 
assessment of PLP is limited to the manufacturing sector, since data are not available for most 
countries outside this sector. See Rudra, Nita. (2002) Globalization and the Decline of the 
Welfare State in Less-Developed Countries. International Organization 56:411-45. 
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3.8. The Ideology of Political Parties 
In measuring the ideology of political parties, the primary focus is on the 
ideology of the ruling party in government. And as such, the operational definition of 
party ideology follows Castes and Mair’s (1984) typology as leftist, centrist, or 
rightist parties. If the ruling party’s ideology is left, then party ideology is coded 1. If 
the ruling party’s ideology is centre, then party ideology is coded 0. And if the ruling 
party ideology is right, then party ideology is coded -1 (Castles and Mair, 1984).  
 
3.9. Confounding Variables 
A survey of the literature shows that a set of important variables affects states’ 
welfare spending. These variables are summarized in Table 1. They include a lagged 
endogenous variable to control for serial correlation (Baltagi, 2005),10
Following Wagner’s law GDP per capita, which proxies countries’ economic 
development, is expected to have a positive effect on welfare spending (Adsera and 
Boix, 2002, Avelinon, et al., 2005, Cameron, 1978, Garrett, 2001, Kaufman and    
Segura-Ubiergo, 2001, Rodrik, 1998, Rudra, 2002). German economist Adolph 
Wagner (1835-1917) postulated that the development of an industrial economy is 
accompanied by an increased share of government expenditure in countries’ GDP 
  logged GDP 
per capita, GDP growth rate, the number of dependents in countries, the level of 
urbanization, logged inflation, logged population and decade dummy variables that 
are used to account for important international conditions; namely the oil crisis of the 
1970s and the economic recession and debt crisis of the 1980s, that could affect 
welfare spending rather than economic globalization. 
                                      
10  Students of welfare policy traditionally include a lagged endogenous variable in their 
econometric models to control for serial correlation. In this analysis, I do not break with this 
tradition nor challenge the logic for the use of the lagged endogenous variable.   
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(Halicio, 2003, Youseif and Abizadeh, 1992). However, the growth rate of countries’ 
GDP is expected to have a negative effect on welfare spending as economic 
expansion reduces the need for social spending (Avelinon, et al., 2005, Cameron, 
1978, Garrett, 2001, Rudra, 2002).  
The dependency ratio (sum of young and old in the total population) is 
expected to have a positive effect on welfare spending. However, since this variable is 
featured in only one study and was reported not to have a statistically significant 
effect on welfare spending (Garrett, 2001), it is used in this study to test the 
robustness of the empirical results.  
Urbanization captures the concentration of the working class and poor and is 
expected to have a positive effect on welfare spending. In countries with urban 
industrial cities the high concentration of poor and the working class people increases 
demand for welfare spending (Avelinon, et al., 2005, Garrett, 2001, Rodrik, 1998, 
Rudra, 2002). The level of inflation is expected to have a negative effect on welfare 
spending. As inflation increases governments are pressured to cut public spending, 
especially social welfare. However, the reported direction of the coefficient is not 
consistent in existing research. Some researchers report that inflation has a negative 
effect on welfare spending (Avelinon, et al., 2005), while others report a positive 
effect (Hicks and Swank, 1992). This study also control for population size although a 
survey of the literature has shown that the variable is used in only one study and its 
reported effect on welfare spending is zero (Garrett, 2001).  
Following Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001), two-decade dummy variables 
are incorporated into the analysis to control for international systemic forces that may 
impact states’ welfare expenditures that are independent from economic globalization. 
One variable captures the oil crisis years from 1970 to 1981. By the late 1960s world 
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petroleum production peaked and subsequent production entered into a severe decline. 
And as the world’s demand for petroleum remained high, the steep shortfall in 
production led to sharp increases in oil prices, which led to extreme price inflation. In 
1973, petroleum prices experienced further increases as a result of OPEC’s oil 
embargo against the West. And in 1979, oil prices again increased as a result of the 
Iranian revolution that severely damaged Iran’s oil fields, which further reduced oil 
supplies (Spero, 1981, Chapter 8). The oil crisis of the 1970s, which produced high 
levels of inflation, exploded government’s energy expenditures and deteriorated 
countries’ balance of payments, is expected to have a negative effect on welfare 
spending (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001). 
The other decade variable captures the global recession and debt crisis years 
from 1982 to 1990, which is often referred to as Latin America’s lost decade. As a 
consequence of the oil price shocks and inflation of the 1970s, the world economy, by 
the early 1980s, went into recession whereby the GDP growth rates of the developed 
and developing world plummeted. For most developing countries the recession 
created a breaking point as many experienced a liquidity crisis. Petroleum exporting 
countries flush with petrodollars invested their money in international banks, which 
'recycled' a major portion of the capital as loans to developing countries, especially to 
governments in Latin America. As interest rates increased in the U.S. and in Europe in 
1979, debt payments also increased making it harder for borrowing countries to pay 
back their debts, which ultimately precipitated the debt crisis of the 1980s (Lomax, 
1988, Nunnenkamp, 1986). The global recession and the Third World’s debt crisis of 
the 1980s are also expected to have a negative effect on welfare spending. 
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3.10. The Data Estimation Procedures 
To empirically test the hypotheses of this study, seven regression models are 
employed. Model one features the interactive effect of economic globalization and 
corporate capital on governments’ social spending. Model two features the interactive 
effect of economic globalization and the index of political institutions on 
governments’ social spending. Models three through five feature the interactive 
effects of economic globalization and regime type, electoral competition and voter 
participation on governments’ social spending. The interactive effects of economic 
globalization and labor unions and the ideology of the ruling political party on 
governments’ social spending are featured in models six through seven. The pooled 
time-series cross-sectional regressions are expressed as: 
 
Model 1: Economic Globalization and Corporate Capital 
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3CC + β4G*CC + β5CV + …. +ε  
 
Model 2: Economic Globalization and Political Institutions 
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3PI + β4G*PI + β5CV + …. +ε  
 
Model 3: Economic Globalization and Political Regime 
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3R + β4G*R + β5CV + …. +ε  
 
Model 4: Economic Globalization and Electoral Competition 
W = α + β1W_1 + β2G + β3E + β4G*E + β5CV + .... +ε  
 
Model 5: Economic Globalization and Voter Participation 
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3V +β4G*V + β5CV + …. +ε  
 
Model 6: Economic Globalization and Labor Unions 
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3L+ β4G*L + β5CV + …. +ε  
 
Model 7: Economic Globalization and Political Parties 
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3P + β4G*P + β5CV + …. +ε 
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 Where W, represents governments’ social spending; W_1, represents a one year lag of 
governments’ social spending; G, represents economic globalization; CC, represents 
Corporate Capital; G*CC, represents the interactive term for economic globalization 
and corporate capital; PI, represents the index of Political Institutions; G*PI, 
represents the interactive term for economic globalization and the index of Political 
Institutions; R, represents political regime type; G*R, represents the interactive term 
for economic globalization and political regime type; E, represents the level of 
electoral competition; G*E, represents the interactive term for economic globalization 
and the level of electoral competition; V represents the level of voter participation; 
G*V, represents the interactive term for economic globalization and the level of voter 
participation; P, represents the ideology of the ruling political party; G*P, represents 
the interactive term for economic globalization and the ideology of the ruling political 
party; L, represents the strength of labor unions; G*L, represents the interactive term 
for economic globalization and labor unions’ strength; and CV, represents the control 
variables that are included in the study.  
 
3.11. Case Study Selection Method 
A comparative case study design is also utilized to further test the study’s 
integrated theory. There are two advantages of case study research designs over large 
N-statistical analyses. First, case study designs allow for detailed examination of the 
causal mechanisms through which government social policy is generated by the 
interactions between economic globalization and the various domestic political and 
economic variables. Although statistical analyses allow for greater theoretical 
generalization, they are limited in their ability to describe the ways in which variables 
of theoretical interest interact under specific political conditions. The case study 
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component of this research will uncover the specific causal processes through which 
the interaction of domestic political factors with economic globalization produces 
social welfare policies. Second, case studies allow us to see how the causal 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables change over time. 
Although large N-statistical analyses allow us to generate theoretical generalizations 
about these relationships, they may not explain social welfare outcomes in specific 
countries.  
The methodology that informs the selection of cases in this research is based on 
the most similar systems design. Cases are selected that have similar values for the 
confounding variables, while having different values for the central explanatory 
variables (King et al., 1994). Following this method, case studies of South Korea, 
Chile and Spain are used to test the hypotheses that welfare spending is conditional on 
the ways in which countries’ domestic politics and institutions interact with global 
economic integration. All three countries transitioned from authoritarian regimes and 
therefore share a similar political history. All three countries are similar in terms of 
their per-capita wealth. Both Spain and South Korea are high-income OECD member 
countries and Chile is classified as an upper-middle income country. 11  The age-
dependency ratios in all three countries are also similar.  In 2005, the age-dependence 
ratios in South Korea, Spain and Chile were respectively 40, 45, and 49 dependents 
for every 100 working age persons. 12
 However, in these countries there are significant variations in the key explanatory 
 In addition, all three countries are non-oil 
producers and were similarly affected by the oil price shocks of the 1970s. 
                                      
11 The country classifications are based on the World Bank’s Data. The data base can be 
accessed at http://web.worldbank.org 
12 This data can be accessed at 
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/peo_age_dep_rat_dep_to_wor_pop-dependency-ratio-
dependents-working-population 
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indicators. In all three countries there has been significant variation in the nature of 
their external trade policies and regime type. As Table 3.3 shows, these variations can 
be sorted into four categories: statist protectionism under military authoritarianism 
(South Korea under Park Chung-hee and Spain under Franco); statist protectionism 
under democracy (Chile under the socialist government of Salvador Allende); 
economic liberalism under military authoritarianism (Chile under the Pinochet 
regime); and economic liberalism under democracy (South Korea under Kim Dae-
jung, Chile under the Concertación coalition government and Spain under the socialist 
government of Manuel Chaves González). In addition, case studies of these countries 
allow for greater cross-regional variation, which also provides a strong robust test of 
the study’s hypotheses. A full discussion of these cases is provided in chapters seven, 
eight and nine. 
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3.12. Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Control Variables of Welfare Spending 
 
Variable  Hypothesized 
Theoretical Direction 
Reported 
Direction 
Lagged Endogenous Variable positive  
Rudra 2002  positive 
Avelino Brown, and Hunter 2005 positive 
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 
2001 
positive 
Logged Per Capita GDP positive  
Rudra 2002  positive 
Cameron 1978 zero 
Avelino Brown, and Hunter 2005 zero 
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 
2001 
zero 
Adsera and Boix 2002 positive 
Rodrik 1998 zero 
Garrett 2001 zero 
GDP Growth Rate negative  
Avelino Brown, and Hunter 2005  negative 
Cameron 1978 negative 
Garrett and Mitchell 2001 negative 
Rudra 200 zero 
Dependents positive  
Garrett and Mitchell 2001  positive 
Garrett 2001  zero 
Urbanization positive  
Rudra 2002  zero 
Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005 positive 
Rodrik 1998 negative 
Garrett 2001 zero 
Logged Inflation negative  
Hicks and Swank 1992  positive 
Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005 negative 
Population Not Determined  
Garrett 2001  zero 
Dummy Decade 1970-1981 
(Oil crisis Years) 
negative  
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 
2001 
 negative 
Dummy Decade 1982-1990 
(Economic Recession-Debt 
Crisis Years) 
negative  
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 
2001 
 negative 
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Table 3.2: Corporate Market Capitalization and Welfare Spending 
 
Lagged Welfare Spending               0.937* 
                                           (0.026) 
 
POLITY                              0.003 
                                     (0.005) 
 
Index of Economic Freedom               0.002 
                                     (0.009) 
 
Market Capitalization % GDP              11334427.769*           
                                          (4277302.936) 
 
POLITY*Market Capitalization           0.009 
                                     (0.005) 
 
Index of Economic Freedom*              -0.002 
Market Capitalization % GDP   (0.006) 
 
POLITY*Index of Economic Freedom       -0.000 
                                    (0.001) 
 
Corporate Power                       -378279.352** 
                                     (156,283.603) 
 
Economic Globalization                      -0.000 
                                     (0.000) 
 
Urbanization                              -0.000 
                                      (0.000) 
 
Dependency                              0.006 
                                      (0.020) 
 
Growth                                     0.001 
                                     (0.001) 
 
Ln GDP per capita                       0.012** 
                                     (0.006) 
 
Ln population                        -0.001 
                                           (0.001) 
 
Ln inflation                              0.001 
                                (0.002) 
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Table 3.2: Corporate Market Capitalization and Welfare Spending (continued) 
   Growth                         0.001 
                           (0.001) 
 
   Ln GDP per capita             0.012** 
                        (0.006) 
 
   Ln population     -0.001 
                           (0.001) 
 
   Ln inflation                    0.001 
                          (0.002) 
    
   Oil shock (70’s)                 0.000 
                                 (0.000) 
 
   Debt crisis (80’s)             -0.004                                                  
                          (0.004) 
 
   Constant                   -0.087 
                           (0.061) 
 
  Observations                    296 
                       
  R-squared                    0.96 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Panel correct standard errors in parentheses   ** significant at 1%; *significant at 5% 
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Table 3.3: Case Study Selection 
                                                                    
           Economic                Statist     
                               Liberalization                  Protectionism                  
                          
 
 
   Military 
Authoritarian 
  Regimes 
 
 
 
  
Democratic 
  Regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Hanbeom Jeong 2010
Park Chung-hee (Korea) 
1961-1979 
 
Chun Doo-hwan 
1980-1988 
 
Franco (Spain) 
1939-1975 
Pinochet (Chile)  
1973-1990 
Allende (Chile) 
1971-1973 
Kim Dae-jung (Korea) 
1988-2003 
 
Concertación (Chile) 
1990-present 
 
Manuel Chaves González 
(Spain) 
1982-1996 
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Part II 
Empirical Finding 
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Chapter 4 
The Race to the Bottom: Globalization, Transnational Capital and Social 
Policy 
 
4.1. Corporate Capital and Social Spending 
 Marxist theories of the welfare state argue that capitalism in its 
national form depends on a robust welfare state to socialize the cost of capital 
accumulation and manage class conflict between the owners of capital and the owners 
of labor. However, as capital became increasingly internationalized and was no longer 
limited to the national labor market, it no longer required the welfare state’s 
intervention to facilitate political compromise with the working class. Under 
conditions of global economic integration, transnational corporations can now secure 
greater tax concessions from states that increasingly compete for corporate 
investments in a never-ending race to the bottom, where state revenues dwindle and 
the priorities of the welfare state are abandoned (Manley, 2008, Miliband, 1969, 
Teeple, 1995). To the extent that Marxist theory provides the causal mechanism 
through which economic globalization exerts a downward pressure on social spending, 
it is a variant of efficiency theory and as such generated hypothesis HE1, which stated: 
Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with a decrease in 
welfare spending when the structure of corporate capital is transnational. 
 Table 4 presents estimates of the control variables as well as the economic 
globalization variable to assess the stability of the empirical platform on which the 
study’s welfare expenditure models are built. Model 4a presents estimates for the 
main control variables without the variable for economic globalization. Model 4b 
presents estimates for economic globalization along with the controls.  
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 The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables is consistent 
with the theoretical predictions and the reported findings of previous empirical 
research. In both models, prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent 
variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. And 
consistent with Wagner’s Law, higher levels of economic development is positively 
associated with welfare spending. Economic growth, urbanization, population (model 
4a only), inflation and the debt crisis of the 1980s are all negatively associated with 
welfare spending. The oil shocks of the 1970s and dependency fails to reach statistical 
significance. Economic globalization is positively associated with welfare spending in 
model 4b. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 Table 4.1 presents the findings of the effect on welfare spending from the 
interaction between corporate capital and economic globalization. Model 4.1a 
presents the results with the main explanatory variables - corporate capital and 
economic globalization – without the interaction term. Model 4.1b presents the main 
results with the interaction term.  
 
[Table 4.1 about here] 
 
 In models 4.1a and 4.1b, prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged 
dependent variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. 
While higher levels of economic development are positively associated with welfare 
spending, all other control variables fail to reach statistical significance. In model 4.1a, 
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corporate capital (the constitutive element of the interaction term) is positively 
associated with welfare spending. However, since the coefficient on the interaction 
term – Corporate Capital*Globalization - is negative, this positive effect diminishes as 
corporate capital integrates into the global economy as predicted by Marxist theory. In 
figure 4.1, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of corporate capital on 
welfare spending for meaningful changes in countries’ integration into the global 
economy. The 95% confidence intervals around the line show the conditions under 
which corporate capital has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending – and 
it has a statistically significant effect whenever the upper and lower bounds of the 
confidence interval are both above (or below) the zero line. It can be observed from 
figure 4.1 that corporate capital’s influence on countries’ political economy has a 
significant positive effect on welfare spending when its integration into the global 
economy is low. However, this positive effect diminishes as its integration into the 
global economy increases. Once global economic integration exceeds a score of 50 on 
the KOF index, then corporate capital’s influence on countries’ political economy no 
longer has a significant positive effect on welfare spending. 
 
[Figure 4.1 about here] 
 
4.2. Robustness Checks: Alternate Measures of Globalization and Social Spending 
 Alternative measures of social spending and economic globalization, as 
featured in the research of other scholars, are used to provide additional empirical test 
for hypothesis HE1. These scholars measure welfare spending as a percentage of 
countries’ GDP and use trade openness and openness to foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as proxies for economic globalization (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001, 
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Rudra, 2002, Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). Table 4.2 presents the findings of the effect on 
welfare spending from the interaction between corporate capital and openness to trade 
and FDI. Model 4.2a presents the results with the main explanatory variables – trade, 
FDI and corporate capital – without the interaction terms. Model 4.2b presents the 
main results with the interaction terms. 
 
[Table 4.2 about here] 
 
 Models 4.2a and 4.2b show that prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged 
dependent variable) are again positively associated with current levels of welfare 
spending. Urbanization, economic growth, economic development (only in model 
4.2a) and the debt crisis of the 1980s are all positively related to welfare spending. 
Population and inflation are negatively associated with welfare spending. In Model 
4.2a, while corporate capital fails to reach statistical significance, trade openness is 
negatively associated with welfare spending. In Model 4.2b, FDI (the constitutive 
element of the interaction term) is positively associated with welfare spending. 
However, since the coefficient on the interaction term – FDI*Corporate Capital - is 
negative, this positive effect diminishes, a finding that is again consistent with 
Marxist theory.  
 Figures 4.2 and 4.3 examine these issues from an alternate vantage point. In 
Figure 4.2, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of FDI on welfare spending 
for meaningful changes in corporate capital. And 95% confidence intervals around the 
line show the conditions under which FDI has a statistically significant effect on 
welfare spending. It can be observed that once corporate capital’s influence within 
countries’ political economy is greater than 13%, then openness to FDI no longer has 
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a significant positive effect on welfare spending.  
 
[Figure 4.2 about here] 
 
 In Model 4.2b, openness to trade (the constitutive element of the interaction 
term) is negatively associated with welfare spending. However, since the coefficient 
on the interaction term – Trade*Corporate Capital - is positive, this reductive effect 
diminishes, a finding that is not consistent with Marxist theory. In figures 4.3, the 
sloping line indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on welfare spending for 
meaningful changes in corporate capital. And 95% confidence intervals around the 
line show the conditions under which trade openness has a statistically significant 
effect on welfare spending. It can be observed that trade openness has a significant 
reductive effect on welfare spending at low levels of corporate capital. However, once 
corporate capital’s influence within countries’ political economy is greater than 15%, 
then openness to international trade no longer has a significant reductive effect on 
welfare spending. 
 
[Figure 4.3 about here] 
 
4.3. Summation  
 The findings presented in this chapter suggest that economic globalization, as 
measured by the comprehensive KOF index, will produce a “race to the bottom effect’ 
on welfare expenditures as it interacts with corporate capital. When the structure of 
corporate capital is national, economic globalization has a positive effect on welfare 
spending. However, when corporate capital is integrated into the global economy, 
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economic globalization has a negative effect on welfare spending, as predicted by 
Marxist theory. This finding received additional confirmation when FDI was used as a 
proxy for economic globalization. When corporate capital is integrated into the global 
economy, openness to FDI has a negative effect on welfare spending, which is also 
consistent with the Marxist variant of efficiency theory.  
 However, when corporate capital is integrated into the global trading system, 
openness to trade has a positive effect on welfare spending, a finding that is 
inconsistent with the Marxist variant of the ‘race to the bottom’ theory. The fact that 
trade flows produce the opposite effect suggests that there are other forces at play in 
determining social policy and that global economic integration does not have to run 
rough shod over the welfare state. It is possible that policy makers could offset 
economic globalization’s ‘race to the boom’ effect by carefully choosing how their 
countries are integrated into the global economy as well as carefully negotiating the 
terms of their countries integration. Negotiating the terms of economic integration 
will invariably introduce domestic political forces into global processes that are 
driven by market forces. The empirical findings that are presented in the next chapter 
suggest that domestic political institutions and political actors play an important role 
in averting globalization’s proclivity to retrench the welfare state.  
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4.4. Tables and Figures 
  
Table 4: Economic Globalization and Welfare Spending 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
                                                          Base Model 4a                Base Model 4b              
                                                           Without  with  
             Economic Globalization   Economic Globalization 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
Lagged Welfare Spending   0.002*   0.002*          
      (0.001)   (0.001)        
 
Economic Globalization      0.002**        
                                (0.000)                     
 
Urbanization                  -0.001*             -0.001*        
      (0.000)   (0.000)        
   
Dependency     0.078   0.095        
            (0.051)   (0.055)    
 
Growth      -0.004**  -0.005**  
      (0.002)   (0.002)          
             
Ln GDP per capita    0.095**  0.071**         
        (0.010)   (0.013)   
   
Ln population     -0.007**  -0.001         
      (0.002)   (0.003)        
   
Ln inflation                 -0.016**              -0.009*        
      (0.004)   (0.004)        
    
Oil shock (70’s)    0.000   0.000        
       (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
Debt crisis (80’s)    -0.020**  -0.006*         
      (0.003)   (0.004)         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant     -0316**  -0.294*         
                  (0.108)               (0.120)         
Observations       451   451            
R-Squared                  0.42                0.46                       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
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Table 4.1: Economic Globalization, Corporate Capital and Welfare Spending 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                   Model 4.1a                    Model 4.1b 
                                                                     Without                           With 
                                                                   Interaction                      Interaction 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
Lagged Welfare Spending   0.953**        0.958** 
      (0.023)        (0.023) 
 
Economic Globalization   -0.000         0.000   
                  (0.000)              (0.000)        
                 
Corporate Capital    0.001   0.002*  
                (0.000)        (0.021)  
 
Globalization * Corporate Capital           -0.00004*  
                    (0.000)        
 
Urbanization                           -0.000        -0.000   
       (0.000)        (0.000) 
    
Dependency     -0.007         0.003 
      (0.020)        (0.019)  
 
Growth      0.001        0.000   
      (0.001)                    (0.001) 
   
Ln GDP per capita    0.009*         0.009*  
        (0.004)        (0.004) 
   
Ln population     0.001         0.000  
      (0.001)        (0.001) 
    
Ln inflation                             -0.001        -0.000   
      (0.002)        (0.002)  
     
Oil shock (70’s)    0.000        0.000    
      (0.000)        (0.000)  
  
Debt crisis (80’s)    0.000        0.001  
      (0.004)        (0.004)  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant     -0.069         -0.066  
                               (0.036)        (0.035)  
Observations                  296           296 
R-Squared                  0.96                     0.96  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
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Fig.4.1. Corporate Capital, Economic Globalization and Welfare Spending
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Table 4.2: Trade, FDI, Corporate Capital and Welfare Spending 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                           Model 4.2a                       Model 4.2b              
                                                            Without                  with  
                         Interaction            Interaction 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Lagged Welfare Spending    0.435**   0.468**          
      (0.109)   (0.098)        
 
Trade      -0.0002**  -0.0004**        
                  (0.000)              (0.000)    
                  
FDI      -0.001   0.003**         
                  (0.001)              (0.001)    
 
Corporate Capital     0.000   -0.002** 
       (0.000)                          (0.000) 
 
Corporate Capital *Trade        0.00008** 
         (0.000) 
 
Corporate Capital *FDI                      -0.002** 
          (0.000) 
 
Urbanization                  0.0003**                 0.0003**       
      (0.000)   (0.000)        
   
Dependency     0.024    0.030*       
            (0.016)   (0.015)    
 
Growth      0.001**    0.001*   
      (0.000)   (0.000)          
             
Ln GDP per capita    0.008**    0.005          
        (0.004)   (0.004)   
   
Ln population     -0.005**  -0.005**        
      (0.001)   (0.001)        
   
Ln inflation                  -0.003**                0.003**        
      (0.002)   (0.001)        
    
Oil shock (70’s)     0.000    0.000        
       (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
Debt crisis (80’s)     0.006**   0.006**         
      (0.003)   (0.003)         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant     -0.001   0.021         
                  (0.035)                 (0.040)         
Observations        338     338            
R-Squared                    0.60                  0.63                       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1%; *significant at 5% 
 
57 
 
   
 
0
-4
0
-.3
0
-.2
0
-.1
0
.1
0
M
ar
fin
al
 E
ffe
ct
 o
f F
or
ei
gn
 D
ire
ct
 In
ve
st
 o
n 
W
el
fa
re
 S
pe
nd
in
g
5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Corporate Capital
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4.2: FDI, Corporate Capital and Welfare Spending
 
 
58 
 
   
0
-.3
0
.3
0
.4
0
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f T
ra
de
 O
pe
nn
es
s 
on
 W
el
fa
re
 S
pe
nd
in
g
5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Corporate Capital
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4.3: Trade, Corporate Capital and Welfare Spending
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Chapter 5 
The Political Environment of Welfare Compensation: Globalization, 
Institutions and Social Policy 
 
The evidence that was presented in the previous chapter lends support to the 
argument that economic globalization exerts a downward pressure on welfare 
expenditures through the operations of transnational corporations. While the use of 
alternate measures of social spending and globalization, specifically openness to FDI, 
confirms the predictions of efficiency theory, openness to trade does not. And it was 
suggested that endogenous political forces might also be at work negotiating the terms of 
countries’ integration into the global economy and in the process avert globalization’s 
proclivity to retrench the welfare state. This chapter presents the findings that lend 
empirical support to this argument.  
 
5.1. The Social Generosity of Democratic Governments 
 It was argued in chapter 2 that the authority characteristics of political regimes 
simultaneously affect the pace at which national economies are integrated into the global 
economy and the scale of social spending. Since policy makers in democracies are 
subject to pressures from elections and interest groups, they are more likely to allocate a 
larger portion of their budgets for social welfare spending than those in authoritarian 
regimes. And to the extent that economic globalization’s effect on welfare spending is 
conditional on the authority characteristics of political regimes, the argument generated 
hypothesis 2, which stated: Increasing levels of global economic integration are 
associated with an increase in welfare spending when political regimes are democratic. 
 Table 5.1 presents the findings of the interactive effect of economic globalization 
and political regime type on welfare spending. Model 5.1a presents the results with the 
main explanatory variables – economic globalization and political regime type – without 
the interaction term. And Model 5.1b presents the main results with the interaction term. 
 
[Table 5.1 about here] 
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 The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 5.1a 
and 5.1b are also consistent with the theoretical predictions and the reported findings of 
previous empirical research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent 
variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare spending in both models. 
Urbanization is negatively associated with welfare spending in both models. Increasing 
levels in the ratio of countries’ young and old dependents are positively associated with 
welfare spending in both models. Economic growth is negatively associated with welfare 
spending in both models. And consistent with Wagner’s Law, higher levels of economic 
development is positively associated with welfare spending in both models. Inflation is 
negatively associated with welfare spending in both models. While the oil shocks of the 
1970s fail to reach statistical significance, the debt crisis of the 1980s is negatively 
associated with welfare spending in model 5.1a but fails to reach statistical significance 
in model 5.1b. And while population size fails to reach statistical significance in model 
5.1a, it is negatively associated with welfare spending in model 5.1b. Economic 
globalization and political regime type are both positively associated with welfare 
spending in model 5.1a.  
 Model 5.1b shows that the interactive effect of economic globalization and 
political regime type is positively associated with welfare spending. The sloping line in 
figure 5.1 indicates the marginal effect of economic globalization on welfare spending for 
meaningful changes in the authority characteristics of political regimes. And 95% 
confidence intervals around the line show the conditions under which economic 
globalization has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It can be observed 
from figure 5.1 that economic globalization has a reductive effect on welfare spending 
when political regimes are autocratic. However, this reductive effect declines as the 
authority characteristics of regimes become more democratic.  When the polity score of 
political regimes is greater than -3, then economic globalization no longer has a reductive 
effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 2 is supported by the data. 
 
[Figure 5.1 about here] 
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While this finding shows that the marginal effect of economic globalization on 
welfare spending is greater among democracies relative to autocracies and is therefore 
lends support to hypothesis 2, additional observations are in order. It is interesting to note 
that autocracies whose economies are integrated into the global economy also provide 
welfare benefits to their citizens, although at much lower levels than democracies. Table 
5.1a, shows the average welfare spending and the average level of economic 
globalization from 1971 to 2004 for several regimes with autocratic polities. These 
regimes have high levels of welfare spending and they are also all highly integrated into 
the global economy. One common characteristic among most of these regimes is that they 
are all one party leftist or former Soviet Republic regimes that have traditionally provided 
generous welfare benefits to their citizens. Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FNL), the 
revolutionary organization that directed its war of independence against France that 
ended in 1962 (Fanon, 1965), ruled the country for four decades and during these years 
developed Algeria’s welfare state. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are all former 
Soviet Republic states with a Marxist tradition for expansive welfare subsidies, which 
have been eroded in recent years. 
 
[Table 5.1A about here] 
 
Throughout the 1970s, Bolivia was ruled by a military regime headed by left 
leaning generals Alfredo Ovando and his successor Juan José Torres. During this period 
the Bolivian military regime promoted welfare reforms that were aimed at changing the 
deplorable living conditions for the vast majority of Bolivians. The regime also 
nationalized the Bolivian operations of the U.S.-based Gulf Oil Corporation (Klein, 
2003). Throughout the early 1970s to the late 1980s, Panama was also ruled by populist 
military regimes. While the regime led by General Omar Torrijoss was corrupt, the 
regime expanded welfare programs and its nationalist foreign policy appealed to the rural 
and urban constituencies that were traditionally ignored by the economic elite. After 
Torrijoss’s death in 1981 the populist direction of military government was continued 
under general Manuel Noriega (Robert C. Harding II, 2001).  
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While the above regimes were autocratic and presided over economies that were 
heavily integrated into the global economy, what motivated their extensive welfare 
allocations was not the pressure from democratic elections but a socialist or populist 
ideological ethos, which defined and shaped the priorities of public policy.  
 
5.2. Tight Elections and Welfare Expansion 
 With the attempt to increase countries’ integration into the global economy the 
clientelistic nature of competitive electoral politics is expected to increase as political 
parties will increasingly seek to provide welfare benefits to constituent voting districts 
adversely affected by economic globalization. In chapter 2, this argument generated 
hypothesis 3, which stated: Increasing levels of global economic integration are 
associated with an increase in welfare spending when the level of electoral competition is 
high. Table 5.2 presents the findings of the interactive effect of economic globalization 
and electoral competition on welfare spending. Model 5.1a presents the results with the 
main explanatory variables - economic globalization and electoral competition – without 
the interaction term. And model 5.2b presents the main results with the interaction term. 
 
[Table 5.2 about here] 
 
 Similar to Table 5.1, the direction of the coefficients for most of the control 
variables in models 5.2a and 5.2b are consistent with the theoretical predictions and the 
reported findings of previous empirical research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the 
lagged dependent variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare 
spending in both models. Urbanization failed to rise to the level of statistical significance 
in both models. Economic growth, population size, the ratio of countries’ young and old 
dependents, and inflation are all negatively associated with welfare spending. Higher 
levels of economic development are positively associated with welfare spending in both 
models. While the oil shocks of the 1970s fail to reach statistical significance, the debt 
crisis of the 1980s is negatively associated with welfare spending. And while economic 
globalization fails to reach statistical significance in model 5.2a, electoral competition is 
positively associated with welfare spending.  
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 Model 5.2b shows the interactive effect of economic globalization and electoral 
competition. Economic globalization (the constitutive element of the interaction term) is 
negatively associated with welfare spending. However, since the coefficient on the 
interaction term – Economic Globalization*Electoral Competition - is positive, this 
reductive effect diminishes. In figure 5.2, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of 
economic globalization on welfare spending for meaningful changes in the level of 
countries’ electoral competition. And 95% confidence intervals around the line show the 
conditions under which economic globalization has a statistically significant effect on 
welfare spending. As predicted, it can be observed from figure 5.2 that economic 
globalization has a significant reductive effect on welfare spending when electoral 
competition is low. However, this reductive effect diminishes as electoral competition 
increases. Once the percentage of votes gained by smaller parties in parliamentary and or 
presidential elections is greater than 29%, then economic globalization no longer has a 
significant reductive effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 3 is supported by the data.  
 
[Figure 5.2 about here] 
 
5.3. Voter Turnout and Social Generosity 
 It was argued that high voter turnout is reflective of the political entrance of first 
time and working class voters who hold political incumbents responsible for the negative 
externalities of global economic integration. And since incumbent politicians are largely 
motivated by re-election, they are more likely to expand welfare expenditures to appease 
the wrath of voters. In chapter 2 this argument led to hypothesis 4, which stated: 
Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase in 
welfare spending when the level of political participation is high. 
 In testing this hypothesis, table 5.3 presents ordinary least square estimates (OLS), 
which assume that political participation - the percentage of the voting age population 
who actually voted in parliamentary and presidential elections - is exogenous of welfare 
spending. However, some scholars argue that political participation and welfare spending 
are endogenous and therefore including the variable in equations that predict welfare 
spending will generate biased estimates (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). It is argued that in the 
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attempt to prevent conflict and increase social cohesion, governments in some countries 
may actually increase welfare spending when political participation is low. In conflict 
prone countries like Colombia and Guatemala where voter turnout rarely exceeds 35% to 
45%, governments in these countries have a stronger incentive to increase welfare 
spending than governments in Uruguay and Costa Rica, where voter turnout is over 80% 
of the voting age population (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007, pp. 121-123).  
 Given this argument, Tables 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 present estimates from a two-stage-
least-squares instrumental variable model (IV), which assumes that political participation 
and welfare spending are endogenous. The IV estimates utilize variables that instrument 
for political participation. These include indicators that measure the number of legislative 
chambers in countries as well as indicators that measure whether elections are governed 
by proportional representation. Theoretically, these variables are considered important 
determinants of voter turnout. It is argued that an increase in the number of legislative 
chambers slows legislation, which in turn reduces turnout because citizens are more 
likely to perceive their votes to be less decisive (Jackman, 1987). This indicator is a 
dichotomous variable that measures the number of legislative chambers in each country. 
The variable is coded 1 if countries’ legislative structure is bicameral and 0 otherwise 
(Johnson and Wallack, 2006). Moreover, it is argued that elections that are governed by 
proportional representation will increase voter turnout since votes are not wasted and 
political parties have a greater incentive to mobilize voters even when their electoral base 
is weak (Jackman, 1987, Lijphart, 1994). This variable is coded 0 for majoritarian 
electoral systems; 1 for mixed-member majority systems; and 2 for closed-list 
proportional representative systems (Gerring and Thacker, 2008, Gerring et al., 2005). 
 Table 5.3 presents OLS estimates of the interactive effect of economic 
globalization and voter turnout on welfare spending. Model 5.3a presents the results with 
the main explanatory variables - economic globalization and voter turnout – without the 
interaction term. And model 5.3b presents the main results with the interaction term. 
 
[Table 5.3 about here] 
 
 The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 5.3a 
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and 5.3b are again consistent with the theoretical predictions and findings that are 
reported in previous empirical research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged 
dependent variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare spending in 
both models. Urbanization and the ratio of countries’ young and old dependents fail to 
rise to the level of statistical significance in both models. Economic growth, population 
size and inflation are all negatively associated with welfare spending. Higher levels of 
economic development are positively associated with welfare spending in both models. 
The oil shocks of the 1970s are negatively associated with welfare spending in model 
5.3a, but fail to reach statistical significance in model 5.3b. And the debt crisis of the 
1980s is negatively associated with welfare spending in both models. Both economic 
globalization and voter turnout are positively associated with welfare spending in model 
5.3a. While these variables fail to reach statistical significance in model 5.3b, the 
coefficient on the main interaction term – Economic Globalization*Voter Turnout - is 
positive.  
 Since the possible endogeneity between political participation and welfare 
spending could bias OLS estimates, it is necessary to estimate the data via an IV model, 
which corrects for endogeneity. Table 5.3.2 presents IV estimates of the interactive effect 
of economic globalization and voter turnout on welfare spending. Model 5.3.2a presents 
the IV results with the main explanatory variables - economic globalization and voter 
turnout – without the interaction term. And model 5.3.2b presents the main IV results 
with the interaction term.  However, before discussing these results, it is necessary to 
examine the first stage regression results, which evaluate the relevance, the strength and 
the validity of the instruments used in the IV models. More importantly, the discussion of 
the first stage regression will also provide results from the empirical test for endogeneity 
and whether OLS estimates in Table 5.3 are inconsistent.  
 
5.3.1. Voter Turnout: First Stage Regression Results 
 Table 5.3.1 presents statistics from the first stage equations to assess the quality of 
the instrumentation procedure. First, the underidentification test, as reported by the 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic, is a test of whether the equations are identified. The test checks 
the relevance of the excluded instruments (the exogenous instrumental variables that are 
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not included in the second stage regression). The statistic is a measure of the instruments’ 
relevance (i.e. the correlation with the endogenous variable – voter turnout - that cannot 
be explained by other control variables), so a rejection of the null indicates that the 
equations are identified and that the instruments are relevant (Maddala, 1992: 383-389). 
In models 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b the small p-values of the Kleibergen-Paap statistic strongly 
indicates that the equations are identified and that the instruments (bicameralism and 
proportional representation) are relevant.  
  
[Table. 5.3.1 about here] 
 
 Second, the weak identification test, as reported by the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F 
statistic and Stock-Yogo critical values test, measures the strength of the instruments’ 
correlation with the endogenous variable – voter turnout. Weak identification arises when 
the instruments are correlated with the endogenous variable, but only weakly. While 
different instrumental variable estimators are more robust to weak instruments, two-stage 
least square can perform poorly when instruments are weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002). 
Instruments are deemed weak if the first-stage F statistics is less than ten (Staiger and 
Stock, 1997). In models 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics suggests 
that the models do not suffer from weak instrumentation. This is also confirmed by the 
Stock-Yogo critical values test, which compares the F statistic with the critical values for 
the nominal bias and size distortion of TSLS. If the F statistic is larger than the critical 
values, then the instruments are strong. In models 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b the critical values test 
at 10% nominal bias as well as 10% size distortion is less than the F statistic, confirming 
that the models do not suffer from weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2002).  
Third, the overidentification test, as reported by the Hansen J statistic, assesses 
the validity of the instruments. Specifically, the Hansen J statistic tests whether the 
instruments are correlated with the equation’s error term. The null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are not correlated with the error term (i.e. that they are correctly excluded 
from the equations). Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that the instruments are not 
valid (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004: 336-338). In models 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b the large 
p-values of the Hansen J statistic preclude rejecting the null and suggest that the 
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instruments are indeed valid.  
 Fourth, a test for endogeneity in a regression estimated via instrumental variables, 
as reported by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, evaluates whether voter turnout is 
endogenous to welfare spending as suggested by recent research. The null hypothesis 
states that any endogeneity among the regressors would not have deleterious effects on 
OLS estimates. A rejection of the null indicates that the endogenous regressors' effects on 
the estimates are meaningful and instrumental variable techniques are required (Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 2004: 338-342). In models 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b the small p-values of the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reject the null and clearly indicate that endogeneity exists 
between voter turnout and welfare spending and that both models are best estimated via 
TSLS instrumental variable procedure. 
 
5.3.2. Voter Turnout: Second Stage Regression Results 
 Table 5.3.2 presents estimates from the second stage regression. The direction of 
the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 5.3.2a and 5.3.2b remain 
consistent with the reported findings of previous empirical research. Prior levels of 
welfare spending (the lagged dependent variable) are positively associated with current 
levels of welfare spending in both models. Economic growth is again negatively 
associated with welfare spending in both models. Higher levels of economic development 
are positively associated with welfare spending in both models. Urbanization and the 
ratio of countries’ young and old dependents fail to rise to the level of statistical 
significance in model 5.3.2a but is negatively associated with welfare spending in model 
5.3.2b. Population fails to rise to the level of statistical significance in model 5.3.2a but is 
negatively associated with welfare spending in model 5.3.2b. Inflation is negatively 
associated with welfare spending in model 5.3.2a but fails to reach statistical significance 
in model 5.3.2b. The oil shocks of the 1970s fail to reach statistical significance in both 
models. And the debt crisis of the 1980s is negatively associated with welfare spending in 
model 5.3.2a but fails to reach statistical significance in model 5.3.2b. Both economic 
globalization and voter turnout are positively associated with welfare spending in model 
5.3.2a.  
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[Table. 5.3.2 about here] 
 
 In model 5.3.2b economic globalization (the constitutive element of the 
interaction term) is negatively associated with welfare spending. However, since the 
coefficient on the interaction term – Economic Globalization*Voter Turnout - is positive, 
this reductive effect diminishes. In figure 5.3, the sloping line indicates the marginal 
effect of economic globalization on welfare spending for meaningful changes in the level 
of voter turnout. And 95% confidence intervals around the line show the conditions under 
which economic globalization has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It 
can be observed from figure 5.3 that economic globalization has a significant reductive 
effect on welfare spending when voter turnout is low. However, this reductive effect 
diminishes as voter turnout increases. Once voter turnout is greater than 35% of the 
voting age population, then economic globalization no longer has a significant reductive 
effect on welfare spending. Even after correcting for endogeneity, the results from the IV 
model support hypothesis 4. 
 
[Figure 5.3 about here] 
 
5.4. Democratization and Higher Social Spending 
 Since countries’ domestic political systems, as noted in Chapter 2, is more than 
the sum of their parts, it is also important to consider that globalization’s effect on social 
spending is conditional on the nature of political institutions (which is an index that is 
comprised of indicators that measure regime type, the level of electoral competition and 
political participation). When regimes are democratic and the level of electoral 
competition and political participation is high, then democratization defines the nature of 
political institutions. The discussion generated hypothesis 5, which stated: Increasing 
levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase in welfare spending 
when democratization of political institutions is high.  
 Table 5.4 presents the findings of the aggregate interactive effect of economic 
globalization and political institutions on welfare spending. Model 5.4a presents the 
results with the main explanatory variables - economic globalization and political 
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institution – without the interaction term. And model 5.4b presents the main results with 
the interaction term. 
 
[Table 5.4 about here] 
   
 In both models the direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables 
are consistent with the theoretical predictions and the reported findings of previous 
empirical research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent variable) are 
positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. Higher levels of economic 
development are positively associated with welfare spending. Economic growth, inflation 
and urbanization are all negatively associated with welfare spending. While population is 
negatively associated with welfare spending in model 5.4a, it is positively associated with 
welfare spending in model 5.4b. The ratio of countries’ young and old dependents is 
positively associated with welfare spending in both models. The oil shocks of the 1970s 
and the debt crisis of the 1980s fail to reach statistical significance in both models.  
 Economic globalization and political institutions are both positively associated 
with welfare spending in model 5.4a. In model 5.4b, the interactive effect of economic 
globalization and political institutions is positively associated with welfare spending and 
supports hypothesis 5. The solid sloping line in figure 5.4 indicates the marginal effect of 
economic globalization on welfare spending for meaningful changes in the 
democratization of countries’ political institutions. 95% confidence intervals around the 
line allow us to determine the conditions under which economic globalization has a 
statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It is easy to see that economic 
globalization has a reductive effect on welfare spending when the democratization of 
political institutions is low. However, this reductive effect declines as the 
democratization of political institutions increases. When the democratization score of 
countries’ political institutions is greater than 6, then economic globalization no longer 
has a reductive effect on welfare spending.  
 
[Figure 5.4 about here] 
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5.5. Robustness Checks: Alternate Measures of Globalization and Social Spending 
 As in the previous chapter, alternate measures of welfare spending and 
economic globalization are used to estimate the effect of economic globalization on 
welfare spending when conditional on the authority characteristics of political regimes. 
Model 5.5a of Table 5.5 presents results for the interactive effect of the alternate 
measures of economic globalization and political regimes on welfare spending. Previous 
welfare spending is positively associated with current welfare spending. While all other 
control variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance, urbanization is 
positively associated with welfare spending in model 5.5b. And while FDI is positively 
associated with welfare spending in model 5.5a, its constitutive element and its 
interaction with political regime fail to rise to the level of statistical significance in model 
5.5b. Trade openness (the constitutive element of the interaction term) is negatively 
associated with welfare spending in model 5.5b. However, since the coefficient on the 
interaction term – Trade*Political Regime - is positive, this reductive effect diminishes.  
In figure 5.5, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on welfare 
spending for meaningful changes in the authority characteristics of political regimes. And 
95% confidence intervals around the line allow us to determine the conditions under 
which openness to trade has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It can 
be observed from figure 5.5 that openness to trade has a reductive effect on welfare 
spending when political regimes are autocratic. However, this reductive effect declines as 
the authority characteristics of regimes become more democratic.  When the polity score 
of political regimes is greater than 4, then openness to trade no longer has a reductive 
effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 2 is also supported by the alternate measures of 
welfare spending and economic globalization.  
 Model 5.6b of Table 5.6 presents results for the interactive effect of the alternate 
measures of economic globalization and the level of countries’ electoral competition on 
welfare spending. Previous welfare spending is positively associated with current welfare 
spending. All other control variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance. FDI 
and its interaction with electoral competition have no statistical significant effect on 
welfare spending. However, trade openness (the constitutive element of the interaction 
term) is again negatively associated with welfare spending. However, since the 
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coefficient on the interaction term – Trade*Electoral Competition - is positive, this 
reductive effect diminishes.  
 In figure 5.6, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on 
welfare spending for meaningful changes in the level of countries’ electoral competition. 
And 95% confidence intervals around the line show the conditions under which economic 
globalization has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It can be observed 
from figure 5.6 that openness to trade has a significant reductive effect on welfare 
spending when electoral competition is low. However, this reductive effect diminishes as 
electoral competition increases. Once the percentage of votes gained by smaller parties in 
parliamentary and or presidential elections is greater than 34%, then openness to trade no 
longer has a significant reductive effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 3 is supported 
by the alternate measures for welfare spending and the economic globalization.  
 Model 5.7b of Table 5.7 presents results for the interactive effect of the alternate 
measures of economic globalization and political participation on welfare spending. 
Previous welfare spending is positively associated with current welfare spending. And 
again, all other control variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance. FDI and 
its interaction with voter turnout have no statistically significant effect on welfare 
spending. However, in model 5.7b, trade openness (the constitutive element of the 
interaction term) is negatively associated with welfare spending. However, since the 
coefficient on the interaction term – Trade*Voter Turnout - is positive, this reductive 
effect diminishes.  
 In figure 5.7, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on 
welfare spending for meaningful changes in the level of voter turnout. And the 95% 
confidence intervals around the line show the conditions under which openness to trade 
has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It can be observed from figure 
5.7 that openness to trade has a significant reductive effect on welfare spending when 
voter turnout is low. However, this reductive effect diminishes as voter turnout increases. 
Once voter turnout is greater than 15% of the voting age population, then openness to 
trade no longer has a significant reductive effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 4 is 
supported by the alternate measures for economic globalization and welfare spending. 
Model 5.8b of Table 5.8 presents results for the interactive effect of the alternate 
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measures of economic globalization and the index of political institutions on welfare 
spending. Previous welfare spending is positively associated with current welfare 
spending. In model 5.8a, both FDI and population are negatively associated with welfare 
spending, while all other variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance. 
Urbanization fails to reach statistical significance in model 5.8a but is positively related 
to welfare spending in model 5.8b. In model 5.8b, FDI and its interaction with domestic 
political institution have no statistical significant effect on welfare spending. Trade 
openness (the constitutive element of the interaction term) is negatively associated with 
welfare spending. However, since the coefficient on the interaction term – 
Trade*Domestic Political Institutions – is positive, this reductive effect diminishes.  
 In figure 5.8, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on 
welfare spending for meaningful changes in the democratization of countries’ political 
institutions. 95% confidence intervals around the line allow us to determine the 
conditions under which openness to trade has a statistically significant effect on welfare 
spending. It is easy to see that openness to trade has a reductive effect on welfare 
spending when the democratization of political institutions is low. However, this 
reductive effect declines as the democratization of political institutions increases. When 
the democratization score of countries’ political institutions is greater than 11, then 
openness to trade no longer has a reductive effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 5 is 
supported by the alternate measures of welfare spending and economic globalization. 
 
5.6. Summation  
 The results presented in this chapter strongly suggest that domestic political 
forces avert globalization’s ‘race to the bottom’ effect on social policy. The effect on 
social spending from global economic integration is largely conditional on the nature of 
domestic institutions that shape the political environment in which welfare policy is made. 
When democratization of political institutions is low, economic globalization has a 
consistently negative effect on welfare spending, an outcome that is consistent with the 
predictions by efficiency theories. However, when democratization of political 
institutions is high, domestic political forces will most likely avert globalization’s 
proclivity to retrench the welfare state by expanding social spending.  
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5.7. Tables and Figures  
Table 5.1: Economic Globalization, Political Regimes and Welfare Spending 
                                                                     Model 5.1a               Model 5.1b 
                                                                        Without                       With 
                                                                       Interaction                Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending   0.003**             0.003**        
             (0.001)             (0.001)         
 
Economic Globalization   0.002**             0.001**                   
             (0.000)             (0.000) 
          
Political Regime    0.004**            -0.002         
             (0.001)             (0.002)         
 
Globalization *Political Regime                    0.00014**                   
                             (0.000)  
                   
Urbanization     -0.001**           -0.001**        
             (0.001)            (0.000)         
  
Dependency     0.102**            0.093*         
             (0.037)            (0.038)         
 
Growth      -0.004**                      -0.004**        
             (0.001)            (0.001)         
 
Ln GDP per capita    0.033**            0.033**        
             (0.007)            (0.007)         
 
Ln population     -0.005            -0.006*   
             (0.002)            (0.002)         
 
Ln inflation     -0.022**                      -0.022**        
             (0.004)            (0.004)         
   
Oil shock (70’s)    -0.003             0.001   
             (0.005)            (0.005)   
 
Debt crisis (80’s)    -0.009*            -0.007   
             (0.005)            (0.005)         
Constant     0.091             0.135         
                        (0.079)           (0.072)         
Observations       801              801          
R-Squared      0.32             0.33          
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
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Figure 5.1: Economic Globalization, Political Regime Type and Welfare Spending
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   Table 5.1A 
 
 
Country Years Polity Average Welfare Average Level of  
  Score Spending % Total  
Government Spending 
 Economic 
 Globalization 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Algeria 1973-1976 -9 0.45 30.00 
Azerbaijan 1991-1994 -3 0.42 45.40 
Azerbaijan 1995-1997 -6 0.46 50.00 
Azerbaijan 1998-2004 -7 0.58 61.03 
Bolivia 1971-1977 -7 0.40 44.02 
Bolivia 1978-1979 -4 0.45 44.50 
Kazakhstan 1991-1994 -3 0.53 60.10 
Kazakhstan 1995-2001 -4 0.50 64.20 
Kyrgyzstan 1991-2004 -3 0.43 60.15 
Panama 1969-1977 -7 0.51 68.54 
Panama 
Panama 
1982-1983 
1987-1988 
-5 
-8 
0.45 
0.53 
69.00 
59.82 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5.2: Economic Globalization, Electoral Competition and Welfare Spending 
                                                                     Model 5.2a               Model 5.2b 
                                                                       Without                        With 
                                                                    Interaction                   Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending   0.002**     0.002** 
             (0.001)      (0.001)         
 
Economic Globalization   0.001      -0.005**                  
             (0.000)      (0.001) 
          
Electoral Competition                    0.028**  -0.013        
             (0.008)      (0.011)         
 
Globalization*Electoral Competition         0.001**                   
                   (0.000)         
           
Urbanization     -0.000      -0.000   
             (0.000)      (0.000)   
  
Dependency     -0.108**              -0.107**  
             (0.024)      (0.024)   
 
Growth      -0.003**  -0.003**  
             (0.001)      (0.001)   
 
Ln GDP per capita    0.042**     0.045** 
             (0.009)              (0.008)         
 
Ln population     -0.010**             -0.010**  
             (0.003)              (0.003)   
 
Ln inflation     -0.021**             -0.021**  
             (0.004)              (0.004)   
   
Oil shock (70’s)    -0.008              -0.007   
             (0.005)              (0.005)   
 
Debt crisis (80’s)    -0.018**             -0.017**        
             (0.004)              (0.004)   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant     0.137      0.285**       
                        (0.072)              (0.075)         
Observations      708         708          
R-Squared                 0.42                0.42          
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5% 
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Figure 5.2: Economic Globalization, Electoral Competition and Welfare Spending
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Table 5.3: Economic Globalization, Voter Turnout and Welfare Spending 
                                                               OLS Model 5.3a          OLS Model 5.3b 
                                                                      Without                        With 
                                                                   Interaction                   Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending              0.002**              0.002**   
            (0.001)             (0.001)   
 
Economic Globalization              0.001*             -0.001   
               (0.000)                          (0.001)         
 
Voter Turnout               0.160**             -0.008   
               (0.027)                 (0.071) 
    
Globalization*Voter Turnout                             0.003*   
                             (0.001) 
          
Urbanization             -0.000             -0.000    
                                                  (0.000)             (0.000) 
     
Dependency            -0.015             -0.005    
             (0.039)             (0.041)    
 
Growth             -0.004**                         -0.004**    
             (0.001)             (0.001)    
 
Ln GDP per capita            0.047**              0.047**    
               (0.008)             (0.007)    
 
Ln population            -0.007*             -0.008**    
             (0.003)             (0.003)    
    
Ln inflation            -0.021**                         -0.021**    
             (0.004)             (0.005)    
     
Oil shock (70’s)           -0.015*             -0.013    
             (0.007)             (0.007) 
     
Debt crisis (80’s)           -0.020**                         -0.019**    
             (0.004)             (0.004)    
Constant            -0.019              0.122    
             (0.085)             (0.099)    
Observations              699               699    
R-Squared             0.42              0.43     
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%;*significant at 5%  
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Table 5.3.1: Economic Globalization, Voter Turnout and Welfare Spending  
Results from the First Stage IV Regression 
 
IV Model 5.3.1a 
Without 
Interaction 
   IV Model 5.3.1b 
       With 
Interaction  
Underidentification test:    
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic          67.48 15.01   
p-value 0.00  0.00   
    
Weak identification test: 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 40.71 37.23  
    
Stock-Yogi weak ID critical values test:                             
TSLS size of nominal bias 10% 34.62 36.36  
Maximal IV size distortion 10% 19.93 19.93  
 
Overidentification test of all instruments: 
Hansen J statistic 1.59 0.31             
p-value 0.21 0.58            
 
Test for Endogeneity:    
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test       10.16      5.12 
p-value         0.00      0.02 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5.3.2: Economic Globalization, Voter Turnout and Welfare Spending 
                                                               IV Model 5.3.2a          IV Model 5.3.2b 
                                                                    Without                          With 
                                                                   Interaction                   Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending   0.002**             0.002**   
             (0.001)             (0.001) 
 
Economic Globalization    0.001**            -0.026*   
                 (0.000)                   (0.013)               
 
Voter Turnout                 0.349**            -2.113   
                 (0.099)             (1.115) 
   
Globalization*Voter Turnout                  0.038*   
                              (0.019) 
 
Urbanization               -0.000             -0.001**   
                            (0.000)             (0.000)   
 
Dependency                0.122             -0.421*   
                (0.105)             (0.218)   
 
Growth               -0.005**                         -0.004*   
                            (0.002)             (0.002)   
 
Ln GDP per capita              0.063**              0.089**   
                 (0.015)             (0.023)   
 
Ln population               0.000             -0.021*   
                        (0.004)             (0.008) 
    
Ln inflation              -0.017**                         -0.003   
               (0.006)             (0.007)   
  
Oil shock (70’s)                  -0.026             -0.004   
              (0.024)             (0.031)   
 
Debt crisis (80’s)            -0.031**                         -0.018   
              (0.011)             (0.013)   
Constant             -0.404              1.589   
              (0.220)             (0.865)   
Observations               546                546   
R-Squared              0.44                0.24  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%;*significant at 5%  
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Figure 5.3: Economic Globalization, Voter Turnout and Welfare Spending
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Table 5.4: Economic Globalization, Political Institutions and Welfare Spending 
                                                                Model 5.4a             Model 5.4b 
                                                                  Without                  With 
                                                               Interaction             Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending        0.003**                    0.003**  
      (0.001)             (0.001) 
 
Economic Globalization        0.002**              0.001**   
                                  (0.000)             (0.000) 
                        
Domestic Political Institution        0.037**             -0.005  
                    (0.007)                   (0.013)  
 
Globalization *Political Institution                                       0.001**    
                            (0.000)        
 
Urbanization                     -0.001**            -0.001**    
           (0.000)            (0.000) 
    
Dependency          0.132**             0.112**  
          (0.041)            (0.042)  
 
Growth          -0.004**           -0.004**    
          (0.001)                    (0.001)  
  
Ln GDP per capita         0.034**                  0.035**  
            (0.007)           (0.007) 
   
Ln population         -0.005*           0.007**  
          (0.002)           (0.002)  
   
Ln inflation                     -0.022**          -0.021**    
           (0.004)          (0.004) 
     
Oil shock (70’s)        -0.002          -0.000     
           (0.006)          (0.005) 
   
Debt crisis (80’s)        -0.010          -0.008  
          (0.005)          (0.005) 
Constant          0.077            0.116  
                      (0.082)         (0.074)  
Observations            801            801  
R-Squared                       0.33                      0.34  
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
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Figure 5.4: Economic Globalization, Institutions and Welfare Spending
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Table 5.5: Trade, FDI, Political Regime and Welfare Spending 
                                                                             Model 5.5a                                  Model 5.5b 
                                                                              Without                                          With 
                                                                            Interaction                                    Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending                                    0.786**              0.772** 
                 (0.082)             (0.081) 
 
Trade          -0.000      -3.34e-06* 
              (0.000)             (0.000) 
 
FDI                                                                      -2.15e-06*                                      -0.000     
                                                                             (0.000)                                         (0.000)                                                  
 
Political Regime          0.000             -0.001 
                 (0.000)             (0.001) 
 
Trade*Political Regime                        5.40e-07** 
                (0.000) 
 
FDI*Political Regime                                                                                               0.000 
                                                                                                                                 (0.000) 
 
Urbanization          0.000                0.0002* 
                 (0.000)             (0.000) 
  
Dependency          0.011               0.015 
                 (0.012)             (0.013) 
 
Growth           0.000               0.000 
                 (0.000)             (0.000) 
 
Ln GDP per capita         0.003               0.003 
                 (0.003)             (0.003) 
 
Ln population         -0.002*             -0.001 
                 (0.001)              (0.001) 
 
Ln inflation         -0.000              -0.001 
                 (0.001)              (0.001) 
   
Oil shock (70’s)          0.001              0.003 
                 (0.003)              (0.003) 
 
Debt crisis (80’s)          0.001                0.002 
                 (0.002)              (0.002) 
Constant         -0.002              -0.010 
                 (0.037)              (0.039) 
Observations           923                 923 
R-Squared                        0.69                 0.70 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
 
85 
 
   
0
-5
0
-5
0
-4
0
-4
0
-3
0
-3
0
3030
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f T
ra
de
 O
pe
nn
es
s 
 o
n 
W
el
fa
re
 S
pe
nd
in
g
-10 -5 0 5 10
The Authority Characteristics of Political Regimes
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Figure 5.5: Trade Openness, Political Regime Type and Welfare Spending
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Table 5.6: Trade, FDI, Electoral Competition and Welfare Spending 
                                                                                    Model 5.6a                       Model 5.6b 
                                                                             Without                                With 
                                                                                    Interaction                         Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending     0.812**    0.804** 
                       (0.075)                  (0.074) 
 
Trade         -0.000   -5.93e-06** 
                (0.000)             (0.000) 
 
FDI                                                                     -0.000                                -0.000                                  
                                                                           (0.000)                                (0.000) 
 
Electoral Competition       0.000    -0.000 
               (0.000)   (0.000) 
 
Trade*Electoral Competition                    1.26e-07** 
                              (0.000) 
 
FDI*Electoral Competition                                                                                      0.000 
                                                                                                                                  (0.000) 
 
Urbanization      0.000   0.000 
                    (0.000)   (0.000) 
  
Dependency      0.011    0.014 
             (0.013)   (0.014) 
 
Growth      0.000   0.000 
                   (0.000)   (0.000) 
 
Ln GDP per capita    0.003   0.003 
                   (0.003)   (0.003) 
 
Ln population                  -0.001   -0.000 
                   (0.001)   (0.001) 
 
Ln inflation                  -0.001   -0.001 
                   (0.001)   (0.001) 
   
Oil shock (70’s)                   0.002   0.003 
                   (0.003)   (0.003) 
 
Debt crisis (80’s)                   0.002   0.002 
                   (0.002)   (0.002) 
Constant                  -0.018   -0.015 
                   (0.036)   (0.035) 
Observations                   946         946 
R-Squared                   0.70   0.70 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
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Figure 5.6: Trade Openness, Electoral Competition and Welfare Spending
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Table 5.7: Trade, FDI, Voter Turnout and Welfare Spending 
                                                                           Model 5.7a                                  Model 5.7b 
                                                                            Without                                           With 
                                                                           Interaction                                    Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending         0.809**    0.802** 
                 (0.076)             (0.076) 
 
Trade          -0.000    -4.13e-06** 
                    (0.000)    (0.000) 
 
FDI                                                                       -0.000                                          -0.000 
                                                                             (0.000)                                         (0.000) 
                                                                            
Voter Turnout          0.000    -0.000 
          (0.000)    (0.000) 
 
Trade*Voter Turnout         1.04e-07*  
                          (0.000) 
 
FDI*Voter Turnout                                                                                                    0.000  
                                                                                                                                  (0.000) 
 
Urbanization                      0.000     0.000  
         (0.000)                 (0.000)  
 
Dependency         0.015    0.017 
         (0.014)                (0.015) 
 
Growth          0.000                 0.000 
         (0.000)                (0.000) 
 
Ln GDP per capita        0.003    0.003 
           (0.003)                (0.003) 
 
Ln population        -0.001               -0.000 
         (0.001)                     (0.001)  
 
Ln inflation        -0.000                 -0.001 
         (0.001)                    (0.001)   
 
Oil shock (70’s)                      0.002    0.003 
         (0.003)                (0.003) 
 
Debt crisis (80’s)         0.002    0.002 
         (0.002)                (0.002) 
Constant        -0.022               -0.021 
         (0.036)              (0.036) 
Observations                        946    946 
R-Squared          0.70                 0.70 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5% 
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Figure 5.7: Trade Openness, Voter Turnout and Welfare Spending
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Table 5.8: Trade, FDI, Domestic Political Institutions and Welfare Spending 
                                                                             Model 5.8a                                 Model 5.8b 
                                                                               Without                                         With 
                                                                             Interaction                                  Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending           0.786**        0.775** 
       (0.082)   (0.135) 
 
Trade           -0.000   -2.08e-06* 
                     (0.000)   (0.000) 
 
FDI                                                                        -2.14e-06*                                  -0.000 
                                                                               (0.000)                                       (0.000) 
 
Domestic Political Institution         0.001   -0.006 
                     (0.002)   (0.004) 
 
Trade*Domestic                          3.20e-06** 
Political Institution                       (0.000) 
 
FDI*Domestic                           -0.000 
Political Institution                                                  (0.000) 
 
 
Urbanization                        0.000      0.00014*  
           (0.000)   (0.000)  
 
Dependency           0.013    0.015 
           (0.012)   (0.013) 
 
Growth            0.000                 0.000 
          (0.000)                (0.000) 
 
Ln GDP per capita         0.003    0.003 
            (0.003)   (0.003) 
 
Ln population         -0.002**   -0.000   
                                                  (0.001)   (0.001)  
 
Ln inflation         -0.001   -0.001 
         (0.001)                 (0.001) 
   
Oil shock (70’s)         0.001     0.002 
         (0.003)   (0.003) 
 
Debt crisis (80’s)         0.001     0.001 
         (0.002)                (0.002) 
Constant       -0.002    -0.012 
        (0.037)   (0.040) 
Observations                                                  923      923 
R-Squared                      0.70      0.70 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
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Figure 5.8: Trade Openess, Institutions and Welfare Spending
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Chapter 6 
The Distribution of Welfare Compensation: Globalization, Political 
Affiliation and Social Policy 
 
 The previous chapter presented evidence that the political institutional 
environment that shapes the incentives and preferences of policy makers who make social 
policy averts globalization’s natural proclivity to retrench the welfare state. Domestic 
political actors such as labor unions and political parties shape the distribution of states’ 
social policy. Do the political and ideological preferences of these actors also apply the 
brakes to globalization’s ‘race to the bottom’ effect on social spending?  The discussion 
that follows addresses this question. 
 
6.1. Labor Unions and Social Generosity 
 Recent scholarship contends that globalization’s effect on states’ social spending 
is conditional on the relative strength of organized labor. It is argued that the power of 
organized labor is displayed when it exerts pressure on governments to increase welfare 
spending by effectively lobbying the WTO to link labor standards to free trade 
agreements (Hughes and Wilkinson, 1998, Wachtel, 1998, Wet, 1995, Wilkinson and 
Hughes, 2000). The discussion in chapter 2 generated hypothesis 6, which stated: 
Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase in 
welfare spending when labor unions are strong.   
 Yet, as discussed in chapter 2, other scholars challenge this notion arguing instead 
that global economic integration has weakened the power of organized labor to influence 
states’ welfare policies. Organized labor’s weakened position is a function of the fact that 
the labor movements in many countries have been transformed from being militant 
organizations that once pressed for the rights of the working class, to being co-opted into 
the free market priorities of transnational capitalism and increasingly see themselves as 
partners to corporate capital no longer willing to press the state for welfare benefits (Gray, 
2008, Gray, 2007). These counter-arguments generated hypothesis 7, which stated: 
Increasing levels of global economic integration is not associated with an increase in 
welfare spending regardless of the strength of labor unions.  
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 Table 6.1 presents the findings of the interactive effect of economic globalization 
and labor unions on welfare spending. Model 6.1a presents the results with the main 
explanatory variables - economic globalization and labor unions – without the interaction 
term. And model 6.1b presents the main results with the interaction term.  
 
[Table 6.1 about here] 
 
 The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 6.1a 
and 6.1b are consistent with theoretical predictions that are reported in the findings of 
previous research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent variable) are 
positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. Urbanization, economic 
growth, population, inflation and the debt crisis of the 1980s are all negatively associated 
with welfare spending. Higher levels of economic development are positively associated 
with welfare spending. The ratio of countries’ young and old dependents and the oil 
shocks of the 1970s fail to reach statistical significance.  
 In model 6.1a, economic globalization and organized labor are positively 
associated with welfare spending. While model 6.1b shows that both economic 
globalization and organized labor (the constitutive elements of the interaction term) are 
positively associated with welfare spending, the coefficient on the interaction term – 
Economic Globalization*Labor Power – has no statistically significant effect on welfare 
spending, which support hypothesis 7. In other words, this suggest that organized labor’s 
effect on states’ welfare spending is not through the forces of global economic integration. 
This finding lends support to the argument that economic globalization may have 
weakened and co-opted labor to support the priorities of transnational capital. 
 
6.2. Party Ideology and Social Generosity 
 Social democratic theories contend that economic globalization’s effect on social 
spending is conditional on the nature of party politics. Governments led by leftist or 
centrist political parties are more likely to support robust welfare policies than 
governments led by parties to the political right (Huber and Stephens, 2001, Stephens, 
2005). In chapter 2, these arguments generated hypothesis 8, which stated: Increasing 
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levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase in welfare spending 
when ruling political parties are on the left. 
 Table 6.2 presents the findings of the interactive effect of economic globalization 
and the ideology of ruling parties on welfare spending. Model 6.2a presents the results 
with the main explanatory variables - economic globalization and the ideology of the 
ruling party – without the interaction term. And model 6.2b presents the main results with 
the interaction term.  
 
[Table 6.2 about here] 
 
 The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 6.2a 
and 6.2b are consistent with the theoretical predictions that are reported in the findings of 
previous research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent variable) are 
positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. Urbanization, economic 
growth, population, inflation, the oil shock of the 1970s (in model 6.2a only) and the debt 
crisis of the 1980s are all negatively associated with welfare spending. Higher levels of 
economic development are positively associated with welfare spending. The ratio of 
countries’ young and old dependents and the oil shocks of the 1970s (in model 6.2b only) 
fail to reach statistical significance.  
 Economic globalization is positively associated with welfare spending in 
models 6.2a and 6.2b. The ideology of the ruling political party is positively associated 
with welfare spending in model 6.2a, but fails to reach statistical significance in model 
6.2b. The coefficient on the interaction term – Economic Globalization*Ruling Party 
Ideology - is positive. In figure 6.2, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of 
economic globalization on welfare spending for meaningful changes in the ideology of 
ruling political parties. And 95% confidence intervals around the line show the conditions 
under which economic globalization has a statistically significant effect on welfare 
spending. Figure 6.2 shows that global economic integration increases welfare spending 
regardless of political parties. While welfare expenditures are not significantly reduced 
under right parties, left parties tend to be more generous in the provision of welfare 
benefits. From this perspective, since social democratic theory predicted that right parties 
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are more likely to slash states’ welfare spending, while left parties are expected to 
significantly increase spending, hypotheses 8 is partially confirmed by the finding. A 
clearer picture emerges when considering this issue from a different vantage point. In 
figure 6.2a, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of the ideology of ruling parties 
on welfare spending for meaningful changes in countries’ integration into the global 
economy. From this perspective, right parties have a reductive effect on welfare spending 
at low levels of global economic integration. However, once left of center parties govern 
and countries’ integration into the global economy exceeds a score of 45 on the KOF 
index, then an ideological movement from the right to the left increases welfare spending. 
 
6.3. Robustness Checks: Alternate Measures of Globalization and Social Spending. 
 As was done in the previous empirical chapters, alternate measures of social 
spending and economic globalization are used to provide additional empirical test for the 
study’s hypotheses. Table 6.3 presents the findings of the interactive effect of labor 
unions and openness to trade and FDI on welfare spending. Model 6.3a presents the 
results with the main explanatory variables - labor unions and openness to trade and FDI 
– without the interaction terms. And model 6.3b presents the main results with the 
interaction terms.  
 
[Table 6.3 about here] 
 
 The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 6.3a 
and 6.3b are also consistent with theoretical predictions that have been reported in 
previous research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent variable) are 
positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. Urbanization, economic 
growth, population, inflation, the oil shock of the 1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s 
are all negatively associated with welfare spending. Consistent with Wagner’s Law, 
higher levels of economic development is positively associated with welfare spending. 
And the ratio of countries’ young and old dependents fails to reach statistical significance.  
 The power of organized labor has a positive effect on welfare spending in model 
6.3a, but interestingly becomes negative in model 6.3b. Openness to trade is negatively 
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associated with welfare spending, in models 6.3a and 6.3b. However, since the coefficient 
on the interaction term – Labor Power*Trade – is positive, this reductive effect 
diminishes, a finding that is consistent with hypothesis 6. In figures 6.3, the sloping line 
indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on welfare spending for meaningful 
changes in the Potential Labor Power index (PLP). And 95% confidence intervals around 
the line show the conditions under which trade openness has a statistically significant 
effect on welfare spending. It can be observed from figure 6.3 that trade openness has a 
significant reductive effect on welfare spending when the power of organized labor on 
the PLP index low. However, this reductive effect diminishes as the power of organized 
labor increases. Once labor power is greater than 10 percentage points on the PLP index 
then openness to international trade no longer has a significant reductive effect on 
welfare spending.  
 While this analysis has shown that the effects on the welfare state that come 
from global economic integration, measured in terms of the KOF globalization index - 
are not conditional on the strength of organized labor, the effects on welfare spending 
that come from openness to international trade are conditional on the power of the labor 
movement. This finding seems to support the argument that organized labor can affect 
welfare policy by attaching labor standards to free trade agreements, which bind 
governments into making concessions for increased welfare benefits.  
 Table 6.4 presents the findings of the interactive effect of party ideology and 
openness to trade and FDI on welfare spending. Model 6.4a presents the results with the 
main explanatory variables – party ideology and openness to trade and FDI – without the 
interaction terms. And model 6.4b presents the main results with the interaction terms.  
 
[Table. 6.4 about here] 
 
 The directions of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 6.4a 
and 6.4b are consistent with the theoretical predictions that are reported in the findings of 
previous research. Again, prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent 
variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. Urbanization, 
economic growth, population, inflation, the oil shock of the 1970s and the debt crisis of 
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the 1980s are all negatively associated with welfare spending. Higher levels of economic 
development and the level of urbanization are positively associated with welfare 
spending. The ratio of countries’ young and old dependents and FDI all fail to reach 
statistical significance. While openness to trade is negatively associated with welfare 
spending in models 6.4a and 6.4b, party ideology fails to reach statistical significance. 
And the interactive terms Party Ideology*Trade and Party Ideology*FDI also fail to reach 
statistical significance, suggesting that these alternative measures of economic 
globalization do not affect states’ welfare spending via the ideology of political parties. 
However, the finding presented in Table 6.2 does show that economic globalization, 
broadly defined and measured by the KOF index, positively affect welfare spending 
through party ideology. 
 
6.4. Summation 
 The results presented in this chapter suggest that political and ideological 
preferences of labor unions and political parties avert globalization’s downward pressure 
on social policy. When organized labor is politically strong, economic globalization, 
measured in terms of openness to trade, will have a positive effect on states’ welfare 
spending. Economic globalization will increase welfare spending regardless of the 
ideology of ruling political parties, although relative to right parties, left parties provide 
more generous welfare benefits. The study’s cross-national empirical findings have 
shown that globalization’s effect on the welfare state is conditional on the nature of 
domestic political institutions and political actors. In the chapters that follow these 
findings are confirmed via the comparative case studies of globalization’s effects on the 
welfare state in South Korea, Chile and Spain. 
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6.5. Tables and Figures 
 
Table 6.1: Economic Globalization, Organized Labor and Welfare Spending 
                                                                           Model 6.1a                                  Model 6.1b 
                                                                             Without                                         With 
                                                                          Interaction                                   Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending    0.003*     0.003**    
             (0.001)              (0.001)   
 
Economic Globalization    0.001**     0.002**   
                (0.000)    (0.000) 
 
Labor Power      0.001**    0.002**   
      (0.000)    (0.000) 
      
Economic Globalization* Labor Power      -0.000  
          (0.000)               
 
Urbanization     -0.001**                                      -0.001** 
      (0.000)    (0.000) 
 
Dependency     -0.002     0.001  
      (0.024)    (0.024)                
 
Growth      -0.005**   -0.005** 
      (0.001)    (0.001) 
 
Ln GDP per capita    0.030**    0.029** 
      (0.006)    (0.006) 
 
Ln population     -0.006**   -0.006** 
      (0.002)    (0.002) 
    
Ln inflation     -0.018**   -0.018**   
      (0.005)    (0.003)  
 
Oil shock (70’s)    -0.013    -0.014 
      (0.007)    (0.007) 
 
Debt crisis (80’s)    -0.013*    -0.014*    
      (0.006)    (0.007)             
Constant     0.249**   0.244**               
                 (0.080)               (0.079)             
Observations      737   737 
R-Squared                  0.31     0.31           
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5% 
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Table 6.2: Economic Globalization, Party Ideology and Welfare Spending 
                                                                            Model 6.2a                                 Model 6.2b 
                                                                             Without                                          With 
                                                                           Interaction                                   Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending   0.002**                  0.002**   
             (0.001)              (0.001)   
 
Economic Globalization   0.002**                0.002** 
                (0.000)    (0.000) 
 
Ruling Party Ideology        0.012**               -0.024   
      (0.004)    (0.013) 
      
Globalization*Ruling Party Ideology      0.001** 
          (0.000)               
 
Urbanization     -0.0005*                                      -0.0005* 
      (0.000)    (0.000) 
 
Dependency     -0.017    -0.013  
      (0.031)    (0.032)                
 
Growth      -0.004**                 -0.004** 
      (0.001)    (0.001) 
 
Ln GDP per capita    0.037**   0.033** 
      (0.008)    (0.008) 
 
Ln population     -0.008**    -0.007** 
      (0.002)    (0.002) 
    
Ln inflation     -0.015**   -0.015**   
      (0.004)    (0.004)  
 
Oil shock (70’s)    -0.013*    -0.011 
      (0.006)    (0.006) 
 
Debt crisis (80’s)    -0.017**    -0.014**   
      (0.004)    (0.004)             
Constant     0.173     0.194**              
                 (0.089)    (0.090)            
Observations      717   717 
R-Squared                  0.34      0.35             
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5% 
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Figure 6.2: Economic Globalization, Party Ideology and Welfare Spending
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Figure 6.2a: Party Ideology, Economic Globalization and Welfare Spending
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Table 6.3: Trade, FDI, Organized Labor and Welfare Spending 
                                                                       Model 10.a                                Model 10.b 
                                                                          Without                                        With 
                                                                       Interaction                                  Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending                             0.003**                                       0.003** 
                                                       (0.001)                (0.001)             
                            
Trade                                                             -0.0005**                                      -0.001**        
                                                                       (0.000)                                          (0.000) 
 
FDI                                                          0.001                              0.002         
                                (0.002)                            (0.002)     
 
Labor Power                                  0.001**                          -0.003**       
                 (0.000)                             (0.000)  
      
Labor Power*Trade                                                                                              0.00009** 
                                                                                                                             (0.000) 
       
 Labor Power*FDI                                                                                               -0.000 
                                                                                                                             (0.000) 
                                                   
Urbanization               -0.001**                                         -0.001**                          
                              (0.000)                 (0.000)               
 
Dependency               -0.005                                  0.014       
                              (0.028)                 (0.029)                              
 
Growth               -0.004**                 -0.005**   
                (0.001)                  (0.001)             
 
Ln GDP per capita                            0.052**                 0.063**   
                (0.007)                 (0.008)              
 
Ln population               -0.014**              -0.009**   
                (0.003)               (0.003)             
    
Ln inflation               -0.023**               -0.025**              
                (0.005)               (0.005)               
 
Oil shock (70’s)               -0.022**               -0.022*                   
                (0.009)              (0.009)             
 
Debt crisis (80’s)               -0.022*                             -0.023**    
                (0.098)                             (0.111)         
Constant                0.244**               0.129                
                   (0.098)                                          (0.111) 
Observations    709                                     709                              
R-Squared                 0.31                    0.33                             
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5% 
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Figure 6.3: Trade, Labor Unions and Welfare Spending
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Table 6.4: Party Ideology, Trade, FDI and Welfare Spending 
                                                                       Model 6.4a                                Model 6.4b 
                                                                          Without                                        With 
                                                                       Interaction                                  Interaction 
Lagged Welfare Spending                                0.003*                                       0.003* 
                                                         (0.010)                (0.001)                  
                     
Trade                                                                -0.0005**                                   -0.0005**        
                                                                         (0.000)                                        (0.000) 
 
FDI                                                             0.000                0.001         
                                   (0.002)                           (0.002)     
 
Ruling Party Ideology                        0.008                           0.007       
                    (0.004)               (0.008)  
      
Party Ideology*Trade                                                                                           0.000 
                                                                                                                             (0.000) 
       
 Party Ideology*FDI                                                                                            -0.005 
                                                                                                                             (0.000) 
                                                   
Urbanization                 -0.0005*                            -0.0004*                          
                                (0.000)                 (0.000)               
 
Dependency                  -0.022                  0.026       
                                (0.030)                (0.030)                              
 
Growth                   -0.004**                -0.004**   
                   (0.001)                (0.001)             
 
Ln GDP per capita                               0.053**                  0.051**   
                   (0.007)                (0.007)              
 
Ln population                  -0.018**             -0.018**   
                   (0.001)               (0.002)             
    
Ln inflation                  -0.024**                -0.024**              
                   (0.004)               (0.004)               
 
Oil shock (70’s)                 -0.023**               -0.022**                   
                   (0.005)              (0.005)             
 
Debt crisis (80’s)                  -0.029**              -0.029**    
                   (0.004)              (0.005)         
Constant                   0.266**              0.281**               
                      (0.087)                                       (0.087) 
Observations       757                                     757                              
R-Squared                    0.31                    0.31                             
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 5%; *significant at 1% 
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Part III 
Economic Globalization and the Welfare 
State in Emerging Economies with Authoritarian Political 
Histories 
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Chapter 7 
Globalization and the Welfare State in South Korea 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The South Korean welfare state has grown over the past forty years from a system 
with limited benefits into a system that is relatively comprehensive. What explains this 
dynamic is the interplay between the variation of South Korea’s global economic 
integration and variation in the nature of its political institutions, which was characterized 
by a transition from authoritarian military rule to democratic governance.  
South Korea’s military regimes used social welfare as an instrument to promote 
economic growth and industrialization. The welfare state under South Korea’s military 
regimes was an ideal portrayal of the developmental use of social policy. The essential 
components of the corporatist consensus of South Korea’s developmental welfare state 
included: trade policies that protected corporate capital from foreign competition; 
corporate capital’s provision of full employment and private welfare benefits to industry 
workers; and labor unions acceptance of limited welfare benefits from the state in 
exchange for full employment of its members (Goodman and White, 1998, p. 17, Wade, 
1990, White, 1988, Woo-Cumings, 1999). This chapter presents a discussion of how the 
pressures of global economic integration and political democratization unraveled this 
consensus making social policy in South Korea increasingly consistent with 
compensatory approaches of the welfare state.  
Many intricacies are associated with the dynamics of South Korea’s welfare state 
making it desirable to present an historical overview of its evolution from 
authoritarianism to democracy. This will comprise the content of the next section, to be 
followed by a discussion of the corporatist consensus of South Korea’s developmental 
welfare state. This is followed by a discussion of the various welfare programs under the 
military regimes and the ways in which these programs were limited in coverage and 
were subordinated to the priorities of industrial development. The next sections discuss 
how the process of economic globalization and democratic governance unraveled the 
consensus of the developmental welfare state and significantly transformed welfare 
policy in South Korea. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the future challenges 
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and the limitations of South Korea’s welfare state in an increasingly integrated global 
economy.   
 
7.2. Historical Overview 
In 1961 a military coup d'état led by Major General Park Chung-hee effectively 
ended the democratic government in South Korea’s Second Republic. After the 
assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1979, popular protest against the military regime 
emerged. These protests reached a climax with the coup d'état led by Chun Doo-hwan 
and the establishment of martial law. In 1980, millions of people protested the military 
regime’s massacre of Gwangju, which killed 207 democratic protesters. As a result of 
these protests, the regime made political concessions for the transition to democracy. 
When the first democratic presidential election was held in 1987, Kim Young-sam and 
Kim Dae-jung, former critics of South Korea’s military regimes, ran against each other 
and split the opposition vote, enabling former general Roh Tae-woo to win the election. 
In 1991, Kim Young-sam’s Unification Democracy Party merged with Roh's ruling 
Democratic Justice Party. And as the candidate of the ruling conservative political party 
he defeated Kim Dae-jung in the 1992 presidential election. The Asian financial crisis in 
1997 and the subsequent collapse of the South Korean economy eroded the electoral 
credibility of the ruling conservative government and in that year ushered into office the 
liberal government of Kim Dae-jung.    
 
7.3. The Corporatist Consensus of the Developmental Welfare State  
South Korea’s military regimes induced agreements on economic and social 
policy among labor unions and corporate capital. There was consensus on the importance 
of protecting the domestic market from international competition. Trade policies 
advantaged domestic firms by encouraging exports and restricting imports. In return, 
domestic firms provided full employment and private welfare benefits to workers in the 
industrial sector (Robinson, 2002, 257, Wiarda, 1997). Labor unions accepted limited 
welfare benefits from the state in exchange for economic growth and stable employment 
(Park, 2008, Song and Hong, 2005).  
Since an expansive welfare state was seen as an obstacle to economic 
 
108 
 
   
development, social spending was restricted and subordinated to the priorities of 
industrial development. The state’s expenditure on education and job training were 
considered as investments in industrial development rather than social welfare (Goodman 
and Peng, 1996, Holliday, 2000, Jones, 1993, Kwon, 2007, Kwon and Holliday, 2007). 
Consequently, expenditures for education and job training accounted for 85-90% of all 
social spending, while expenditures on health and social protection remained at 1% of 
total government spending throughout the 1970s and 1980s (United Nations, 2007). 
Expenditure on education was seen as providing a foundation for transforming South 
Korea from a low-skilled labor-intensive economy to one that produced high value-added 
technologies for export markets. In this regard, welfare benefits were limited to workers 
in the public and industrial sectors that were critical to economic development. The state 
provided generous tax-cuts and investment subsidies to encourage private firms to 
provide health care and social protection benefits to their workers.13
 
 With the exception 
of public pensions for workers in the public sector, private firms and the contributions of 
their workers funded all the social insurance and pension programs (Kwon, 2007, Kwon, 
1999, Kwon et al., 2009). In short, since welfare policy was subordinated to the priorities 
of South Korea’s industrial development, the essential logic of the developmental welfare 
state was largely consistent with efficiency theoretical explanations of states’ welfare 
policies.  
7.4. The Social Policies of the Military Regimes 
The welfare policies of South Korea’s developmental welfare state can be 
categorized into three programs. These include social insurance, which included 
industrial accident insurance, national health insurance, and employment insurance; 
public pensions; and public assistance (Kim, 2007, Kwon, 2007).  
In 1963, the Park Chung-hee regime introduced the industrial accident insurance 
program to promote economic development by facilitating corporate investments in hard 
industry like construction, shipbuilding, and the machine industry. The coverage of the 
                                      
13 The state also drew upon South Korea’s Confusion culture where the provision of welfare was 
the responsibility of the family. See Song, Ho Keun, and Kyung Zoon Hong. (2005) Globalization 
and Social Policy in South Korea. In Globalization and the Future of the Welfare State, edited by 
Miguel Glatzer and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.  
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program was funded by the corporate sector and was restricted to firms that had more 
than 500 employees (Kwon, 2007).  Two years later, the government introduced health 
insurance that only provided coverage for workers in the public sector, private schools 
and those employed in the corporate sector of the economy. The state’s financial 
contribution to health insurance was negligible and limited to funding the cost of 
administering the program. However, since the funding for health insurance came from 
the financial contributions of workers and their employers, coverage was unaffordable for 
the self-employed, small businesses, and rural farmers – the most vulnerable in South 
Korean society (Kim, 2007, Kwon, 2007). Similarly, the government’s unemployment 
insurance program, which provided benefits to workers displaced by temporary 
unemployment was only available to workers in the private sector who were critical to 
the country’s economic development (Kwon, 2007, Kwon, 1999).  
While the social insurance program was used to promote economic development, 
public pensions were designed to consolidate the political support of the military regime 
and consequently was only available to government and military personnel (Song and 
Hong, 2005). By 1988 the military government introduced a national pension program 
(Kim, 2007, Kwon, 2007). And similar to the national health insurance, the national 
pension program was only available to those workers that were critical to South Korea’s 
industrial development (Kwon, 2007, Kwon, 1999). The national pension program was 
also financed by the contributions of industrial workers and private firms (Kim, 2007).  
Public assistance is the only social protection program that was fully funded by 
the military regime. The program provided small amounts of food, condiments, clothing, 
monetary allowance or “consolation money” and subsidized heating costs for the aged. 
However, the program was not universal and was restricted to the elderly whose family 
members were not of a working age (Song and Hong, 2005).  
 
7.5. Political Democratization and Economic Liberalization  
The national protest against the Chun Doo-hwan military regime during the 1980s 
forced the government to make several concessions for the transition to democracy. 
These included the amendment of the constitution, the promotion of basic human rights 
and greater freedoms to political parties, the restoration of presidential elections, the 
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introduction of local autonomy, the promotion of free speech and the extension of 
amnesty to pro-democracy leader, Kim Dae-jung (Han-Gyo-Rae, 1987). In December 
1987, presidential election was restored, and with the election of the conservative 
government led by Kim Young Sam, the first civilian regime in 1993, the government 
embarked on a number of political reforms. The political power of the state was 
decentralized by giving regional jurisdictions more autonomy. The electoral system was 
restructured to increase voter participation in national elections.  
Political democratization was followed by international demands to liberalize 
South Korea’s economy. Major trading partners, like the U.S., pressed the government to 
liberalize South Korea’s trade and investment policies that protected domestic firms from 
foreign competition. In response, the government liberalized its trade policy, which 
effectively ended the protectionist practices of the previous military regimes. Policies that 
protected the domestic market from foreign capital flows were also abandoned, while the 
government’s membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1993 and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996 strengthened 
domestic economic reform and deepened South Korea’s integration into the global 
economy (Yang and Moon, 2005). As a result, trade expansion accounted for over 50% of 
South Korea’s GDP throughout the 1990s. Capital flows into South Korea accounted for 
US$538 million in 1986 and increased to US$1,473 million in 1987. These increases 
continued throughout the 1990s, exceeding US$10,200 million in 1997 (Song and Hong, 
2005).  
 
7.6. The Crisis of the Developmental Welfare State 
The liberalization of the South Korean economy was an abrogation of the 
corporatist consensus of the developmental welfare state that was based on trade 
protection. Domestic firms could no longer rely on the state to protect them from foreign 
competition. In addition, facing increasing competition from foreign multinationals, they 
could no longer afford to provide full employment or private welfare for the industrial 
work force. Foreign competition, especially in labor-intensive industries, increased 
production costs and forced many firms into bankruptcy, which increased unemployment. 
With rising unemployment, labor unions would increasingly look to the state to provide a 
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social safety-net (Song and Hong, 2005, Yang and Moon, 2005).14
The response of the Kim Young Sam government was to reform the existing 
developmental welfare system by incrementally expanding the government’s role in the 
system. The government provided funding for job training, job security grants and 
unemployment compensation through the Employment Insurance Program. Unemployed 
workers from the industrial sector were eligible for unemployment benefits and job 
security grants were given to domestic firms to discourage them from cutting their pay-
rolls. The Employment Insurance Program covered unemployed workers in the private 
sectors and private school teachers. And similar to the welfare policies of the previous 
military regimes, the program was financed by the contributions of workers and their 
employers (Kwon, 2007). The government also expanded the National Pension Program 
to the self-employed and established several task force committees to study reforming 
social insurance, pensions, health, housing, education, public protection and employment. 
The committees included the Welfare Policy Committee for the Disabled and the Medical 
Care Reform Committee, and the Committee for Social Security Policy, which was 
responsible for drafting the Five-Year Welfare Development Plan (Song and Hong, 2005).  
  
While the previous military regimes viewed welfare policy as an instrument for 
industrial development, Kim Young Sam’s conservative democratic government viewed it 
as a mechanism to improve the quality of life as well as an instrument to facilitate 
development (Song and Hong, 2005). However, welfare reform by the Kim Young Sam 
government was never comprehensive or universal in scope. The role of the state in 
welfare reform was restricted to being an organizer of the system, still passing the 
financial burden of welfare to private companies, social and religious organizations and 
individual workers (Koh, 1998). In this respect, the welfare policies of Kim Young Sam’s 
conservative government were fundamentally on the same line with those of the previous 
military regimes. 
 
7.7. The Asian Financial Crisis, the Democratic Left and the IMF 
Attempts at welfare reform collapsed in face of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
                                      
14 Rising unemployment also undermined South Korea’s family welfare system since the 
unemployed could not provide for the needs of the family.  
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The crisis started in Thailand with the financial collapse of the Thai baht, which was 
driven in part by the financial overextension in the real estate market and the country’s 
rising foreign debt. As the crisis spread, most of Southeast Asia saw slumping currencies, 
devalued stock markets and a steep rise in private debt. The financial contagion also 
spread to Northeast Asian countries like South Korea. Indonesia, Thailand and South 
Korea were the countries the most affected by the crisis. The South Korean economy 
experienced negative growth rates of 6.7 percent, unemployment rose to 7 percent in 
1998, then climbing to 8.6 percent in early 1999, and real income plummeted to 9.3% 
(Song and Hong, 2005, Yang and Moon, 2005). 
South Korea’s electorate blamed the conservative government of Kim Young Sam 
for the financial crisis and in the presidential elections in 1997 replaced the government 
with the liberal government of Kim Dae-jung. The new government inherited an 
economy with high levels of debt and depleted foreign exchange reserves. To restore the 
financial stability of the economy the government accepted a short-term stabilization loan 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The economic reforms demanded by the 
IMF included the further liberalization of trade, the privatization of public enterprises, the 
tightening of monetary policy to arrest the depreciation of the currency, increases in the 
interest rate to control inflation, and banking reforms to promote greater transparency, all 
of which furthered the process of liberalizing the South Korean economy (Yang and 
Moon, 2005). Higher interest rates, in the short-term, coupled with the further 
liberalization of the economy undermined domestic investment, increased corporate 
bankruptcies, unemployment, and poverty. The urban poverty rate in South Korea surged 
from 7 percent in 1997 to 21 percent in 1998 (National Statistics Office, 1999, Song and 
Hong, 2005).  
 
7.8. Social Democratic Corporatism and Comprehensive Welfare Reform 
The management of the economic crisis provided the liberal government with the 
opportunity to fundamentally transform welfare policy from one that was largely 
selective and based on industrial development to one that was more universal. In pursuing 
welfare reform, the government attempted to navigate the implementation of two 
conflicting policies: neoliberal economic reform to resolve the financial crisis and social 
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reforms to provide adequate safety-nets to those displaced by the financial crisis. 
Neoliberal economic reform threatened to impede the development of social reform, the 
policy preference of labor unions and the lower classes – the main supporters of the 
liberal government (Song and Hong, 2005). On the other hand, the neoliberal economic 
policies of the IMF were important to stabilize the market to facilitate economic growth.   
In resolving this dilemma, the government forged a social democratic corporatist 
consensus among labor, capital and government regarding the importance of continuing 
the process of integrating South Korea into the global economy, while developing a 
comprehensive welfare system (Katzenstein, 1984, Katzenstein, 1985). The creation of 
the Tripartite Commission in 1998, which included representatives from the government, 
labor unions and private industry were charged with the task developing a viable 
compromise to economic and social reforms (Song and Hong, 2005, Yang and Moon, 
2005). Members of the commission agreed to introduce economic policies that would 
facilitate the process of economic liberalization as well as introduce policies that would 
establish a comprehensive social safety-net to compensate those who are displaced by the 
process of global economic integration (See Table 7.1). Coupled with the political 
preference of the liberal government, the financial crisis expedited the pace of economic 
liberalization and facilitated the transformation of South Korea’s welfare system (Song 
and Hong, 2005). The liberal government, relative to its predecessors, not only 
structurally reformed South Korea’s social policy but also expanded the country’s social 
welfare programs, as indicated in Table 7.2.  
The liberal government extended the coverage of the Employment Insurance 
Program. The program was expanded in four stages. First, to companies with ten or more 
workers in January 1998; then to companies with more than five workers in march 1998; 
and then to all the companies in October 1998; and finally to all the employees including 
temporary workers, part-time workers, and day workers in September 2000 (Gazier and 
Herrera, 2000, Yang and Moon, 2005). The duration of unemployment benefit was also 
extended from 60 to 120 days (Kwon, 2007).  
In 1999, the government significantly expanded the National Pension Program to 
cover the entire population. Farmers, the self-employed and temporary workers were 
excluded from the program in the past because it was difficult to ascertain their income. 
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The reform of the National Pension Program made it possible to determine their income 
by calculating the amount that they would contribute to the program based on the value 
of their homes and cars. (Song and Hong, 2005, Yang and Moon, 2005).  
Coverage under the Industrial Accident Insurance Program was also expanded. In 
the early 1960s, the injury insurance program covered companies with more than 500 
employees. Before the reform, the insurance covered 7.5 million employees in companies 
with more than five workers. Small companies were excluded from the program. 
However, as a result of the reform, the program covered an additional 1.6 million 
employees in small companies with four or fewer workers in 2000. At present, enrollment 
in the program is compulsory for any company with at least one employee. (Yang and 
Moon, 2005).  
A comprehensive National Health Insurance program did not exist in South Korea. 
Different insurance programs administered health insurance. The Industrial Workers’ 
Health Insurance covered 38 percent of the population, the Public Employee Health 
Insurance covered 11 percent of the population, and the Regional Health Insurance 
Program covered 51 percent of the population (Song and Hong, 2005). However, since 
having separate programs administer health insurance proved to be financially inefficient, 
the government successfully integrated these programs into a National Health Insurance 
program with universal coverage (Yang and Moon, 2005). 
In addition to reforming the various social insurance programs, the government 
redesigned the public assistance program and expanded its coverage. With the passage of 
the National Basic Livelihood Security Law in 1998, the government introduced a 
generous and comprehensive public assistance program because the existing program 
only covered people who did not have family members of working age. Consequently, 
many people in poverty were not eligible to receive the benefits. The new program 
allowed for benefits to be extended to the poor without regard to any of the eligibility 
requirements that governed the old program. 15
                                      
15 The previous assistance program excluded people between the age of 18 to 64 and those who 
have family members of working age. However, the new program only required that beneficiaries 
take part in programs such as job training, public work projects or community services if they 
were of working age (Kwon 2007). 
 In addition, the new public assistance 
program provided cash benefits to the poor and the disabled (Kim, 2007, Kwon, 2007).  
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7.9. Limitations and Future Challenges of the Welfare State  
The South Korean welfare system was fundamentally transformed from a system 
with limited benefits to one where benefits have increasingly become universal. For 
example, during 1997 to 2002, social welfare spending increased by 78 percent, health 
care expenditures increased by 120 percent, education expenditures increased by 60 
percent, and social protection expenditures increased by 49 percent (United Nations, 
2007). Thus, the South Korean case lends support to the argument that states’ welfare 
policy is the outcome of the conditional relationship between economic globalization and 
the process of political democratization.  
However, despite its transformation, South Korea’s welfare policy is not without 
limitations. For example, the unemployment insurance program does not cover school 
and college graduates because it is limited to the workers who have been employed for a 
minimum of six months. The National Pension Program is a voluntary rather than a 
mandatory system. In addition, by making the program voluntary the government 
intended to appease the self-employed who saw their contributions to the program as a 
type of quasi-tax. To date, approximately half of these workers have not registered for the 
program (Kim, 2000, pp. 10-11, Lee, 2001, p. 6, Yang and Moon, 2005).  
South Korea’s aging population is a major challenge to the future financial 
sustainability of the welfare state. Demographic aging will increase the demand for social 
protection benefits. While demographic aging is also occurring in other OECD countries, 
the speed and scale of aging is faster in South Korea than other OECD countries. The 
speed of demographic aging in South Korea is also faster than in Japan where for the last 
two decades welfare policies have been adjusted to serve the social needs of the elderly. 
South Korea’s demographic aging is also faster than in France and the United States (see 
Table 7.3). Given this phenomenon, the number of pensioners in the future will increase 
significantly and over burden the pension fund. Similarly, government health care 
expenditures will increase as the number of elderly utilizing health care services increases 
and the quality of medical care that they demand will also become increasingly expensive 
(Kwon, 2007, pp. 8-10).  
 The welfare reforms that were initiated by the liberal government during the 
late 1990s were based on the principle that South Korea’s welfare policies should be 
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socially inclusive, economically developmental and democratically shaped. However, the 
demographic aging of the South Korean society poses the greatest challenge to the future 
financial sustainability of a welfare system that is based on these principles. Will the 
pressures of demographic aging coupled with the pressures of economic globalization 
unravel a welfare system that is socially inclusive and once again place greater emphasis 
on the developmental importance of social policy? This question highlights the 
continuing complexity in studying the dynamics of the welfare state in South Korea. 
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7.10. Tables 
Table 7.1: Key Contents of the Tripartite Commission’s “Social Compromise to 
Overcome the Economic Crisis” 
 
Management transparency 
and corporate restructuring 
 
 
Enhancing labor market 
flexibility 
 
 
Policies to promote 
employment stability and 
combat unemployment 
 
 
 
 
 
Enhancing labor rights 
 
 
 
 
Extension and consolidation 
of the social security system 
Improvement of the corporate financial structure 
More responsible and more transparent corporate governance  
Promotion of business competitiveness 
 
Permission for employers to dismiss workers in cases of 
managerial need 
Permission for the establishment of temporary work agencies 
 
Expansion and improvement of employment insurance 
Livelihood support for the unemployed 
Expansion and improvement of the public employment service 
Expansion of vocational training 
Job creation through public works and business start-up 
subsidies 
Consultation and re-hiring requirements in case of redundancy 
dismissals 
 
Permission for public servants to form workplace associations 
Permission for teachers to join trade unions 
Permission for trade unions to engage in political activities 
Right of dismissed and unemployed workers to join trade 
unions 
 
Integration of social partners in social security steering 
committees 
Wage guarantee in bankruptcy cases 
Extension of social insurance coverage to non-regular workers 
 
 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2000:49) in Yang and Moon 
(2005: 81) 
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Table 7.2: Globalization and Social Spending 
 
Year 
Welfare Expenditure (% of GDP) 
Social 
Insurance 
Welfare 
Service 
Social 
Expenditure 
Chun Doo-hwan Military Government    
1980 0.50 -- -- 
1981 0.50 -- -- 
1982 0.50 -- -- 
1983 0.50 -- -- 
1984 0.80 0.1 -- 
1985 0.20 0.1 -- 
1986 0.20 0.1 2.6 
1987 0.20 0.1 2.6 
Roh Tae-woo Transitional Government    
1988 0.20 0.1 3.2 
1989 0.30 0.1 3.6 
1990 0.80 0.1 3.9 
1991 0.90 0.1 3.8 
1992 1.00 0.1 4.2 
Kim Young-sam Democratic 
Government 
   
1993 0.90 0.2 4.4 
1994 0.90 0.2 4.7 
1995 0.80 0.2 5.1 
1996 0.90 0.2 5.3 
1997 0.90 0.2 6.8 
Kim Dae-jung Democratic Government    
1998 1.02 0.2 6.9 
1999 1.19 0.4 7.2 
2000 1.60 0.5 10.2 
2001 2.00 0.7 n/a 
2002 2.00 0.6 n/a 
Source: National Statistical Office in Song and Hong (2005:183) 
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Table 7.3: The Speed of Demographic Aging 
 Years that the rate of 
elderly population reach to 
Number of years 
when elderly 
increase from 7% to 
14% of the 
population 
Number of years when 
elderly increase from 
14% to 20% of the 
population 
 7% 14% 20% 
      
Korea 2000 2019 2026 19 7 
Japan 1970 1994 2006 24 12 
      
France 1864 1979 2020 115 41 
USA 1942 2013 2028 71 15 
Source: National Statistical Office (2001) in H.J. Kwon (2007) 
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Chapter 8 
Globalization and the Welfare State in Chile 
 
8.1. Introduction 
The welfare state in Chile was transformed from a system with comprehensive 
benefits that was heavily funded by government revenues into one where benefits were 
significantly limited and regulated by market forces. Welfare policy has recently evolved 
into a quasi-comprehensive system in which state subsidies and benefits have been 
expanded but guided by the logic of the private market. Like South Korea, these 
dynamics are largely the result of the interplay between the variation of Chile’s 
integration into the global economy and variation in the nature of its domestic political 
system, which witnessed a transition from democratic governance to authoritarianism and 
then the resumption of democratic practices after sixteen years of military rule.  
This chapter begins with an historical overview and then highlights the ways in 
which Chile’s democratic regimes, while pursuing an industrial strategy that featured 
import-substitution industry (ISI), trade protection and the nationalization of key 
industries, developed a comprehensive welfare state. The chapter then discusses how the 
economic and political crisis of the ISI induced welfare state led to the military coup 
d'état in 1973. The chapter then examines how the economic stabilization and trade 
liberalization policies of the military junta globally integrated the economy and in the 
process replaced Chile’s traditional welfare state with one that featured significantly 
limited benefits that were regulated by the free market. This is followed by a discussion 
of the restoration of democracy in Chile and the creation of a quasi-comprehensive 
welfare state under conditions of greater global economic integration and the political 
dominance of the Concertación regime, which is composed of a ruling coalition of centre-
left political parties. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the future challenges to 
Chile’s welfare state. 
 
8.2. Historical Overview 
Chile achieved independence from Spain in 1811 and by 1932 established an 
electoral democracy that ended in 1973. Throughout much of this period, various 
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governments attempted to reform Chile’s social and economic system by pursuing ISI, 
trade protectionism, expanding the welfare state and statist policies that sought to 
nationalize key industries. These statist policies were instituted following the election of 
Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in 1964. The government acquired 
majority ownership of the copper industry, redistributed land, and expanded access to 
education. Despite these changes Chile’s political left pressed for more radical reforms, 
which in 1970 culminated with the election of Salvador Allende of the Popular Unity 
party. The Allende government accelerated the reforms of the Frei administration by fully 
nationalizing the copper and telecommunication industries and expanded land reform and 
the welfare state. The PDC allied with Chile’s parties on the right to block the legislative 
initiatives of Allende’s Popular Unity government. The ideological gridlock prevented the 
government from addressing the economic depression. Unemployment and inflation 
increased, while international capital flows to Chile plummeted. And as the economy 
continued to deteriorate along with the indecisive outcome of the 1973 Legislative 
elections, the military intervened on September 11 (Collier and Sater, 1996).  
The Chilean military, led by General Augusto Pinochet, deposed the Allende 
government in a violent coup and terminated democratic practices and civil liberties and 
regarded the organized left as an internal enemy of the state. In 1978, General Pinochet 
won a tightly controlled referendum, which institutionalized the junta’s rule. The military 
regime implemented a series of neo-liberal economic reforms that liberalized trade and 
investment, privatized state holdings in the economy, and dismantled the comprehensive 
welfare state. In 1980, General Pinochet won another referendum that approved the new 
Constitution, which called for a plebiscite in 1988. Chileans were given the opportunity 
to reelect Pinochet to another 8-year term or reject him in favor of contested democratic 
elections. The collapse of the economy in 1982 sparked a nationwide protest against the 
military junta, which helped to galvanize opposition to Pinochet’s reelection among 
Chile’s political parties. In the ensuing plebiscite, 55% of the Chilean people rejected 8 
more years of military rule and called for democratic elections in 1989 (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993, Falcoff, 1989). 
Two major coalitions of parties emerged to contest the 1989 elections. These 
included the center-left Coalition of Parties for Democracy, or Concertación, and the 
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center-right Democracy and Progress coalition. Patricio Aylwin, a Christian Democrat 
and the candidate of the Concertación, won the presidency with 55% of the vote and the 
Concertación won majorities in the Chamber of Deputies and among the elected members 
of the Senate. The Concertación coalition has governed Chile continuously since the 
transition to democracy. Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle was elected president in 1993, followed 
by Ricardo Lagos in 1999, and recently Michelle Bachelet in 2005. While the 
Concertación coalition governments maintained the neo-liberal economic policies of the 
Pinochet regime, they have also implemented social programs, although at much reduced 
levels than the Allende era, to reduce poverty and expand access to education and health 
care (Rector, 2005).  
 
8.3. Import-Substitution and the Welfare State 
 From the 1930’s to the mid-1970s, Chile’s import substitution model of industrial 
development, which was promoted by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA) and at that time was adopted by governments throughout Latin 
America, involved the use of discriminatory tariffs, exchange rate controls and tax 
policies to help establish national industries and protect them from overseas competition. 
During this period, Chile’s ISI strategy was intimately connected with its Bismarkian 
social interventions to provide a comprehensive welfare state.  
The logic of ISI was that since developing countries faced a declining terms of 
trade with advanced industrial countries and the infancy of their industries placed them at 
a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis Western transnational firms, Latin American 
countries should reduce their dependence on the global economy by encouraging the 
local production of industrial goods. Protectionist trade policies were, therefore, used to 
help strengthen national firms to the point where they could compete with foreign 
producers (Prebisch, 1959, Prebisch, 1950).  
Chile’s import-competing industries supported trade protection since such policies 
limited foreign competition and produce economic rents for national firms. Since 1838, 
the Sociedad National de Agricultura (SNA), which represented the interests of Chile’s 
landowning agricultural producers, secured legislation that imposed tariffs on agricultural 
imports. And by 1897, the political clout of the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SFF), that 
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represented the interests of Chile’s industrial manufacturers was instrumental to the 
passage of Law 980, which raised tariffs on imported textiles and other manufacturing 
goods (Edwards and Lederman, 1998, pp. 31-32). Labor unions supported trade 
protection since it stabilized the national labor market by allowing domestic firms to 
provide full employment, which in turn strengthens the labor union’s collective 
bargaining power (Barrera and Valenzuela, 1986). At the end of the Allende 
administration, Chile’s import tariffs averaged 105 percent and were highly dispersed 
across a range of imported products where some products were subjected to nominal 
tariffs of more than 700 percent. Moreover, trade was severely constrained by a battery of 
quantitative restrictions. Some of these restrictions included import prohibitions of 
certain products and the maintenance of a multiple exchange rate system, which further 
discouraged imports (Edwards and Lederman, 1998, p. 3).  
The ISI strategy also involved the nationalization of industries, especially foreign 
companies that the state considered crucial to national development. Protectionist trade 
policies were re-enforced by the successive nationalization policies of the Christian 
Democratic and Socialist governments of Edurdo Frei and Salvador Allende. In his state-
of-the-nation address in May 21, 1969, President Frei unveiled plans for the 
“Chileanization” or part ownership of Chile’s copper industry, which culminated in an 
agreement with Anaconda – the American copper company – for the “negotiated and 
progressive” nationalization of the company’s major mines throughout the country. A 
similar agreement was also negotiated with the American owned Kennecott Copper 
Corporation that allowed the government’s share of the companies’ profits to increase 
from 72.6 percent to 91.8 percent (Sobel, 1974, p. 22-24). In explaining his economic 
policies in the months prior to his Presidential inauguration, Allende noted:  
 
“We must recover our basic resources that are in the hands of foreign capital, especially 
American – copper, iron ore, nitrates, which are in your hands, the hands of American 
monopolies. Then we must nationalize the monopolies that influence the social and 
economic development of the country. To this we must add a serious wide-ranging 
profound agrarian reform, the nationalization of banking and state control over foreign 
trade” (Sobel, 1974, p. 33). 
 
And in the first year of Allende’s presidency, the Chilean Congress unanimously 
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approved a constitutional amendment that authorized the president to fully nationalize the 
copper companies of Anaconda, Kennecott and Cerro. All 158 senators and deputies who 
represented every major political party in Chile voted in favor of the reform. Although 60 
percent of Chile’s private banking system had already been nationalized by previous 
administrations, the Allende government accelerated this trend by nationalizing the 
subsidiaries of the Bank of America, the Bank of London and Citibank of New York. The 
government also nationalized the U.S-owned International Telephone & Telegraph 
Corporation (ITT), RCA Victor - the U.S-owned electronic corporation and the assembly 
plants of General Motors Corporation (Sobel, 1974, pp. 50-51; pp. 56-57; p. 79). In 1973, 
at the end of the Allende administration, the state controlled 80 percent of Chile’s 
industrial production, 400 corporate enterprises and approximately 60 percent of the 
country’s GNP (Collier and Sater, 1996, p. 342). 
ISI was also an integral component of Chile’s welfare state. The Allende 
government’s expanded control over the country’s industrial output was correlated with a 
massive increase in social spending. During the period of Chile’s largest nationalization 
initiatives, social spending on health care, education, housing and social assistance, for 
each year form 1970-1973, more than doubled the annual average of the previous four 
years (See Table. 8.1).  
In the 1940’s, White Collar workers from the financial and manufacturing 
industries established their own health care system – the National Medical Services for 
Employees (SERMENA) that established a private provider system with private doctors. 
A limited public health care system was established in 1952, with the creation of the 
National Health Care Service (SNS), which only provided prenatal care and family 
planning. However, by 1971, the Allende government unified the health care systems into 
the Servicio Unico de Salud – a national health care system. The state built a network of 
hospitals and clinics in working class neighborhoods on the outskirts of major cities and 
provided care for every 44,000 inhabitants. The government also established the National 
Milk Plan that provided 3,470,000 persons with a ½ liter of milk a day to reduce 
malnutrition, which affected 50% of Chile’ children in 1970. Spending on education 
increased primary and secondary school enrollments. Primary school enrollment 
increased from an annual average of 34% during the period 1960-70 to 65% in 1971 to 
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1972. Secondary school enrollment also grew at a rate of 18.2% during 1971-72 (Isreal, 
1989, pp. 35-36). While Chile’s state-run Social Security system – the Servicio de Seguro 
Social (SSS) was designed to serve the needs of miners, urban blue-collar and service 
workers, the Allende government extended coverage to informal workers and peasants 
and effectively transformed the social security system into a universal entitlement system 
(Hudson, 1994, Illanes and Riesco, 2007).  
The nationalization initiatives of the state were also used to provide the working 
classes with employment and salary increases as well as empower the labor unions. In 
1970, the Allende government signed an agreement with one of the country’s largest 
unions, the Central Workers Union, which provided for the participation of workers in the 
planning and the administration of state-owned and mixed corporate enterprises, the 
reduction of unemployment by the provision of 180, 000 jobs and the creation of a 
Central Committee on Wages and Salaries to formulate new wage and salary policies. In 
negotiations with the government in 1971 for a new contract, Workers at the 
Chuquicamata copper mines were given a 21.8% pay increase plus a commitment by the 
Allende government to spend $3.7 million dollars during 1972 on social programs for the 
town of Chuquicamata (Sobel, 1974, p. 38; p. 71).   
 
8.4. The Economic and Political Crisis of the Welfare State 
By the early 1970’s, there was growing evidence that Chile’s ISI strategy and the 
welfare state that it supported was financially unsustainable. Social spending per person, 
between 1920 and 1970, increased by 38%, while GNP per capita increased by only 2.3% 
(Arellano, 1985, p. 414). Trade protectionism provided no incentive for domestic firms to 
become efficient, but merely encouraged rent seeking behavior. In addition, the small size 
of the domestic market never allowed domestic firms to reach economies of scale to be 
able to compete in export markets. Consequently, overall industrial production fell even 
among the nationalized industries. And the state’s social policies that increased 
employment and the purchasing power of the working class coupled with the decline in 
industrial production gave rise to black market activities, shortages and inflationary 
pressures, which surpassed 200 percent by 1972. In addition, the falling prices for copper 
(Chile’s main export) and the tripling price for imported oil plunged the balance of 
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payments into deficit, which forced the devaluation of the official exchange rate from 48 
Chilean escudos to the U.S. dollar to 85 escudos to the dollar. And on the black market 
the currency fell from 150 to 300 escudos to the dollar (Collier and Sater, 1996, pp. 345-
346, Hudson, 1994, Isreal, 1989, Sobel, 1974, p. 85).  
The crisis in the macro economy led to a significant decline in tax revenues, 
which severely eroded the state’s ability to finance its increasingly costly social programs. 
As a result of the Allende government’s expansion of the social security system, there 
were 35 different pension funds and more than 150 social security programs for different 
occupational groups. Since the newly incorporated participants of the program secured by 
law new benefits that were denied to original participants (even when the programs of the 
new participants were added to existing pension funds), the social security system 
became inherently unequal and was in financial crisis by 1972. The state’s support for the 
national health care program also became financially unsustainable given the fact that it 
was tied to the social security system (Hudson, 1994, Mesa-Lago, 1989). 
Chile’s economic crisis triggered a political crisis within Allende’s coalition 
government. The Socialist being the largest party within the coalition continued to press 
Allende to accelerate the economic and social policies in Chile’s transition to socialism. 
The PDC members of the coalition gradually shifted to the right and became the most 
important opposition to the Allende government and they actively promoted legislation 
that attempted to reverse the expansive growth of the state’s acquisition of private capital. 
Given the fact that the Allende government expropriated the holding of American 
corporations, opposition also came from the U.S. government. The Nixon administration 
pursued a two-track policy towards Allende’s government. Overtly, the administration 
cut U.S. aid to Chile and blocked Chile’s request for financial assistance from the World 
Bank at a time when Allende’s government needed it the most. Covertly, the Nixon 
administration worked to help destabilize the government by increasing aid to Chile’s 
military and opposition political groups. With the growing economic crisis and political 
polarization within the Allende government, the military junta staged a coup d’état on 
September 11, 1973 (Isreal, 1989, pp. 263-269, Sobel, 1974, pp. 90-91).  
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8.5. Economic Liberalization and the Retrenched Welfare State  
In formulating an economic strategy to arrest the economic crisis the junta relied 
heavily on the advise of the Chicago Boys, a group of Chilean neo-liberal economists 
who were trained at the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman and Arnold 
Harberger. The economic policies that were advocated by the Chicago Boys ended 
decades of ISI development in Chile and the comprehensive welfare state that it induced. 
The junta’s Minister of Finance, in October 1973, stated that Chile’s “best prospects for 
growth are in the opening to international competition” (Méndez, 1979, p. 63-64). The 
junta’s economic policy was based on three objectives: the stabilization of the economy; 
the liberalization of trade; and the privatization of state holdings (Laban and Larrain, 
1995, p. 116, Silva, 1993). 
The stabilization policy involved a two-part strategy. Often referred to as ‘shock 
treatment’, the first part of the stabilization policy sought to eliminate inflationary 
pressures by cutting the fiscal deficit by 25% within the first six months of the military 
dictatorship.16
                                      
16 During this time the junta also replaced the escudo with the peso, with 1 peso = 10, 000 escudos. 
 The reduction of the fiscal deficit involved the retrenchment of public 
sector jobs and across the board cuts in the social programs of the welfare state 
(Friedman, 1975). Second, the stabilization policy also concentrated on arresting the 
balance of payments crisis by securing external financing from international creditors. By 
January 1974, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a stand-by arrangement 
that allowed Chile to borrow U.S$94.8 million over 12 months to overcome the foreign 
exchange deficit of its balance of payments. The Inter-American Development Bank, in 
April of that year, approved a U.S$73.3 million loan to Chile, which was denied to the 
Allende government in 1972. In addition, a syndicate of international commercial banks 
that included Bankers Trust, Irving Trust, and First National City Bank and several 
Canadian banks opened a U.S$170 million line of credit to Chile. In addition, just two 
months after the coup d’état, Manufactures Hanover Trust Co. of New York extended a 
U.S$44 million loan to Chile’s Central Bank and a combination of other American and 
Canadian commercial banks offered Chile additional loans that totaled U.S$150 million. 
For its part, the U.S. government also extended loans totaling U.S$52 million to finance 
Chile’s imports of American corn and wheat (Sobel, 1974, p. 161; p. 173).  
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The junta’s liberalization policy dismantled the Allende government’s 
differentiated tariff structure of rates between 10% and 35%. The objective was to reduce 
tariffs to a uniform rate of 10% by 1979 (Edwards and Lederman, 1998, p. 4). In fact, as 
shown in Table 8.2, the junta successfully implemented its trade reforms by significantly 
reducing tariffs from their 1973 levels to 10% by 1979. However, this pattern was 
temporarily suspended in 1982-83, when Chile experienced its worst economic crisis 
since the 1930s. Table 8.5 shows that during these years the economy recorded negative 
growth rates of -10.3% and -3.8% respectively. In addition to tariff reductions, the junta 
also gradually reduced and eventually eliminated import prohibitions and import licenses, 
which served as non-tariff barriers to trade (see Table 8.3). While trade liberalization was 
incongruent with the rent seeking interests of Chile’s import competing firms, trade 
reforms found strong political support among export-oriented industries that were unable 
to realize economies of scale under ISI. Exporting firms in Chile’s mining and wine 
industries gained from trade liberalization and the export promotion policies of the junta. 
Since trade liberalization lowered the price of imported inputs of production, the reform 
also benefited firms in the construction and transportation industry which participated in 
several industrial strikes against the Allende government that temporarily paralyzed the 
domestic economy during 1970-73 (Campero, 1991, Edwards and Lederman, 1998, p. 
33). 
Three months after the coup d’état the junta implemented its privatization policy 
by announcing that 115 nationalized companies, including 12 that were owned by foreign 
capital would be returned to their former owners. The first of these companies were 4 
U.S-owned motion pictures distributors, the U.S-owned General Tire International and 
Dow Chemical. Chile’s State Development Corporation announced that another 88 
business and industries would also be returned to their former owners because they were 
illegally expropriated by Allende’s Popular Unity government. The junta also signed an 
agreement with General Motor Corporation that effectively returned ownership of the 
nationalized assembly plants back to the company (Sobel, 1974, p. 162; p. 173). On 
December 1974, the junta passed a decree that prohibited the state ownership of 
commercial banks (Edwards and Lederman, 1998, p. 38).  
 The junta’s privatization policies, which also liberalized the capital markets, were 
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reinforced by the repression of labor unions that aligned themselves with the Allende 
government and implemented measures that severely weakened the labor movement. On 
September 18, 1973, the junta issued a decree that banned the presentation of union 
demands and suspended the right of union leaders to use paid working hours to address 
union issues. Other decrees were issued that made it easier for private firms to fire 
workers, including the firing of workers who lead, in what the junta considered an illegal 
strike. The junta implemented measures that suspended previous agreements with unions 
regarding salary increases, benefits and other remunerations to their members. The junta’s 
anti-labor diktat also suspended unions’ rights for collective bargaining and the automatic 
adjustment of pensions to compensate for inflation (Arellano, 1985, p. 415, Barrera and 
Valenzuela, 1986, p. 235-236). Consequently, union membership drastically declined 
from 65% of Chile’s total wage earners in 1973, the last year of the Allende government, 
to less than 20% on average for the entire 1980s (Cortázar, 1997, p. 240). 
 As shown in Table 8.4, the neo-liberal stabilization policies that slashed the fiscal 
deficit achieved their objective by drastically reducing inflation from a high of 605.9% in 
1973 to 21% in 1989, the last year of military rule in Chile. Controlling inflation and the 
stabilization of prices allowed Chile’s industry to achieve greater economies of scale as 
they benefited from the privatization of capital markets and trade liberalization, which 
effectively integrated Chile into the global economy. As a result, Chile’s annual growth 
rates during the years of military rule, with the exception of 1982-83, exceeded the 
growth rates of the previous democratic governments as well as its Latin American 
neighbors and established the economic conditions that have sustained growth into the 
transitional years under democratic rule (see Table 8.5).  
 The success of the junta’s neo-liberal policies in resurrecting the economy came at 
the expense of Chile’s welfare state and ended five decades of continuous social spending 
that was financed by public revenues. As a consequence of the junta’s stabilization 
policies to reduce inflation, social spending as a proportion of GNP was reduced from 
20% in the second half of the 1960s to 14% by the start of the 1980s (See Table 8.6). 
Combined with the junta’s privatization policies, the allocation of education, housing and 
social security was largely determined by market forces with increased participation by 
the private sector.  
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In terms of education reform, the junta drastically reduced expenditures on public 
schools and placed the burden of administering and supporting the education system on 
local municipalities and parents. Between 1980 to1990, government spending on 
education was cut by 27%. Schools that were located in affluent municipalities were able 
to compensate for the shortfall in government funding but schools in poor districts had no 
alternative source of funding (Delannoy, 2000). Instead, in 1981, the junta introduced a 
nationwide school voucher program that gave parents the choice between sending their 
children to private or public schools. The program created a dynamic market for 
education with more than a thousand private schools entering the market for profit, which 
increased private enrollment rate from 20% to 40% by 1988 and exceeded 50% in Chile’s 
urban areas.  However, the market forces that were unleashed by the voucher program did 
not improve education outcomes. Results from the international test scores in math and 
science (TIMSS) in which Chile participated in 1970 and 1999 showed that Chile’s 
ranking, relative to the other 12 countries that participated in those years, worsened 
(Hsieh and Urquiola, 2002). Higher education was also market driven. Under the Allende 
government university tuition had traditionally been free. However, with the reform of 
higher education students were required to pay an enrollment fee. In addition, the level of 
state’s funding to the universities was based on the proportion of students who entered 
universities with the highest scores on the national aptitude test. Universities were forced 
to compete for state funding in their effort to recruit the most qualified students. The 
reform of higher education significantly reduced access to students from working class 
families who could not afford university fees or whose test scores were not competitive to 
be recruited by Chile’s financially strapped universities (Arellano, 1985, pp. 114-116). 
The Allende government established, Servicio Unico de Salud, a national health 
care system by merging SERMENA – the private health care system for white-collar 
workers with SNS – the public system for blue-collar workers. The junta’s reform of 
health care gave participants the option of switching to private health care institutions. 
Eight percent of the participants that switched took with them 40% of the revenues of the 
public health care. While privatization increased the quality of health care for the affluent 
that switched, the access to quality health care service among the remaining low-income 
groups suffered from a sharp decline in state funding (Collier and Sater, 1996, pp. 373-
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374, Laban and Larrain, 1995, 123).  
From the 1950s, the state played a major role in Chile’s low-cost housing 
development and built 60% of the houses between 1960 and 1972. The junta drastically 
slashed public spending on housing to less than half of its 1970 levels, which increased 
Chile’s housing deficit. In addition, the junta also reduced subsidies on housing loans and 
increased the participation of the private sector in the development of new homes and 
municipal buildings. Housing was also allocated to income groups that met certain 
savings goals, which effectively reduced poor families’ access to housing since they 
could not meet the junta’s savings criteria (Hudson, 1994). 
The military junta closed the previously unfunded pay-as-you-go state run 
pension system in which benefits were paid directly from taxes and social security 
contributions. The pay-as-you-go system was replaced by funded personal retirement 
accounts that were administered by private Pension Fund Managing Corporations, often 
referred to as Administradores de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs) (Soto, 2007). Initially, the 
state supervised the pension system and required that assets were deposited in the 
government debt or bank deposits. However, by the mid to late 1980s, pension fund 
assets have increasingly been deposited in private domestic securities and mutual funds 
(Borzutzky, 2003, DuPont, 1996, Kritzer, 1996, Mitchell, 1998). The reform of the 
pension system removed the share of the employer’s contribution to the pension system 
by terminating the social security tax and established a mandatory contribution rate of 
10% of employee’s monthly wages (Borzutzky, 2001, Borzutzky, 2003, Castiglioni, 
2001). The privatization of the pension system also provided for two separate poverty 
safety nets. First, workers who contributed to their personal accounts for at least 20 years 
and who did not accumulate sufficient funds in their accounts to maintain a minimum 
standard of living upon retirement were entitled to a government-financed “top up” 
benefit called the minimum pension guarantee. Second, elders who either fail to 
contribute for 20 years or were never in the system at all were entitled to a PASIS, which 
was a small noncontributory means-tested benefit that was worth half the minimum 
pension (Borzutzky, 2003, Kritzer, 1996, Mitchell, 1998).  
While Chile’s privatized pension system has been hailed as a success and a model 
for pension reform, the new system was limited in its coverage. Before the junta’s 
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privatization, the coverage of the public pension system accounted for 72 percent of the 
population, while the private pension system covered just 60 percent by 2000. The 
problem of coverage is rooted in the structure of Chile’s labor market, which is 
characterized by high levels of self-employment and an informal labor force. Among the 
self-employed, who account for 28 percent of Chile’s labor force, only 4 percent were 
engaged in the new pension system in 2000. Approximately, 1.5 million self-employed 
workers were not enrolled in the system (Borzutzky, 2003, Mideplan, 2000). The 10% 
mandatory employee contribution coupled with the nature of Chile’s labor market 
reduces the incentive for low-wage workers to contribute to the privatized pension 
system. As a result, only a minority from Chile’s labor force makes regular contributions 
to the pension system, which reduces the likelihood that participants will accumulate 
sufficient funds in their personal accounts to maintain a minimum standard of living upon 
retirement. In 2006, projections that were based on the history of worker contributions 
demonstrated that a large share of the pension system’s participants would indeed face 
financial hardship upon retirement. And 45% of participants would also have pensions 
below the minimum pension guarantee threshold and would not have met the level of 
contribution required to qualify for the subsidized government benefit (Solange et al., 
2006). An additional problem with the privatized pension reforms is that the high 
administrative costs, which reduce retirement benefits, also had a negative effect on the 
level of participation in the system. Administrative cost that is paid to pension fund 
managers reduce the rate of benefits from 12.7 percent before the reforms to 7.4 percent 
after their implementation (Kay, 1997).  
 
8.6. Democratic Transition and the Welfare State: Continuity and Change  
 In the 1988 plebiscite the Chilean people voted to reject 8 more years of military 
rule in favor of democratic elections in 1989 that brought the Concertación coalition 
government, led by Patricio Aylwin, to office. The new government continued the neo-
liberalization economic policies of the junta and went even further in the process of 
integrating Chile into the global economy. Immediately upon taking office, the Aylwin 
government reduced the uniform tariff from 15% to 11% in 1991. Unilaterally reduced, 
even further, the uniform tariff from 11% to 6% from 1999 to 2003 (Bravo-Ortega, 2006, 
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p. 11; p. 13). And from 1997 to 2009, various Concertación administrations have also 
extended trade liberalization by negotiating a series of bilateral and multilateral free trade 
agreements. Currently, Chile has signed 13 Free Trade Agreements, two Free Trade 
association agreements with MERCOSUR and the European Union and five Economic 
Complementation Agreements17
However, while continuing and in some respects deepening the free market 
policies inherited from the military junta, the Aylwin government also implemented 
changes in Chile’s social welfare policies. In terms of education the government 
expanded spending for elementary, secondary and post-secondary schools. Table 8.8 
shows that public expenditure on education increased from U.S $940.3 million in 1990 to 
U.S $3017.7 million in 2001. Moreover, pubic spending per student in primary, 
secondary and post-secondary schools almost tripled the amounts spent from 1990 to 
2002. Consequently, relative to the years under military rule, working class children have 
greater access to public education. The dropout rate among children from low income 
families have been reduced from 4%, for the first half of the 1990s, to 2% in 1997 (Cox, 
2004, p. 5). There was also a marked improvement in the learning performance among 
schools with different systems (municipal schools or government subsidized private 
schools) and these improvements were not biased in favor of private schools. The 
improvement in learning performance, access and retention rates among low-income 
children were also a result of the expansion and improved forms of social assistance. The 
expansion in government funded social assistance included food, health care, school-
materials supply and grant programs. The main support for primary education came in the 
form of school meals and health care. In 2003, 867,589 primary students received school 
lunches, while another 100,415 received eyeglasses and hearing aids (Cox, 2004, p. 7; pp. 
12-17).  
 (See Table 8.7). 
In terms of housing, the government continued the practices of the junta by 
allowing private sector participation in the construction of new homes but increased 
public spending on housing by 50%. The government also changed the eligibility 
requirements for public housing programs to benefit low-income families and provided 
                                      
17 These are agreement to establish a framework for negotiations leading to the creation of free tra
de. 
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subsidies to poor neighborhoods to fund utilities. And while the government maintained 
the structure of privatized heath care, it increased funding for the public health care 
portions of the system that largely served the poor, especially primary care services. The 
government increased the salaries of health workers in the public sector and gave more 
authority to local and regional governments over the distribution of equipment and 
health-care resources and provisions (Hudson, 1994). 
The privatized structure of Chile’s pension system was maintained by various 
Concertación administrations. The Aylwin government, however, increased the minimum 
pension that was paid of what remained of the state-run pay-as-you-go system by 30% 
(Hudson, 1994). In 2006, the Concertación government led by Michelle Bachelet moved 
to reform the private pension system to address the problems of coverage and the low 
participation among low income and the self-employed members of the labor force. 
Referred to as the “reform of the reform” became law in 2008 and sought to strengthen 
Chile’s private pension system. The latest reforms created a new and more generous non-
contributory “solidarity pension” that replaces both the means-tested PASIS benefit and 
the minimum pension guarantee that was established by the military junta. In 2012 when 
the reform is fully phased in, elders with family incomes of less than 60% of the national 
average will be eligible for a full solidarity pension provided that they have no 
contributory pension benefit. Under the pension system that was created by the junta, 
low-income workers had little incentive to contribute once they qualified for the 
minimum pension guarantee. Under the new system, every additional income that is 
contributed to the personal accounts will earn an extra return. The reform includes other 
measures that are designed to increase participation in the system. The reforms make 
participation by the self-employed mandatory. This requirement will be phased in over a 
seven-year period. The reforms also seek to boost the participation of young low-income 
workers by paying subsidies to their employers who offer them formal-sector jobs. The 
personal retirement accounts for women will also be supplemented to compensate for 
time spent as non-contributors, while providing child care at home. In addition, the new 
reforms include measures that will reduce the administrative fees that are charged by 
pension fund managers plus measures that will improve competition among AFPs 
(Jackson et al., 2009, pp. 32-33) .  
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8.7. Future Challenges of the Welfare State 
There is tension between the Concertación government’s social welfare initiatives and its 
commitment to deepen Chile’s integration into the global economy. This tension will 
become more pronounced as Chile’s aging population increasingly demand greater 
outlays in social assistance. In addition, since Chile’s economy is deeply integrated into 
the global market, price fluctuations for copper and a prolonged recession in global 
capital markets could undermine the financial viability of public expenditures in 
education, housing and health care as well as threaten pension funds that are increasingly 
invested in overseas capital markets (OECD, 1998, pp. 17-18). While the Concertación 
government, in the context of maintaining its domestic economic neo-liberal agenda, has 
benefited from the sustained growth of the global economy over the last two decades to 
fund Chile’s social programs, the recent collapse of global financial system and the 
subsequent recession in major industrial economies will most likely force the government 
to retrench the quasi nature of the welfare state. 
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8.8. Tables 
Table 8.1: Social Spending During the Allende Government (millions U.S. dollar) 
 
                                    1965-69*        1970         1971         1972   1973 
Health                                      139.4           154.2         211.6        247.8   237.2 
Education                          281.9           362.0         473.2        524.2   354.9 
Housing                          133.7           108.6         229.0        228.3   220.9 
Child Assistance                  0.3               0.7             0.6            0.8             0.7 
Social Assistance                  6.9              7.8              8.4          10.6             5.3 
Social Subsistence                  0.8              1.9              1.5            0.8             0.3 
TOTAL                          562.8          635.2          924.2      1012.6         828.5 
% of total Expenditure+              32.2           28.9            33.5          34.3           21.6 
*Average  
+Excluding debt service expenses  
Source: World Bank, Chile, An Economy in Transition (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 165. 
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Table 8.2: Itinerary of Import Tariff Reductions, 1973-1991 
 
Date                           Maximum         % of Items            Tariff       % of        Average  
                              Tariff Subject to Tariff       Mode      Items         Tariff 
December 31, 1973       220           8.0              90          12.4           94.0 
March 1, 1974                   200           8.2              80    12.3           90.0 
March 27, 1974       160         17.1              70    13.0           80.0 
June 5, 1974                   149         14.4              60    13.0           67.0 
January 16, 1975       120           8.2              55    13.0          52.0 
August 13, 1975         90           1.6              40    20.3          44.0 
February 9, 1976         80           0.5              35    24.0          38.0 
June 7, 1976                     65           0.5              30    21.2          33.0 
December 23, 1976         65           0.5              20    26.2          27.0 
January 8, 1977         55           0.5              20    24.7          24.0 
May 2, 1977                     45           0.6              20    25.8          22.4 
August 29, 1977         35           1.6              20    26.3          19.8 
December 3, 1977         25         22.9              15    37.0          15.7 
June 1, 1978                     25         21.6              10    51.6          13.9 
June 1, 1979                     10         99.5              10    99.5          10.1 
March 23, 1983         20         99.5              20    99.5          20.0 
February 9, 1984         35         99.5              35    99.5          35.0 
March 1, 1985                     30         99.5              30    99.5          30.0 
June 29, 1985                     20         99.5              20    99.5          22.0 
January 5, 1988         15         99.5              15    99.5          15.0 
June 1, 1991                     11        99.5              11    99.5          11.0 
Source: Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo. (1987) Import Liberalization: The Chilean Experience, 
1973-1982. In Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions, edited by J.S 
Valenzuela and A. Valenzuela. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
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Table 8.3: The Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB's) 
 
Instruments                          The Situation in 1973:                       Dates when Relaxed 
                                   The Number of Product            and Eliminated  
                                              Categories Affected   
Import Prohibitions                          187                             August 1976: Down to 6 
products 
                                                                              April 1978: Down to 5 
products 
                                                                              August 1981: All 
eliminated 
   
Prior Deposits*                                 2,872                             January 1974: Wavers 
granted 
                                                                              August 1976: Eliminated 
   
Import Licenses**                       2,278                             January 1974: Eliminated 
Source: Sebastian Edwards, and Daniel Lederman. (1998) The Political Economy of 
Unilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Chile. In NBER Working Paper Series. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, p. 60. 
*Required a 90-day non-interest bearing deposit at the Central Bank, which was 
equivalent to 10% of the value of the imported item. 
**Government approval was required prior to importation. 
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Table 8.4: Chile's Inflation, 1973-89 (% change) 
 
                                                   1973                          605.9 
                                                   1974                          369.2 
                                                   1975                          343.2 
                                                   1976                          197.9 
                                                   1977                            84.2 
                                                   1978                            37.2 
                                                   1979                            38.0 
                                                   1980                            31.2 
                                                   1981                              9.9 
                                                   1982                            20.7 
                                                   1983                            23.1 
                                                   1984                            23.0 
                                                   1985                            26.4 
                                                   1986                            17.4 
                                                   1987                            21.5 
                                                   1988                            12.7 
                                                   1989                            21.4 
Source: Sebastain Edwards and Alejandra Cox Edwards, Monetarism and Liberalism: 
The Chilean Experiment (University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 28; p. 213) 
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Table 8.5: Chile vs. Latin America: Average Annual Growth Rates (percentages), 1965 – 
2008 (Alessandri, Frei, Allende, Pinochet and Concertación Administrations) 
 
              Year                       Chile                  Latin America 
                                            The Alessandri Years 
                  1961                                 4.8                                4.3      
                  1962                                 4.7                                3.5 
                  1963                                 6.3                                7.3 
                  1964                                 2.2                                5.1 
                                                  The Frei Years  
                  1965                         0.8                         4.7 
                  1966                       11.2                               4.5 
                  1967                         3.2                         6.0 
                  1968                               3.6                         7.1 
                  1969                         3.7                         6.8 
                  1970                         2.1                         6.7 
                            The Allende Years  
                  1971                        9.0                        6.8 
                  1972                       -1.2                        7.0 
                  1973                       -5.6                        8.3 
                            The Pinochet Years  
                  1974                        1.0                        7.0 
                  1975                     -12.9                        3.8 
                  1976                        3.5                        5.4 
                  1977                        9.9                               4.8 
                  1978                        8.2                        5.1 
                  1979                        8.3                        6.5 
                  1980                        7.5                        5.9 
                  1981                                 5.3                               1.7 
                  1982                              -10.3                             -1.4 
                  1983                                -3.8                             -2.5   
                  1984                                 8.0                              3.7 
                  1985                                 7.1                              2.6 
                  1986                                 5.6                              4.1 
                  1987                                 6.6                              3.4 
                  1988                                 7.3                              0.5 
                  1989                               10.6                              0.9   
                                           The Concertación Years 
                                             Patricio Aylwin Govt. 
                  1990                                 3.7                              0.3  
                  1991                                 8.0                              4.6 
                  1992                               12.3                              3.9 
                  1993                                 7.0                              3.7 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
141 
 
   
Table 8.5: Chile vs. Latin America: Average Annual Growth Rates (percentages), 1965 – 
2008 (Alessandri, Frei, Allende, Pinochet and Concertación Administrations), (continued) 
 
                                                           Chile                        Latin America 
                                           The Concertación Years 
                                         Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle Govt. 
                  Year  
                  1994                                 5.7                                  4.7 
                  1995                               10.6                                  0.6 
                  1996                                 7.4                                  3.5 
                  1997                                 6.6                                  5.5 
                  1998                                 3.2                                  2.4 
                  1999                                -0.8                                  0.2 
                                               Ricardo Lagos Govt. 
                  2000                                 4.5                                  3.9 
                  2001                                 3.4                                  0.3 
                  2002                                 2.2                                 -0.5 
                  2003                                 3.9                                  2.2 
                  2004                                 6.0                                  6.1 
                  2005                                 5.6                                  4.9 
                                             Michelle Bachelet Govt. 
                  2006                                 4.6                                  5.6 
                  2007                                 4.7                                  5.8 
                  2008                                 3.2                                  4.4 
________________________________________________________________________
______ 
Source: Data for the years 1961-1981 was adapted from Jorge Rodriguez Grossi, ed, 
Perspectivas Economicas Para La Democracia: Balance y lecciones Para La Experiencia 
Chilena (Santiago: Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanisticos, 1984), p. 32. Data for the 
years 1982-2008 was adapted from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 
2009. 
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Table 8.6: Government Social Spending, 1961-1981 (% GDP) 
 
                                                               Alessandri Years 
                                                     1961                               17.0 
                                                     1963                               16.3  
                                                                   Frei Years 
                                                     1965                               20.0 
                                                     1967                               20.1 
                                                     1969                               18.7     
                                                                Allende Years 
                                                     1970                     19.9 
                                                     1971                     25.2 
                                                     1972                     25.8 
                                                                Pinochet Years 
                                                     1974                     17.6 
                                                     1975                               18.3 
                                                     1977                               17.4 
                                                     1979                               15.4 
                                                     1981                               14.3 
Source: Adopted from, Arellano, José-Pablo. (1985) Social Policies in Chile: An Historic
al Review. Journal of Latin American Studies 17:397-418. 
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Table 8.7: Chile: Trade Agreements of the Concertación Government 
 
               Bilateral Free                  Free Trade  Economic Complementation+ 
            Trade Agreements                      Associations                          Agreements 
             1997 - Canada        1996 - MERCOSUR          1993 - Bolivia 
             1998 - Mexico                   2003 - European Union          1993 - Venezuela 
             1999 - Central America                                                      1994 - Colombia 
             2002 - Costa Rica                                    1995 - Ecuador 
             2002 - El Salvador                                    1995 - Peru 
             2004 - EFTA#    
             2004 - U.S    
             2004 - South Korea 
             2006 - Panama    
             2006 - China    
             2007 - India*    
             2007 - Japan    
  2009 - Australia  
* Trade agreement comes with safe guards. 
#EFTA countries include: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
Source: Adopted from McGill University’s Preferential Trade Agreement Database, 
which can be accessed at http://ptas.mcgill.ca 
+Economic Complementation is an agreement to establish a framework for negotiations 
leading to the creation of free trade. Information on these agreements were adopted from, 
Tim Martyn, Complete Guide to Regional Trade Agreements of the Asia-Pacific. The 
Australian APEC Study Center, 2001. 
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Table 8.8: Public Expenditure on Education by various Concertación Administrations; 
Spending per Student, by Level, 1990-2002 
 
 Public Expenditure                                               Ministry of education,    
  on Education                                                             spending per student 
         ($US Million 2001)                                     Each year, by educational level 
  
                                                  (US$ Million 2001)   
  
Year                                                    Primary Secondary    Post-secondary 
1990      940.3                                        231.8    213.8       823.3 
1991    1035.5                                        244.8    216.5     1109.3 
1992    1176.4                                        270.1    270.7     1111.9 
1993    1328.5                                        302.8    296.3     1097.4 
1994    1461.3                                        325.5    324.5     1148.0 
1995    1620.2                                        371.0    396.3     1180.0 
1996    1840.6                                        402.3    441.1     1240.1 
1997    2017.8                                        443.4    494.3     1319.5 
1998    2214.7                                        480.5    546.0     1333.0 
1999    2412.3                                        518.7    550.0     1417.1 
2000    2617.8                                        539.5    609.6    1374.0 
2001    2788.8                                        582.8    623.5    1360.5 
2002    3017.7                                         N/A                 N/A                   N/A 
%Growth in per student spending                    151.4                191.7      63.5 
Source: Cristián Cox. 2004. Innovation and reform to improve the quality of primary 
education: Chile (EFA Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2005, The Quality 
Imperative), p. 34.  
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Chapter 9 
Globalization and the Welfare State in Spain 
 
9.1. Introduction 
From the autocratic regime of Francisco Franco, which pursued an ISI industrial 
strategy that featured protectionist trade policies and where social benefits were 
developmental in nature and limited to workers in the industrial sector, to the Socialist 
government (PSOE) of Manuel Chaves González where social benefits were universal in 
nature but commensurate with the government’s neo-liberal economic strategy, the 
changing nature of Spain’s welfare state is largely correlated with variations in the 
interaction between the country’s integration into the global economy and changes within 
its domestic political system.  
This chapter begins with a brief overview of Spain’s political history and then 
highlights the ways in which the ISI industrial strategy of Franco’s dictatorship, unlike 
Chile’s military regime but similar to South Korea’s military rulers, established a 
developmental welfare state with limited social benefits. The chapter then discusses how 
Franco’s ISI developmental strategy undermined economic growth and precipitated the 
crisis of Spain’s developmental welfare state. The chapter then examines how the 
Stabilization Plan that was adopted by Franco’s regime and continued by the transitional 
government to arrest the country’s economic crisis gradually liberalized the economy, 
while facilitating reforms in Spain’s social welfare policies. This is followed by a 
discussion of how the restoration of democracy, especially during the leadership of the 
PSOE government, deepened Spain’s integration into the global economy, significantly 
expanded the country’s social welfare policies but increasingly tied this expansion to the 
growth of the market economy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how Spain’s 
aging population challenges the future sustainability of the country’s social policies.  
 
9.2. Historical Overview 
Franco and the military participated in a failed coup d'état against the Popular 
Front government, which led to the Spanish civil war from 1936 to 1939. During this 
conflict, Franco emerged as the leader of the Nationalists against the Popular Front 
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government. After winning the civil war with assistance from Hitler’s Germany and 
Mussolini’s Italy, Franco dissolved the Spanish Parliament and established an autocratic 
regime from 1939 until his death in 1975. And during World War II Franco permitted 
Spanish volunteers – the Blue Division – to join the Nazis in the fight against the Soviet 
Bolsheviks on the Eastern Front as re-payment for Germany’s support during the civil 
war. In 1946, the United Nations (UN) imposed diplomatic sanctions against the Franco 
regime for its support of the Axis powers and considered using economic sanctions to 
promote democratization in Spain (Baklanoff, 1978, Harrison, 1985). The post-war 
diplomatic isolation and the threat of economic sanctions strengthened economic 
nationalism as the Franco regime’s control of foreign trade and the adoption of an ISI 
development strategy induced the establishment of a developmental welfare state 
(Anderson, 1970). 
Before his death, Franco declared that Juan Carlos would be his successor as King. 
With this declaration a constitutional monarchy was established in 1977, which oversaw 
the formation of a political confederation by several centrist political parties that led to 
the creation of the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD). In the elections of June 15, 
1977 the UCD received 34.4% of the vote taking 166 of the 350 seats in the Congress of 
Deputies. After 38 years of dictatorship, the transitional UCD led government governed 
in a coalition with rightist and leftist parties in the Congress. The UCD ruled the country 
until its defeat to the PSOE in the 1982 general election in which it received only 6.7% of 
the vote and 11 seats. The party’s conservative electoral base defected and gave their 
support to the newly created alliance between the Democratic Popular Party (PDP) and 
the Popular Alliance (AP). During its tenure in office the PSOE implemented a number 
of neo-liberal economic reforms that set the stage for Spain’s entrance into the European 
Economic Community (EEC). The alliance between the PDP and AP eventually led to 
the establishment of the Peoples Party (PP) - the principal conservative political 
opposition that defeated the PSOE in the 1996 general election.  
 
9.3. Import-Substitution and the Developmental Welfare State 
Spain’s post-war diplomatic isolation and the threat of economic sanctions against 
the Franco regime reinforced the protectionist tradition that characterized Spain’s trade 
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policy since the late 1800s (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 2005, World Bank, 1963). The 
threat of economic sanctions gave impetus to economic nationalism, which created the 
conditions in which the ISI developmental strategy was adopted (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 
1947). The Franco regime established the National Institute of Industry (INI) to give 
incentives to domestic firms to manufacture products that would substitute for imports 
(Anderson, 1970). In addition to high tariffs, import licenses and quotas were frequently 
used to strengthen national firms by restricting competition from foreign importers 
(Anderson, 1970, Baklanoff, 1978).  
Franco’s trade policy was consistent with the logic of ISI development. 
Technological inputs used in domestic industry were imported from behind high trade 
barriers. The regime’s trade policies consisted of a system of multiple exchange rates, the 
importation of industrial inputs, quotas and state-monopolized trade agreements. The 
system of multiple exchange rates not only restricted trade but also severely discouraged 
foreign investment (World Bank, 1963). Imports were limited to technological inputs 
such as raw materials, semi-finished products, machinery and various chemical inputs 
that were critical for domestic industrial production. Thirty-eight percent of Spain’s 
imports between 1960 to 1961 consisted of industrial inputs and sixty-two percent 
consisted of quotas and state-monopolized trade (Baklanoff, 1978). The composition of 
trade from the 1950s to the 1970s, as shown in Table 9.1, largely reflected the economic 
autarchy of the Franco regime, which would prove unsustainable with the onset of the 
near collapse of the economy by the early to mid-1950s.  
Given the developmental nature of Franco’s welfare state, social benefits were 
limited to workers in the industrial sectors (Cousins, 1995, Gibbons, 1999). To encourage 
the worker productivity, the regime introduced compulsory insurance for retirement and 
health care for workers in the industrial sector (See, Table 9.2). In 1942, the regime 
provided Health Insurance for low-income industrial workers and their dependants. In 
1947, the Old Age and Invalid Insurance Program was introduced, which provided old 
age subsidies for disabled and low-income industrial workers who were respectively over 
the age of 60 and 65 years. Private sector firms’ contribution to the program was based on 
a pay-as-you-go system, while public sector firms made contributions via the Regimen de 
Clases Pasivas (RCP). In 1946, health care benefits covered just 30% of population 
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(Cousins, 1995).  
 
9.4. Economic Crisis, Liberalism and the Reform of the Developmental Welfare State 
As a result of the adverse residual effects of the civil war and the failure of 
Franco’s ISI development strategy, Spain was far more economically retarded in 1940s 
than in the previous decade. By the early 1950s, the ISI model proved inadequate to 
generate economic growth. Spain’s per capita GDP was barely 40 percent of the average 
for Western Europe countries. The country experienced high levels of inflation, the 
tripling of consumer prices and negative growth rates in some years. The ISI-induced 
economic crisis, like Allende’s Chile, led to the growth of the black market and rationing 
(Solsten and Meditz, 1988). Moreover, the protectionist trade policies of ISI undermined 
Spain’s technological development and depleted the country’s foreign exchange reserves. 
Such reserves, which were US$58 million in 1958, dropped to US$6 million by mid-
1959. And given the growing demands of the emerging middle class for imported food 
and luxury items coupled with the regime’s restraints on foreign trade, exports collapsed 
and the value of the Spanish peseta fell on the black market, all of which increased the 
country’s balance of payments deficits (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 2005, 184, Solsten and 
Meditz, 1988).  
To pull Spain form the economic crisis, the Franco regime adopted the 
recommendations for liberal economic reforms that were advocated by a group of 
developmental technocrats that included bankers, industrial executives, some academic 
economists and members of the semi-secret Roman Catholic lay organization - Opus Dei 
(Giner, 1986, Moreno, 2001). An important aspect of these reforms called for an overhaul 
of the tax collection system, which increased tax revenues, and coupled with a program 
of monetary and fiscal restraints the public sector, by 1958, were no longer experiencing 
deficits but reported a surplus. In addition, Spain joined the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation 
(OECD) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These institutions 
brought about significant reforms to Spain’s trade policies through a series of initiatives, 
which included the introduction of a single exchange rate regime and the liberalization of 
price controls and trade restrictions (Solsten and Meditz, 1988). In implementing these 
 
149 
 
   
reforms, tariff rates (both nominal and effective) were significantly reduced. The average 
level of tariffs declined by 21 percent from 18.7 percent in 1961 to 15.5 percent in 1970 
(Baklanoff, 1978, Heston et al., 2006).  
The liberal economic reforms allowed the Franco regime to avoid the possibility 
of suspending its debt payments to foreign banks that held Spanish currency, and by the 
end of 1959 Spain’s balance payments showed a US$100-million surplus. The reforms, 
moreover, facilitated a steep increase in foreign direct investment between 1960 and 1974 
that amounted to US$7.6 billion, which later contributed to the growth of the economy by 
an impressive 7 percent from 1962 to 1974 (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 2005, Solsten and 
Meditz, 1988).  
However, the initial effect of these reforms was deflationary and recessionary as 
they significantly deteriorated real incomes and raised unemployment in the first years of 
their implementation. The rise in unemployment and reduced wages led to the emigration 
of approximately 500,000 Spanish workers to other West European countries in search 
for employment. In a country where social policies were limited the negative effects of 
the reforms on the Spanish working class induced a crisis in the developmental welfare 
state. In addition, although the Franco regime outlawed collective bargaining and 
organized labor unions, the frequency of strikes among industrial sector workers 
drastically increased, which in turn triggered the growth of various social movements that 
called for greater democratization and an expansion of the welfare state (Hipsher, 1996, 
Hooper, 1986, Mangen, 2001, Ramon, 1985, Solsten and Meditz, 1988).  
In response to the growing dissatisfaction among the industrial working class, the 
Franco regime sought to modernize Spain’s social policies in an attempt to appease 
striking workers as well as to increase the efficiency of existing social programs. There 
were no attempts to transform Spain’s limited developmental welfare state into one that 
provided universal access to social benefits, which was the standard for most countries in 
Western Europe (Rodriguez, 1993). As shown in Table 9.2, the regime introduced 
unemployment and illness insurance and social security programs that largely targeted 
workers in Spain’s industrial sectors. The provision of social security benefits were based 
on the occupational category of workers and the level of contributions provided by the 
affiliated private and public sector firms (Cousins, 1995, Lieberman, 1982, Rodriguez, 
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1993). In addition, the regime created temporary work programs that were designed to 
provide employment relief from the recessionary effects of the liberal economic reforms 
(Lieberman, 1982, Mangen, 2001). Even with the attempts to modernize social policy, 
welfare spending in Spain remained at 4 percent of GDP throughout the 1960s, which 
was far below the standard of Western European countries (Mangen, 2001). 
 
9.5. The Oil Crisis, the Transitional Centrist and the Developmental Welfare State  
The return to democracy in Spain correlated with the quadrupling of imported oil 
prices. And given the fact the Spain imported 70% of its energy, the oil price shocks of 
the 1970s produced an inflationary effect on economic output. However, since the 
political capital of the centrist government of Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez was largely spent 
on drafting the new constitution and negotiating the terms for the transition to democracy, 
the government failed to implement the necessary economic policies that would help the 
country adjust to the inflationary pressures of the global economy. Consequently, 
industrial productivity plummeted, which was followed by a sharp increase in wages and 
consumer prices. As the economy contracted, Spain experienced a reversal in its 
migration trends due to the economic recession throughout Western Europe as well as an 
increased outflow of labor from the rural areas that sought diminishing job prospects in 
the cities. Together, these factors contributed to the sharp increase in the country’s 
unemployment. The recessionary effects of the oil price shocks and government inaction 
resulted in job losses for 1.5 million workers and by 1982 – the last year of transitional 
government - unemployment stood at 17 percent (Harrison, 1985, Mangen, 2001, Solsten 
and Meditz, 1988).  
  The negotiations between the Suarez government and the political opposition 
produced the - Pactos de la Moncloa (The Moncloa Pacts) in October 1977, which was a 
series of agreements that defined the process of democratization. These agreements 
guaranteed a free press, the right of labor unions to organize, the legalization of political 
parties, the submission of the military to civilian authority, the establishment of local 
government through open elections, and immunity for members of Franco’s regime for 
actions taken during the dictatorship. The creation of a new constitution via a referendum 
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in December 1978 formalized Spain’s transition to democracy (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 
2005).  
The Moncloa Pacts also established the basic structure of Spain’s limited welfare 
state during the transitional period. In terms of welfare reform, the Suarez government 
was similar to the Franco regime in that it sought to improve the efficiency and the 
quality of social services under the existing welfare system by restructuring the 
fragmentary and duplicative ways in which agencies delivered welfare benefits (Mangen, 
2001). But more importantly, the Moncloa Pacts created a framework that guided the 
government’s use of social policy to compensate the industrial working class during the 
economic crisis. In this regard, the government expanded unemployment benefits for 
industrial workers by extending unemployment entitlements from 12 to 18 months 
(McMillion, 1981, OECD, 1984). Health care coverage was also extended to self-
employed professionals and government subsidies were given to private firms as an 
incentive to create industrial jobs (Baklanoff, 1978). However, the Moncloa Pacts 
between the Suarez government and the political opposition made no provision for a 
comprehensive reform of Franco’s developmental welfare state. Such reforms would later 
emerge under conditions of greater political democratization and the deepening of 
Spain’s economic integration into the European community.  
 
9.6. Neo-Liberal Socialists, European Integration and Comprehensive Welfare Reform 
When the PSOE took office in October 1982, the socialist government inherited 
an economy where inflation was running at an annual rate of 16%, the trade deficit stood 
at US$4 billion, the public sector experienced large deficits, and Spain’s foreign 
exchange reserves were nearly depleted. But having secured an absolute majority in both 
houses of the Spanish parliament, the socialist government combined its agenda for 
comprehensive social reform with a neoliberal economic strategy and was able to 
implement unpopular economic adjustment measures that brought the economy back into 
balance (Magone, 2004, Solsten and Meditz, 1988).  
To reduce the public sector deficit, the government brought the debt-ridden social 
security system into better balance. The government passed its pension reform legislation 
in 1985, which involved substantial cuts in benefits and saved US$600 million (Beremo 
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and Gacia-Duran, 1994, p.109). And through a series of privatization initiatives the 
socialist government sought to expand the role of the private sector in the economy. 
These initiatives included the closing of state-run corporations that were unprofitable and 
privatizing others that belonged to the state holding company INT (National Industry 
Institute). In other instances, the government downsized state-owned companies in the 
coal, iron and steel industries. PSOE also passed legislation that ended the state’s 
monopoly of the telecommunications industry and liberalized the energy sector by 
allowing the pipeline network of Repsol – the state owned Oil Company – to be used by 
private competitors. In addition, PSOE slashed corporate taxes by 8 percent to improve 
the competitiveness and profitability of Spanish firms (Polavieja and Richards, 2001, 
Richards, 1999, pp. 167-168). The government also moved quickly to deregulate the 
labor market in order to encourage private investment and make the economy more 
competitive. The uniform structure of wages in an inflationary economy undermined 
corporate investment since the existing rigidity of the labor market restricted the ability 
of private firms to reduce their indebtedness (Beremo and Gacia-Duran, 1994, p. 108).  
The neoliberal economic strategy of the socialist government also included the 
liberalization of trade, which was largely driven by Spain’s entry into the European 
Economic Community (EEC) (Heston, et al., 2006). The PSOE signed the Treaty of 
Accession to the EEC in 1986, which reduced tariffs to zero for imports coming from 
member countries of the EEC (Ferrera, 2005). The “Europeanization” of Spain was 
finalized when the socialist government signed the Maastricht Treaty, which established 
Spain’s membership in the European Monetary Union (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 2005).  
The neoliberal adjustment measures of the PSOE reduced the budget deficit to 5 
percent in 1985. Inflation was reduced to 4.5% in 1987 and the deregulation of the labor 
market contained the growth of real wages below the rate of inflation. Spain's industrial 
output grew at a rate of 5.2% in 1987 and its real GDP registered a growth rate of 5.5 
percent, which was the largest rate of expansion among OECD countries during that year 
(Solsten and Meditz, 1988).  
While the stabilization and growth of the economy provided the PSOE with the 
financial basis to pursue welfare reform, European integration, which required the 
comprehensive expansion of Spain’s social policies to meet European standards, provided 
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the government with an external political motive to extend universal health, education 
and social protection benefits (Guillen and Alvarez, 2001). The passage of the General 
Health Act universalized health care services for all citizens and foreign residents in 
Spain. Health care coverage increased to 99.8 percent of the population in 1991(Almeda 
and Sarasa, 1996). The government also expanded unemployment benefits to 50 percent 
of the unemployed, and social benefits to primary and secondary public education was 
expanded to cover students between 4 and 15 years old. At the university level, the 
provision of government funded scholarships allowed low-income families to have 
greater access to higher education (Moreno and Arriba, 1998).  
The ‘Europeanization’ of Spain brought the country’s social policies closer to the 
European standard (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 2005). During its tenure in office (1980-
1996), the socialist government’s welfare reform expanded overall social spending from 
25 percent of GDP in 1975 to 40 percent in 1996. Social protection spending increased 
from 15.6 percent GDP in 1980 to 20.7 percent in 1990 (Guillen and Alvarez, 2001). The 
government’s spending on pensions also increased from 8.5 percent of GDP in 1982 to 
10.5 percent in 1995 (OECD, 1999), and as Table 9.3 shows, aggregate per capita social 
spending on education, social security and health care increased from US$1,311 in 1975 
to $US2,625 in 1996. 
The Spanish case shows that the transformation of the country’s social policies 
was a function of the interactive and mutually reinforcing process of the political 
transformation of the state and the economic integration into the European community. In 
response to the economic crisis of the 1950s and 1970s, Spain abandoned economic 
nationalism as well as the developmental nature of its social policies and embraced 
economic liberalization and democracy, while constructing a universal welfare state. 
Notwithstanding the attempts by the Franco regime to liberalize the economy during the 
1960s and the 1970s, further liberalization was largely a product of Spain’s membership 
in the EEC, which required not only the consolidation of democracy but also the 
comprehensive reform of the welfare state. 
 
9.7. The Future Challenge to the Welfare State 
 Like most countries in the European Union, Spain’s aging population poses the 
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greatest threat to the future financial viability of the welfare state, especially the pension 
system. Given the fact that the country’s fertility rate is 1.2, which is the lowest in the 
European community, and that 20 percent of the population in 2020 will be over sixty-
five years old, Spain faces a future of extreme demographic aging and soaring retirement 
costs (European Commission, 1998, Moreno, 2001). It is estimated that in countries like 
Spain, Italy, Germany and France the total burden of pension expenditures (if the current 
unfunded pay-as-you-go pension system is left unchanged) is expected to rise to 
approximately 90% of GDP from 2000 to 2050 (Rother et al., 2004). However, with 
fewer workers to cover the rising costs of pensions, Spain’s future pension debt is 
estimated to be 244 percent of GDP by 2050. This is significantly larger than its current 
debt, which is 49.7 percent of GDP that is owed to creditors (Thomas, 2010, p.1).18
 A major overall of the pension system is vital to the financial sustainability of 
Spain’s welfare state. Such reform may entail a combination of various options such as 
establishing private pension accounts, increasing the retirement age or increasing taxes. 
These options, however, will be politically costly for Spain’s policy makers. However, if 
governments lack the political courage to reform how the current pension system is 
funded, then Spain’s mounting pension deficits will decrease future governments’ ability 
to finance social policies because the high interest payments that are accrued from such 
debt will crowd out spending priorities on health care, education and social protection 
programs. 
  
                                      
18 It must be noted that the rise in immigration flows to Spain has merely delayed the impending 
debt crisis of Spain’s pension system. In the short term, since immigrants tend to be young they 
help finance pensions by adding to the ranks of working-age contributors. However, in the long 
term immigrants also grow old, and therefore add to the ranks of retired beneficiaries. 
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9.8. Tables 
Table 9.1: Spain: Composition of Foreign Trade, by Product Categories, 1959 and 1973 
(percentage) 
    Imports        Exports 
       1959 1973 1959 1973 
Food product 7.5 14.1 57.2 29.3 
Raw materials (a)   9.9 3.7 
Semi-Finished Products (b) (a+b)  68.  (a+b)  50.2 21.9 23.1 
Capital Goods    19.3 27.0 3.0 23.2 
Consumer manufactures 4.9 8.7 9.0 20.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Banco Central, Estudio economico (1974:118-19) tables IV-12-13; Banco de 
Bilbao, Informe economico (1973:157) in Baklanoff (1978:69) 
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Table 9.2:  Social Policy of the Developmental Welfare State in Spain: The Franco 
Regime 1939-1975  
 
1939-
1959 
 
1939 
 
 
 
1942 
 
 
Mid-
1940s 
 
 
1960-
1974 
 
1961 
 
 
1963 
 
 
 
1963 
 
1972  
 
 
1970 
 
The Period of Import Substitution Industrialization and Economic 
Decline 
 
Old age subsidy for low income workers over 65 years or for those with                     
disabilities over 60 years – consolidated in 1947 as Old Age and 
Invalidity Insurance Program 
 
Health insurance for low income workers and their dependants 
(coverage 30% of       population in 1946 rising to 44% by 1960) 
 
Mutual Aid Associations (providing benefits for retirement, disability, 
long illness, widows and orphans and hence duplicating the insurance 
programs) 
 
The Period of Liberal Economic Reforms and Economic Growth 
 
Unemployment insurance for affiliates of retirements and illness 
insurance schemes 
 
Basic Law of Social Security – a Bismarckian scheme along 
occupational lines and based on contributions of the affiliates – benefits 
linked to professional and               occupational categories 
 
Non contributive pensions 
 
Reform of social security – members contributions began to be linked 
to real incomes 
 
Reform of education system – mandatory and free of charge 6 to 14 
years, now 16 years 
 
 Source: Gullien (1992) and Cousins (1995) 
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Table 9.3: Spain’s Social Spending Per Capita from 1972 and in 1997 (in constant US $) 
Year Education Social Security Health Total 
1972 152.3 877.2 17.3 1046.8 
1973 160.7 962.3 16.5 1139.5 
1974 159.9 1041.2 18.2 1219.3 
1975 170.3 1121.7 20.0 1311.9 
1976 182.9 1147.0 17.4 1347.2 
1977 214.5 1315.5 18.5 1548.5 
1978 236.1 1487.2 19.1 1742.4 
1979 224.7 1604.3 23.5 1852.5 
1980 235.5 1728.0 19.9 1983.4 
1981 229.2 1748.0 19.4 1996.6 
1982 217.7 2138.2 18.2 2374.1 
1983 195.5 2195.1 18.9 2409.5 
1984 218.3 1694.3 463.5 2376.1 
1985 214.4 1523.1 490.9 2228.4 
1986 n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1987 212.0 1513.3 519.8 2245.1 
1988 242.4 1596.7 551.6 2390.7 
1989 259.0 1697.8 630.0 2586.8 
1990 250.1 1834.3 331.8 2416.2 
1991 233.9 1909.1 304.1 2447.1 
1992 229.7 2027.4 324.7 2581.7 
1993 235.2 2218.6 344.4 2798.2 
1994 226.0 2166.8 328.1 2720.9 
1995 227.5 2140.4 303.4 2671.3 
1996 201.3 2115.9 308.4 2625.5 
1997 192.9 2166.0 319.9 2678.8 
Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics and International Finance Statistics, various years. 
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Chapter 10 
Globalization and the Welfare State: Theoretical and Policy Implications 
 
10.1. Summary of the Main Findings 
The theoretical argument of this study is that economic globalization, by default, 
exerts a downward pressure on the social policies of states largely through the operations 
of transnational corporations. However, since globalization’s effect on social policy is 
conditional on endogenous political forces such as regime type, democratization, 
electoral competition and political participation, its proclivity to retrench the welfare state 
is averted by the preferences of political actors and institutions to expand social spending. 
This argument found consistent empirical support via a series of cross-sectional 
regressions that estimated the interactive effects of economic globalization and various 
measures of domestic political institutions and affiliations for a sample of 120 countries 
from 1970 to 2002.  
 The study’s theoretical argument was also demonstrated in the case study analyses 
of South Korea, Chile and Spain, which are summarized in table 10.1. The extent to 
which the social benefits of the welfare state were limited or comprehensive was 
conditional on the interaction between countries’ external trade policies and the political 
authority characteristics of their governments. The comparative analyses of seven 
regimes in these countries showed that greater democratization, combined with trade and 
financial liberalization in South Korea (under Kim Dae-jung), Chile (under the 
Concertación government) and Spain (under the PSOE), produced welfare policies with 
relatively comprehensive social benefits. Among the democratic regimes only Allende’s 
socialist government in Chile established a comprehensive welfare system that was not 
associated with economic liberalization. Among the three military dictatorships only 
Spain (under Franco) and South Korea (under Park Chung-hee) adopted protectionist 
trade policies that were associated with a limited welfare system. Chile (under Augusto 
Pinochet) being the only exception among the military rulers whose retrenchment of the 
welfare state was associated with greater economic liberalization.  
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Theoretical Implications 
10.2. Implications for Recent Research 
 The findings of this study speak to a larger theoretical debate within the 
comparative public policy literature on economic globalization’s effect on the welfare 
state. Recent empirical research has provided additional support for the efficiency theory 
showing that economic globalization has retrenched the welfare state in developing 
countries by drastically cutting social benefits to the middle classes (Rudra, 2008). Other 
studies have found little evidence of globalization’s retrenchment of the welfare state in 
developed countries like Great Britain, the U.S., Germany and Sweden, despite the best 
efforts of conservative governments led by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher 
(Pierson, 1996, Pierson, 2001). Still other studies have found no evidence of the 
supposedly shrinking welfare state in terms of program design, coverage and government 
funding for maternity leave benefits and child care programs among EU and North 
American welfare states (Henderson and White, 2004).  
The empirical findings of these studies are likely to be artifacts of the limited 
sample size, making it impossible to develop a generalizable theory of the welfare state. 
A major theoretical contribution of this research is that since the empirical support of its 
theory is derived from analyses of 120 developed and developing countries, there is 
greater confidence in the generalizability of this study’s theory of the welfare state. 
However, beyond questions of sample size, the empirical findings of this study may also 
help to make sense of the evidence of recent scholarship.  
The fact that recent research has shown that economic globalization exerts a 
downward pressure on social spending in developing countries should come without 
surprise (Rudra, 2008). Harold Wilensky developed one of the earliest theories of the 
welfare state in which he associated the expansion of the welfare state with industrial 
economic development, suggesting that industrial economies produce strong welfare 
states (Wilensky, 1975). Theoretical insights from the ‘new institutionalism” in political 
science arrive at a similar conclusion. Institutionalists argue that since developed 
countries, far more than those in the developing world, have extensive administrative and 
financial resources to implement social policy, they are more likely to develop expansive 
welfare systems (Heclo, 1974). Not only do these arguments explain the broad social 
 
160 
 
   
policy differences between rich and poor countries, but they also contextualize why 
globalization’s ‘race to the bottom effect’ on social spending would be more acute among 
less affluent countries.  
In light of the findings of this research, globalization’s retrenchment of the 
welfare state in developing countries is also explained by the fact that high levels of 
democratization, electoral competition and political participation – variables that mediate 
globalization’s effect on social spending – are weakly constituted into the political 
landscape of countries in the developing world. Consequently, in the absence of effective 
political institutions, globalization’s proclivity to retrench the welfare state will not be 
averted.  
Moreover, democratization of political institutions in developed countries have 
traditionally reflected and protected the interests of the middle class. In these countries, 
high levels of political participation and electoral competition have largely been driven 
by middle class voters’ concerns about government policies that affect home ownership, 
social security, taxes, health care and the education of their children. It is not surprising 
that in developing countries globalization’s downward pressure on social policy will 
largely disadvantage the middle class because political institutions are not sufficiently 
consolidated to effectively protect their interest.   
 
 
Policy Implications 
10.3. The Future Direction of Social Policy 
While this research has argued that reports of the welfare state’s demise at the 
hand of economic globalization have been greatly exaggerated, the impending crisis of 
the social security system may fundamentally change the design of an important 
component of social policy. For most countries the problems of demographic aging pose 
a serious threat to the financial viability of the social security system, one of the most 
expensive and expansive components of the modern welfare state. Most countries 
administer a pension system that is unfunded. Unfunded pensions are called pay-as-you-
go because current employees pay pension contributions that are not invested on financial 
markets but are immediately disbursed to the current generation of retirees. The pay-as-
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you-go systems can begin paying benefits and expand benefits if the population or 
productivity grows quickly. However, if the size of the contributing population shrinks, 
which is the case with demographic aging, or if productivity declines, which was the case 
with the global financial crisis in 2008, then the system veers into crisis. According to 
recent projections for the U.S by the Social Security board of trustees, the system in 2016 
will begin disbursing more money than it collects, and by 2038 the trust fund will go 
bankrupt (Devroye, 2003, p. 316). 
In an attempt to ‘save’ social security and provide pension benefits for an aging 
population, many countries have made significant changes in the design of the program 
and have replaced their unfunded pay-as-you-go systems with fully funded pension 
systems. With funded systems the pension contributions of the current generation are 
invested in financial markets until the accumulated capital is withdrawn after retirement 
and used as retirement income. Following Chile’s example, Bolivia, El Salvador, and 
Mexico have embraced pension systems where contributions are fully invested in capital 
markets. Other Latin American countries like Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Argentina 
all have mixed systems that feature funded and unfunded pension accounts (Jackson, et 
al., 2009, p. 21). In the U.S., even after the financial crisis in 2008, state governments 
have increasingly invested their pension funds in commodity futures, junk bonds, foreign 
stocks, deeply discounted mortgage-backed securities and margin investing (Williams, 
2010). Given the increasing privatization of social security will increasing global 
economic integration with the potential risk of market failure threaten the future stability 
of social policy? Or will potential financial gains from greater exposure to the market 
compensate for market failure during economic downturns and hence strengthen the 
future financial viability of the welfare state? These questions will be answered as the 
global economy emerges from the current recession. 
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10.4 Table 
Table 10.1: Economic Globalization, Regime Type and Welfare Systems 
  
External                        Regime 
 Trade Policy                   Type 
 
Limited System 
 
Comprehensive 
System 
 
 
Protectionism 
 
Authoritarianism 
Park Chung-hee (Korea) 
Franco (Spain) 
 
 
Democracy 
  Allende (Chile) 
 
 
Economic 
Liberalization 
 
Authoritarianism 
Pinochet (Chile)  
 
Democracy 
 Kim Dae-jung (Korea) 
Concertacion (Chile) 
Socialist (Spain) 
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Appendix 1: Generating Political Institution Index 
The primary purpose of principal components analysis is to detect the main 
structure in the relationships among variables covered with the complex dataset and to 
express the patterns in the structure by emphasizing their similarities and differences 
(Smith, 2002). However, the most important contribution of principal component analysis 
is that this analysis allows us to compress the information in the dataset by reducing the 
number of dimensions of the structure without losing much information on political 
system, once we find the patterns of the structure in the dataset (STATA). Principal 
component analysis finds the underlying factors, which shape the variations in the diverse 
political variables.19
 
 
 
TABLE 1. Unrotated Principal Component Factors of Political Institutions 
Factor Eigenvalues Difference  Proportion Cumulative 
 
Factor1 
 
2.36528       
 
1.85239 
  
0.7884 
 
0.7884 
Factor2 0.51290       0.39107             0.1710 0.9594 
Factor3 0.12182       .  0.0406        1.0000 
 
Political Institution Factor: The first factor principal component analysis detects 
represents the democratization level, which is the best summary of the linear relationship 
among the variables: as we can see in table 1, political institution factor explains 
                                      
19 The correlation between two variables can be showed in a scatterplot. A regression line 
can represent the simplest summary of the linear relationship between the variables. This 
means that the regression line reduced the two variables to one factor, which is actually a 
linear combination of the two component variables. When we extend the two-variable 
case to a multiple-variable case, the basic principles are the same even though the 
calculation becomes more complicated. In a multiple-variable case, we can present the 
relationship as defining a space similar to using a plane in a two-variable example. In a 
three- variable case, a three-dimensional scatterplot can be used, and we could fit a 
regression line through the data. If the variable number is more than three, we are unable 
to illustrate the data in a real space; however, the logic of linear relationship and rotation 
of the axes to the regression line to maximize the variance of the detected factor remains 
the same.  
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approximately 79% of the variation in the domestic institutional variables. If we could 
define a variable, which would approximate the institution factor, then the variable would 
capture the most significant pattern among the political institution variables. As Table 1 
shows, political institution variables have only one significant factor accepting the 
Kaiser’s Criterion20
 
 and Cattell’s scree plot graph (Figure 1). 
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FIGURE: Scree Plot of Eigenvalues after Principal Component Factors of Political 
Institutions 
 
                                      
20 According to the Kaiser criterion, researchers can retain only factors with eigenvalues greater 
than 1. This means we keep factors which extracts at least as much as the equivalent of one 
original variable (Kaiser 1960). It is the one most widely used.  
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Appendix 2: Data Sources, Measurements and Definitions 
 
A. Government Welfare Spending 
Measurement:  
Welfare expenditures as a percentage of central government spending 
Welfare expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
Definition: 
Welfare expenditures include social spending on education, health, and social security 
from 1970 to 2002. The data is government final consumption expenditure by function at 
current prices. (Source: National Accounts Official Country Data21
 
 by United Nations 
Statistics Division) 
B. Economic Globalization 
Measurement:  
Actual flows of trade and investments, and restrictions on trade and capital such as tariff 
rates 
Definition:  
Economic globalization is defined as the long distance flows of goods, capital and 
services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. 
(Dreher 2006; Dreher et al 2008) Economic globalization index ranges between 0 and 
100, where higher values indicate a higher degree of globalization. (Source: KOF Index 
of Globalization) 
 
C. Political Regime Type 
Measurement:  
The polity represents the regime authority by scoring the authority spectrum on a 21-
point scale from consolidated autocracies (-10) to consolidated democracy (+10). 
Definition: 
Polity IV represents “concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in 
governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance.” 
This score expresses a spectrum of domestic regime that spans from fully 
institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed 
anocracies) to fully institutionalized democracies.   
 
D. Electoral Competition 
Measurement:  
The percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential 
elections, The values Ranges from 0 to 100. 
Definition: 
Electoral competition represents the electoral votes shared by smaller parties. This is 
calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes shared by the largest party in 
parliamentary elections or by the party of the candidate who won in presidential elections. 
                                      
21 The database includes details of official national accounts statistics in national currencies as 
provided by the National Statistical Offices. Data is available for most of the countries, and for 
the majority of countries data is available from 1970 up to the year t-1. 
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Theoretically, the value may range from 0 (only one party received 100 % of votes) to 
100 (each voter cast a vote for a distinct party). (Source: Vanhanen Index of 
Democratization)  
 
E. Voter Turnout 
Measurement:  
The percentage of the voters out of the voting age population  
Both Parliamentary and Presidential Elections 
Definition: 
The percentage of the voting age population who actually voted in the election. 
Theoretically, the value may range from 0 (no participation) to 100 (full participation). 
Parliamentary and presidential election data are combined. If both elections occur in the 
same year, then parliamentary data is used. Election data in the previous year is used for 
years without elections. (Original Source: International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistant) 
 
F. Corporate Capital 
Measurement:  
Power of Corporate Capital = Institutional Openness*Economic Freedom  
    Corporate Market Capitalization % GDP 
Definition: 
The denominator measures the capitalization or the market values (as a percentage of 
GDP) of domestically incorporated companies listed on countries’ stock exchanges. The 
numerators’ institutional political freedom is taken from the POLITY index and 
institutional economic freedom is taken from the economic freedom of the world index 
(EFW).  The EFW index measures the consistency of countries institutions and policies 
with economic freedom. The index measures the degree of economic freedom that is 
present in five major areas: 
1. Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises. 
2. Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights. 
3. Access to Sound Money. 
4. Freedom to Trade Internationally. 
5. Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business. 
The POLITY and EFW indices represent the political and economic environment that 
corporations operate. By themselves greater political and economic freedoms may have a 
positive effect on welfare spending. However, it is expected that the effect that these 
freedoms have on welfare spending is diminished as a greater share of countries GDP 
comes under the control of corporate capital as it is increasingly integrated into the global 
economy. 
 
G. Labor Strength 
Measurement:  
Potential Labor Power 
Definition: 
PLP = (Number of skilled workers/number of low skilled workers) x (1/surplus labor 
as % of working-age population) (Source: Rudra, Potential Labor Power, 2002) 
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H. Ruling Party Ideology 
Measurement:  
Chief executive member’s party ideology: right (-1), center oriented (0), and left (1). 
Definition: 
Right parties: conservative, Christian democratic, or rightwing. 
Left parties: communist, socialist, social democratic, or left wing. 
Center parties: centrist or when party position is best described as centrist (e.g. the party 
advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). (Source: the 
primary source of this measure is the party’s name in Wikipedia). 
 
I. Legislative Ideology 
Measurement:  
The largest legislative party ideology: right (-1), center oriented (0), and left (1). 
Definition: 
Right parties: conservative, Christian democratic, or right wing. 
Left parties: communist, socialist, social democratic, or left wing. 
Center parties: centrist or when party position is best described as centrist (e.g. the party 
advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). (Source: the 
primary source of this measure is the party’s name in Wikipedia) 
 
J. Urbanization 
Measurement:  
Urban population as a ratio of total population 
Definition: 
Urbanization is the percentage of population of areas defined as urban in each state out of 
total population. (Source: Index of Power Resources, Vanhanen 2003) 
 
K. Dependency 
Measurement:  
Age-dependency ratio 
Definition:  
“Age-dependency ratio is the number of persons over 60 years old divided by number of 
persons aged 20-59. (Source: Rudra 2002) 
 
L. Growth 
Measurement:  
Growth Rate of Real GDP 
The growth rate of GDP at constant prices, in percent 
Definition: 
The difference in real GDP compared to last year, divided by the real GDP last year, 
multiplied by 100. (Source: United Nations Statistics Divisions). 
 
M. GDP per capita 
Measurement:  
Logged GDP per capita 
Definition: 
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This is the estimate of real GDP per Capita in constant US dollars at base year 2000. 
(Source: Gleditsch-Expanded Trade and GDP Data) 
 
N. Population 
Measurement:  
Logged size of population 
Definition: 
Population, thousand (Source: Penn World Table) 
 
O. Inflation 
Measurement:  
Logged Inflation 
Definition: 
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the 
rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of 
GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. (Source: World 
Development Indicators) 
 
P. Oil Shock 
Measurement:  
Dummy 1970s 
Definition: 
1970s dummy represents world economic crisis due to the oil shocks 
 
Q. Debt Crisis 
Measurement:  
Dummy 1980s 
Definition: 
1980s dummy envisions world economic crisis caused by world debt crisis in 1980s. 
 
R. Proportional Representation 
Measurement:  
The coding for the PR  
(0) Majoritarian or Preferential-vote 
(1) Mixed-member majority or Block vote 
(2) Closed-list-PR 
Definition: 
Following centripetal theory of democratic governance, this variable measures three 
features of an electoral system: (a) district magnitude (M), (b) seat allocation rules 
(majoritarian or proportional), and (c) candidate selection rules. The centripetal ideal type 
is defined by M>1, proportional seat allocation rules, and party-controlled candidate 
selection. This is the closed-list-PR electoral system. Other systems are ranked lower in 
this coding according to their deviation from this ideal type. (Source: Gerring, Thacker, 
and Moreno, Gerring et al 2005) 
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S. Bicameralism 
Measurement:  
Dummy Bicameralism 
“0” if not bicameralism 
“1” if bicameralism 
Definition: 
This variable measures the number of chamber of each country. (Source: Johnson & 
Wallack 2006 , and Comparative Welfare States Data Set, Huber et al. 2004 ) 
 
T. Trade Openness 
Measurement:  
Exports + Imports 
GDP 
Definition: 
This variable measures what percent of a country’s GDP comes from trade. The larger the 
percent, the more open the country’s economy is to international trade. (Source: this 
indicator is adopted from the World Bank’s database World Development Indicators, 
2008). 
 
U. FDI 
Measurement:  
Net Inflows of foreign direct investment that is recorded in the balance of payments 
financial account 
Definition: 
This variable captures inward investment that includes equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital. Data are in percent of GDP. 
(Source: this indicator is adopted from the World Bank’s database World Development 
Indicators, 2008). 
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